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SaxX stated that a cyberattack targeting Danfoss regulatory systems affected around 500 supermarkets in France during the night of October 11 to 12, including Intermarché, Netto, Coopérative U, Market, Monoprix, and Leclerc stores. According to him, the attackers forced the defrosting of equipment, with instructions reaching up to 50 °C. Two stores in Alsace alone reportedly recorded losses of 270,000 euros. Relying on information from a cyber official of a major brand, SaxX indicated that the vulnerability concerned three types of equipment and had been known since July, without clients being informed. Only one of the three types had a patch, which needed to be installed manually by refrigerant technicians, store by store. He added that the connected refrigerators used 3G cards installed by technicians, outside of the network and control of the brand's IT teams. The equipment would have been shut down, and the stores would have switched to manual mode, with a return to operation expected within the day, while the application of the patch would take longer. According to SaxX's analysis, the targeted versions were earlier than version 4. He reminded that Danfoss had fixed an authentication bypass vulnerability in version R4.2 related to passwords generated from the date and time. If these elements were confirmed, he estimated, it would not be a “zero-day” vulnerability, but rather a delay in updating. He also noted that Shodan still listed more than 3,700 Danfoss interfaces accessible from the Internet in August. SaxX said that France seemed to be the only country affected for the moment. He mentioned possible explanations such as the size of the French Danfoss park, a common provider or access channel, or deliberate targeting, while clarifying that nothing was established. He finally reported that his contact feared that other organizations might be more affected, particularly those whose activities relied mainly on frozen products. SaxX also indicated that he intervened at midday on TF1’s newscast to talk about the attack and possible motivations of the state group or hackers. #cyberattaque #sécuritéinformatique #France (translated)

FREE Tipsters Picks announced that they would distribute $5,000 among those who "liked" and reposted the publication. They also stated that they had won a parlay of +$33,306 MXN during the NFL games and mentioned bets with odds of +1565 and +370. https://t.co/i7wPdTR9KG #NFL #Apuestas #Domingo (translated)

The author wrote that Helen McEntee lived 60 miles from the Garvaghy Road and, as the minister responsible, had not met residents there. They contrasted this with British MP Chris Bryant, who they said lived 370 miles away but had met residents, and questioned why the government’s instinct was to do nothing. https://t.co/D45WuyX9nk #Ireland #Politics #Community

The Jacinto Benavente square in Madrid will have a new video surveillance system that will include 12 cameras to combat prostitution and theft, at a cost of 370,000 euros and with a planned installation in the spring. #Videovigilancia #SeguridadCiudadana #Prostitución (translated)

Jacek Fogiel commented on the exchange in which a journalist asked Donald Trump if a base would be established in Poland. Trump reportedly replied that the Poles want it and that it is possible. Fogiel recalled that he supported Karol Nawrocki, who — as he wrote — won with a "crushing majority." He cited the results from the National Electoral Commission from June 2, 2025, after counting votes from 100% of precincts: Nawrocki received 50.89%, while Rafał Trzaskowski received 49.11%. Fogiel pointed out that the difference was 1.78 points, or 370,000 votes out of 21 million, and assessed that Trump did not know whom he was talking about. #Polska #wybory #Trump (translated)

Tallis Gomes stated that R$ 370 billion was traded in one session, almost 3% of the GDP, and that the Ibovespa rose by 7.70%, the biggest daily increase since 2020. He said that this money belonged to pension funds, Treasury Direct investors, and 5 million CPF holders in the stock market. Gomes also wrote that, although wealth was not created in Brasília, the choice of who held positions there defined people's lives. #Ibovespa #Economia #Investimentos (translated)

Marcos Rogério stated that he had been elected governor of Rondônia in the first round, with 537,370 votes, equivalent to 56.86% of the valid votes. He said that, according to his assessment, it was the first time a candidate won a first term as governor of the state in the first round. https://t.co/aKnEkfrXcW #Eleições2023 #Governador #Rondônia (translated)

Dr. Raissa Soares thanked Bahia for the 162,370 votes and said that the voters placed her in first place. She stated that she would now work to bring the state to the top and attributed all honor and glory to God. https://t.co/KJCFsJoFWB #Bahia #Eleições2023 #Gratidão (translated)

The former Turkish Prime Minister Demirel (pictured here with Chancellor Schmidt) in an interview with "Hürriyet" in 2001: "Our workers, who went to Europe from 1961 to 2000, have sent almost 100 billion dollars in savings to their families in Turkey, according to my estimates. With this 100 billion dollars, Turkey was built." #Türkei #Migration #Geschichte (translated)

Fake NV – how a cloned newsroom turned an AI video into a $140 million corruption scandal For two days in September, a website that looked almost indistinguishable from one of Ukraine’s best-known news organisations carried an extraordinary corruption story. It claimed that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau had raided former defence procurement chief Arsen Zhumadilov and discovered more than $140 million in cash packed inside refrigerator boxes. One box supposedly carried the words “For the Servant of the People” – an apparent reference to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s political party. The raid never happened. The photographs and video presented as evidence were fabricated, and the news organisation reporting the story was not the New Voice of Ukraine but a cloned version of it. The episode is a compact example of an increasingly effective disinformation technique. Rather than inventing a new propaganda outlet and trying to build its credibility from scratch, an operator can simply steal the identity of an established newsroom and place fabricated material inside an otherwise convincing copy of its editorial environment. A newsroom copied almost in full The counterfeit site appeared at nvukraine.com, while the authentic New Voice of Ukraine operates at nv.ua and english.nv.ua. Registration records examined by fact-checkers show that the false domain was created on 21 September 2026, two days before the fabricated article appeared. According to NV’s own investigation, the imitation went much further than copying a logo: the operators reproduced the site’s visual design, sections, branding, contact information and genuine editorial material. A snapshot of legitimate NV content from 23 September appears to have been copied onto the counterfeit site, into which the operators inserted a single false article. That article claimed that NABU had searched premises connected to Zhumadilov, who had headed Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency until August, and seized $140 million in cash. The story was published in several languages, including Ukrainian and English, suggesting that the operation was intended not only for Ukraine’s domestic information space but also for foreign audiences following the war and Western support for Kyiv. AI supplied the supposed evidence The false article was supported by a video purportedly showing the money discovered during the raid. NABU said no such search or procedural action had taken place and identified the footage as fabricated using artificial intelligence. Independent fact-checker Lead Stories found no credible Ukrainian or international reporting confirming either the raid or the alleged seizure, while searches of NABU’s own published material produced no evidence supporting the claim. The operation therefore combined two separate forms of synthetic credibility. The AI-generated footage supplied what looked like visual proof, while the cloned NV website supplied institutional proof: an apparently reputable Ukrainian newsroom supposedly confirming that the event had happened. Neither element needed to withstand close scrutiny for long. Together, they only needed to appear credible enough to be copied, quoted and redistributed before the deception was exposed. From a fake Ukrainian source into the Russian information ecosystem On 24 September, the story began moving through large pro-Russian Telegram channels. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications traced early amplification to Golos Mordora, with roughly 149,000 subscribers, and Militarist, with around 277,000. Within less than an hour, other channels including VOBLA, Rossiya Seychas and Ostashko! Vazhnoye were circulating versions of the same claim. It subsequently appeared on X and on Russian-language websites including e-news.su and pressa24.ru. Babel calculated that posts carrying the fabrication had accumulated approximately 370,000 views by the morning of 25 September. The story also moved beyond the Russian-language ecosystem. English-language versions appeared in online communities including Lemmy and Hexbear, while accounts on X shared direct links to the counterfeit NV article. NV later reported that larger Russian media and propaganda outlets, including RIA Novosti, Life, Vesti, Ukraina.ru and Mail.ru, had reproduced or discussed the claim. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and a Kremlin representative involved in contacts with the United States, also shared it on 25 September. This amplification is significant, but it should not be confused with proof of authorship. Publicly available evidence shows how the false story entered and spread through a Russian and pro-Russian information ecosystem. It does not establish which organisation registered the cloned domain, generated the video or directed the operation from the outset. Why copy NV? The operation relied on source laundering. A claim originating directly from a Russian Telegram channel that Ukraine’s defence procurement system had concealed $140 million would immediately carry an obvious political context. A claim apparently uncovered by an established Ukrainian newsroom looks very different. Once the fabricated NV article existed, subsequent accounts could cite what appeared to be an independent Ukrainian source rather than present the allegation as their own. Each repost moved the story another step away from its manufactured origin. The use of an English-language version strengthened that mechanism for audiences outside Ukraine. The underlying narrative was also carefully chosen. Corruption in Ukrainian defence procurement is a genuine subject of public scrutiny and investigative reporting, so the fabricated story did not require audiences to accept an entirely unfamiliar premise. It inserted a false event into a real area of political concern. That mixture of authentic context and fabricated evidence can be more persuasive than a completely invented story because much of the surrounding information feels recognisable. What can – and cannot – be attributed Ukrainian authorities and NV describe the episode as a Russian information operation, and its distribution can be documented extensively across pro-Russian and Russian media channels. The available public evidence, however, does not identify the organisation that created the counterfeit website, nor does it link the operation forensically to a named Russian intelligence service, military unit or state contractor. The most precise description is therefore a Russian-aligned disinformation operation whose fabricated material was systematically amplified through the Russian information ecosystem. That distinction matters. Distribution can be observed directly; command-and-control is harder to establish and should not be inferred without evidence. The newsroom itself becomes the deepfake The most important feature of the operation was not the $140 million figure or even the AI-generated video. It was the counterfeit newsroom surrounding them. The operators copied a real publication, populated it largely with genuine material and inserted a single false story, allowing the fabrication to borrow the accumulated credibility of journalists who had nothing to do with it. This points to a broader evolution in synthetic media. AI can fabricate an image, a voice or a video, but an influence operation can now fabricate something larger: the source that supposedly verified the evidence. In the Fake NV operation, the article, the video and the website reinforced one another, creating not simply a false story but a manufactured chain of credibility. Sources The New Voice of Ukraine — investigation into the cloned website https://english.nv.ua/nation/nv-discovers-fake-copy-of-website-with-planted-story-cites-russian-links-50644601.html The New Voice of Ukraine — Russian amplification of the $140 million fabrication https://english.nv.ua/russia-spreads-fake-140-million-ukraine-corruption-story-during-dmitriev-u-s-talks-50644647.html Lead Stories — independent fact-check https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-story-claims-140-million-found-at-home-of-ukraines-zhumadilov-marked-servant-of-the-people-nv-website-originated-it.html Babel — AI video and distribution analysis https://babel.ua/en/news/130469-a-video-is-sharing-online-about-140-million-found-in-the-possession-of-the-ex-head-of-the-defense-procurement-agency-this-is-an-ai-video-distributed-by-a-clone-of-ukrainian-media Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — initial debunk https://spravdi.org/en/ai-fake-about-140-million-amid-us-talks-how-russians-impose-the-image-of-corrupt-ukraine-on-the-west/ Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — NABU confirmation https://spravdi.org/u-merezhi-poshyryuyut-shi-fejk-pro-nibyto-obshuky-nabu-v-eksgolovy-agencziyi-oboronnyh-zakupivel/ Detector Media — distribution and NABU response https://detector.media/infospace/article/252806/2026-09-25-u-merezhi-pidrobyly-sayt-nv-dlya-poshyrennya-feyku-pro-obshuky-v-eksochilnyka-agentsii-oboronnykh-zakupivel/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode10 #FakeNV #NewVoiceOfUkraine #Ukraine #Russia #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #MediaImpersonation #ClonedMedia #FakeMedia #FakeNews #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #AIVideo #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #CorruptionNarrative #UkraineCorruption #DefenceProcurement #NABU #ArsenZhumadilov #Telegram #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

#Nigeria #US : Dirty Deeds : How Top Nigerian Officials Bought a Piece of America. @PPLAAF identified 284 US properties, collectively worth nearly USD 271 million (roughly 370 billion naira), linked to 61 current and former high-level Nigerian officials https://t.co/fq3EURUogc https://t.co/fT8WgrJ3Na #Nigeria #Corruption #RealEstate #NG #US

Testamenttilahjoitusten kärkkyjät olivat ikuinen riesa myös antiikin Roomassa. Nämä perinnönmetsästäjät (captatores) liehakoivat vanhoja ja lapsettomia perinnön toivossa (mm. Martialis: Epigrammit VI,63). Kristityt olivat erityisen hanakoita kähveltämään perintöjä. Ilmiö nousi niin näkyväksi ongelmaksi, että siihen jouduttiin puuttumaan keisarillisella lailla ja asiasta valittivat jopa kirkkoisät itse. Keisari Valentinianus I sääti vuonna 370 lain, jolla kiellettiin papistoa ja munkkeja hakeutumasta leskien koteihin perintöjen toivossa. Laki mitätöi kaikki lahjoitukset ja testamentit, jotka nämä naiset olivat tehneet heitä lähestyneille kirkonmiehille. #antiikinRooma #perintö #historia

At @iaeaorg conference with ideas from 3700 participants from 181 countries România focused on: * Expansion of our nuclear plant facilities, with plans to double our current capacity in the years ahead * Medical research for children targeted cancer treatment with radioactive https://t.co/wEqV9KSonU #NuclearEnergy #MedicalResearch #Romania #RO