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The account fra🐊 had written that the authors of the GF should have understood that, the previous year, the dances had only worked for Franci Manzini and for the others who opposed her. He added that he was no longer interested in seeing dance performances at the Teatro dell’Opera di Roma, claiming that there were other programs for that. #GF #Televisione #Balletto (translated)

Destination Télé indicated that Louise Montangon had gathered 814,000 viewers on CNEWS at 8 PM the day before, with a peak at 976,000 at 8:46 PM. The account also reported 612,000 viewers for C politique on France 5, 422,000 for BFMTV, and 271,000 for LCI. It cited a statement from Montangon calling on teachers to stop seeing themselves as activists. https://t.co/UrEk2P9Aqj #Télévision #Audience #Média (translated)

Nacho with O recounted that Julio Camejo and Mónica Escobedo talked about the other group based on some videos they had seen. According to what he said, Julio told someone that he was ignoring what had happened and pointed out that, when he had the chance, he reproached him for calling another person "Pimpi"; he added that he didn't care if they got angry. Mónica said she didn't like being told who she could talk to and stated that they were not in sixth grade. #LaGranjaGala #LaGranja #RealityShow #Televisión (translated)

Vaya Vaya questioned whether Mane and Pablo had obtained any benefit that week that would prevent the public from voting for them as pawns in #LaGranjaGala. He also asked if Julio could not be a pawn for having won the recognition for Best Foreman. https://t.co/htBuBRjtgt #LaGranjaGala #RealityShow #Televisión (translated)

Tony had shared an exchange in which Jack noted that Jonathan, after the nomination, had stopped talking, while Marina claimed to be happy about his silence. Tony had added that, in his opinion, more and more people were realizing what Jonathan was like, referring to him with offensive expressions. #GFVIP https://t.co/RkjcPa5APV #GFVIP #RealityShow #Televisione (translated)

The author clarified that he did not want to justify Megan, although he believed they were already perfect and did not need to prove it another hundred times. He added that it was the boys who asked her to try again and argued that Andreas seemed upset, without understanding the reason. The post referred to Big Brother Vip. #gfvip https://t.co/VN19lXsJrt #GFVIP #RealityShow #Televisione (translated)

The user 安吉拉🧚🏻‍♀️✨ in my teoman era wrote that they didn't understand what they were watching and noted that the video seemed to show men and women. They accompanied the comment with the hashtag #amici26. #amici26 https://t.co/WgTGNMu3Ol #amici26 #televisione #realityshow (translated)

The Trump Administration has launched an investigation into the Department of Justice regarding whether the major television networks, after their boycott, violated the antitrust law by suspending coverage of President Donald Trump following a veto against CNN, MS NOW, and Politico. #Trump #MediosDeComunicación #InvestigaciónAntimonopolio (translated)

Babel TV reported that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin had agreed to bring significant amounts of Russian diesel back to the American and global markets, with a temporary lifting of American sanctions. The media presented the drop in fuel prices as the stated goal of the agreement. According to Babel TV, Volodymyr Zelensky had strongly criticized the deal, believing it amounted to a gift to Putin and funding for the war. The media added that Trump had called for the election of a new Ukrainian president capable, in his opinion, of reaching an agreement, and had mentioned Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries. It also indicated that Bernard-Henri Lévy had shown emotion and was very critical on television in response to this diplomatic shift. #Trump #Poutine #Zelensky #Ukraine #Gazole #Diesel #AccordTrumpPoutine #election #BHL #usa #PaixUkraine #Carburant #ÉtatsUnis #Russie #GuerreUkraine #Actualité #BreakingNews #information #Trump #Poutine #Ukraine (translated)

Operation Dark Clark – Russia built a real organisation around a false identity Most influence operations create fake people, fake websites or fake news stories. Operation Dark Clark appears to have gone considerably further: Russian operators built what looked like a functioning research organisation in Latin America, employed real people to produce genuine research and concealed from those employees who was ultimately directing their work. OpenAI disclosed the operation on 8 October after banning a cluster of accounts originating in Russia. The actors used ChatGPT while targeting countries across Latin America, principally to damage Ukraine’s reputation, manipulate domestic political debates and manage a self-described research organisation called the Social Research Center, or SRC. OpenAI assessed Dark Clark as Category Five on the six-level Breakout Scale, the first operation it has disrupted since beginning its influence-operation reporting to reach that level. A front organisation with real employees The SRC presented itself as a research platform studying subjects including Latin America’s relationship with India and the Indian diaspora. OpenAI found more than 60 articles on its website, most of them apparently original rather than plagiarised. Internal reports produced by the Russian operators discussed hiring, dismissals, salary scales, staffing and unfinished research projects, strongly suggesting that the operators controlled the organisation rather than merely collaborating with it. At the centre of the structure was “Mia Clark”, a fictitious identity reportedly used to manage social-media activity and communicate with staff. According to OpenAI, the available evidence indicates that employees working for SRC in Latin America were probably unaware that the organisation was being directed by Russian actors. They interviewed experts, conducted research and wrote papers in what appears to have been good faith. The deception therefore existed primarily at the organisational level: much of the work was real, but the identity and strategic purpose of the institution commissioning it were not. OpenAI This is one reason Dark Clark differs from the familiar model of a troll farm. A reader encountering an SRC paper might be looking at research genuinely written by a Latin American employee based on genuine interviews. The manipulation lies further upstream, in who built the institution, selected its direction and controlled its infrastructure. From forged emails to real events The operation also appears to have attempted something more ambitious than online persuasion: inducing real people to produce events that could later be turned into propaganda. In May 2026, according to the operators’ internal reports, they created an email address impersonating Lima’s regional education authorities and instructed schools to organise activities about Ukraine for a cultural-diversity event. The instructions included references to Stepan Bandera, whose historical legacy remains particularly contentious in Poland and parts of Eastern Europe. The operators claimed that some schools complied, replied to the false address and sent photographs of the events. OpenAI could not independently verify every claim contained in the operators’ reports. It did, however, find Peruvian reporting matching the story, followed by publications in Poland and an English-language outlet in Hungary. Some coverage included comments from a Polish MEP calling for people displaying what he described as anti-Polish attitudes to be declared persona non grata. OpenAI therefore concluded that the fabricated starting point appears to have entered genuine political debate across national borders. The mechanism is unusually effective because the final photographs need not themselves be fabricated. If people can be tricked into staging a real event on the basis of a forged instruction, the operation creates authentic visual evidence of something that was artificially initiated. The same method in Ecuador and Bolivia Dark Clark’s internal reports describe similar efforts elsewhere. In Ecuador, the operators claimed they used a fake education email to encourage schools to stage ceremonies involving President Daniel Noboa and Erik Prince, the former head of Blackwater. Ecuadorian media subsequently covered a matching controversy, and the country’s education minister issued a detailed denial. Other Ecuador-focused material included fabricated audio attributed to Ukraine’s consul and a false television report alleging that Noboa’s government was recruiting Ecuadorians to fight in Ukraine. Local fact-checker Lupa found that the supposed Teleamazonas report had never been broadcast, that images had been taken from Instagram, that the audio was AI-generated and that a company named in a supposed recruitment contract did not exist in Ecuador’s corporate registry. In Bolivia, an internal report described a fake audio recording supposedly made by an employee of state water company EPSAS during anti-government protests. It claimed that water supplies to La Paz would be cut and a state of emergency declared. The allegation produced a fact-check and an official denial. OpenAI says the operators explicitly described their objective as worsening the political crisis surrounding the demonstrations. Possible links to the post-Wagner influence machine Dark Clark did not emerge in a vacuum. The operators repeatedly asked ChatGPT about Politology and La Compania, names associated in previous investigations with the Russian influence apparatus that developed from structures once connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Forbidden Stories and its partners obtained 1,431 pages of internal documents describing a network known as “The Company”, which they reported had grown to almost 100 operatives and was conducting influence projects across roughly 30 Global South countries. Their investigation found that the organisation moved under the supervision of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, after Prigozhin’s death. Its documented budget for ten months of activity in 2024 was approximately €7.3 million. Two older Argentina campaigns claimed in Dark Clark’s internal reports — a false story about Javier Milei buying Cartier collars for his dogs and the staging of anti-Milei graffiti — had already been independently attributed by investigative journalists to Politology/La Compania. That is significant corroboration, but it is not enough to prove that every Dark Clark activity was run by the same organisational structure. AI was the back office, not the mastermind Perhaps the most important finding concerns artificial intelligence itself. In most documented cases, the Russians were not using ChatGPT to generate the propaganda seen by the public. Their principal use was administrative: drafting reports for an unknown superior, summarising operations, translating material and recording the supposed success of campaigns. Those reports also expose a weakness in the operators’ own measurement. OpenAI found instances in which they tried to claim credit for developments they had probably not caused, suggesting that they were not only attempting to manipulate Latin American audiences but also presenting an inflated picture of their effectiveness to whoever was supervising them. Dark Clark nevertheless broke further into the real world than any influence operation OpenAI had previously disrupted. Under the Brookings framework, Category Five means that an operation has escaped its original network and been amplified by high-profile individuals such as politicians. Dark Clark crossed that threshold because fabricated narratives appear to have provoked governmental denials, mainstream reporting and political comment in several countries. Its most important innovation was therefore not a particularly convincing deepfake. It was the construction of a partly genuine institution around a concealed foreign controller. The research could be real. The employees could be real. The interviews could be real. What was false was who they were ultimately working for. Sources OpenAI — Disrupting AI-enabled “false front” operations https://openai.com/index/disrupting-ai-enabled-false-front-operations/ Forbidden Stories — Propaganda Machine: Russia’s foreign influence strategy across three continents https://forbiddenstories.org/propaganda-machine-secret-documents-reveal-russias-foreign-influence-strategy-across-three-continents/ Forbidden Stories — Ghost Journalists, Cash and Kremlin Scripts: Argentina https://forbiddenstories.org/ghost-journalists-cash-and-kremlin-scripts-how-russian-operatives-tried-to-influence-argentinian-media/ openDemocracy — Russian influence operation in Bolivia https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia-bolivia-south-america-putin-evo-morales-wagner-prigozhin-covert-operations-propaganda-disinformation-foreign-interference/ Lupa Media — Fake Teleamazonas report about recruiting Ecuadorians for Ukraine https://lupa.com.ec/verificaciones/noboa-mercenarios-ucrania-ecuador/ Brookings Institution — The Breakout Scale https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-breakout-scale-measuring-the-impact-of-influence-operations/ Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode17 #OperationDarkClark #DarkClark #Russia #LatinAmerica #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #FalseFront #FrontOrganisation #FakeInstitution #SocialResearchCenter #SRC #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ChatGPT #OpenAI #NarrativeManipulation #SourceLaundering #InstitutionalManipulation #ForgedDocuments #FakeAudio #PoliticalInfluence #CovertInfluence #Peru #Ecuador #Bolivia #Argentina #Ukraine #Politology #LaCompania #TheCompany #SVR #WagnerLegacy #PropagandaMachine #GlobalSouth #BreakoutScale #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD