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The Liberal Party (PL 22) stated that Carlos Bolsonaro was elected senator for Santa Catarina with 2,041,840 votes, equivalent to 25.35%. The party said he would have the responsibility to represent the interests of the state and Brazil in the Senate and congratulated him on his victory, expressing support for his new mission. #CarlosBolsonaro #SantaCatarina #Senado #PL22 #CarlosBolsonaro #SantaCatarina #Senado (translated)

IRAN: MEK/NCRI – when AI impersonated a real activist in live conversations For years, synthetic media has largely meant fabricated images, cloned voices and manipulated video. A case uncovered by Anthropic in September 2026 suggests a more consequential development: artificial intelligence being used not merely to imitate how a person looks or sounds, but to behave as that person in an ongoing conversation. Anthropic says it dismantled a distributed influence operation targeting Iranians inside the country and abroad that it linked to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or PMOI/MEK, and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The operators used a shared AI-agent platform to support impersonation, audience profiling, coordinated social-media activity, synthetic personas and the laundering of organisational content through apparently independent accounts. At least four people involved in the operation worked for official NCRI media outlets, according to Anthropic. The company also found references to committee approval processes and MEK leadership, but said it could not independently determine the precise level of central control. Cloning a person from 8,400 Telegram posts The most striking part of the operation involved a real activist whose Telegram identity was copied. According to Anthropic, the operators instructed Claude in Persian that it was now that person, then provided approximately 8,400 of the activist’s Telegram posts so the system could learn and reproduce his writing style. The AI-assisted account was subsequently used to conduct live political conversations with the activist’s existing contacts. Anthropic says that, to its knowledge, the people receiving those messages did not know they were interacting with an account being operated with AI assistance. This is materially different from a conventional chatbot or a static deepfake. The system was not simply producing a forged statement attributed to someone else. It was using a large archive of that person’s authentic language as behavioural training material, then applying the resulting imitation interactively. In practical terms, the deception moved from synthetic content to synthetic identity. Anthropic did not publish the identity of the impersonated activist, nor details of his contacts, and the public report does not establish what specific information the conversations produced. What it does establish is that the impersonation was operational rather than experimental: the cloned account was used in real exchanges with real people. From social-media monitoring to psychographic dossiers The impersonation sat inside a much broader targeting system. Anthropic says the network scraped more than 500 social-media channels and categorised individuals by location, age, profession, political orientation and arrest history. It then analysed approximately 51,944 archived messages from conversations to construct detailed psychographic dossiers on dozens of people inside Iran. The system was therefore not limited to broadcasting propaganda. It was also designed to understand specific audiences and individuals. Profiles could be used to decide what kind of message was most likely to resonate with a particular person, which political identity they appeared closest to and how they should be approached. Anthropic describes this as a structured targeting funnel rather than ad hoc social-media activity. That distinction is important in the Iranian context. Political activists, dissidents and opposition contacts inside Iran can face arrest and severe punishment. The report does not show that the dossiers directly led to arrests or other harm, but collecting and organising information such as arrest history and political affiliation adds a surveillance dimension to what would otherwise be described as an influence operation. A shared AI system for an influence network Anthropic found that the actors used a shared Claude-based platform named “Viktor”, with separate workspaces and persistent memory. Those memory files contained approved sources, prohibited words, account-management instructions and methods intended to reduce the risk of detection. One operator loaded MEK founding doctrine into the system as what the report called “strategic base data”, allowing others to reuse it across their work. This persistent-memory structure meant the AI did not have to be briefed from scratch for every task. Once doctrine, stylistic rules and operational constraints had been stored, the system could repeatedly produce material consistent with the network’s objectives. Anthropic says the same general playbook appeared across different workspaces despite the operators not sharing obvious account infrastructure. The network also used automated pipelines to coordinate Instagram posting schedules and tailor messages to different audiences. Some accounts initially avoided mentioning the Mojahedin at all, allowing material aligned with MEK/NCRI narratives to appear as neutral or independent political commentary. Content was distributed through the organisation’s own media ecosystem as well as accounts presented as ordinary news or activist profiles. Anthropic assessed the campaign as Category Two on its Breakout Scale: active on multiple platforms with distribution through NCRI-linked media properties and amplifier accounts, but without evidence of broad authentic penetration. Synthetic citizens and disguised organisational media The same infrastructure generated AI avatars presented as ordinary Iranians, complete with Persian audio, to promote Maryam Rajavi’s political programme. Anthropic says the synthetic nature of these personas was intentionally concealed. Operators also rewrote and redistributed content originating from MEK-affiliated media while stripping identifying features or presenting it through apparently independent accounts. The network’s political messaging targeted the Iranian government but also rival opposition currents, including monarchists and supporters of the Pahlavi camp. Anthropic documented fabricated video material attacking a member of the Pahlavi family and the use of the slogan “Neither Shah Nor Sheikh”, consistent with the NCRI’s broader competition with other opposition movements. That rivalry provides relevant context. Reuters describes the MEK as one of Iran’s principal organised opposition movements in exile and the dominant force behind the NCRI, led by Maryam Rajavi. Its relationship with other opposition currents is often contentious, while the extent of its support inside Iran remains uncertain. What can be attributed – and what cannot Anthropic’s attribution is unusually specific but still needs to be stated carefully. The company says its investigation linked the operation to MEK/NCRI and established that at least four participants worked for official NCRI media organisations. It also found a common operational playbook, committee review structures and repeated references to MEK leadership. On that basis, Anthropic said central tasking was likely. It nevertheless stopped short of saying it had proven that NCRI’s senior leadership directly ordered or managed every component of the operation. That caveat matters. The strongest public evidence supports describing GTG-84006 as a MEK/NCRI-aligned influence operation involving personnel from official NCRI media, rather than asserting that every action was directly commanded by the organisation’s top leadership. The broader significance of the case lies elsewhere. Earlier generations of synthetic media attempted to fabricate evidence: a photograph, a voice recording or a video. Here, AI was used to maintain an identity over time, remember doctrine, analyse targets and speak directly to real people while appearing to be someone they already trusted. The deepfake was no longer merely an artefact. It had become a participant in the conversation. Sources Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 AI Misuse Case Library — GTG-84006 activist impersonation case https://www.misuseofai.com/en/cases/gtg-84006-activist-impersonation/ Reuters — Who makes up Iran’s fragmented opposition? https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/who-makes-up-irans-fragmented-opposition-2025-06-18/ Reuters — Iran’s divided opposition senses its moment https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-divided-opposition-senses-its-moment-activists-remain-wary-protests-2025-06-19/ Reuters — NCRI and Maryam Rajavi https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dissident-leader-abroad-urges-iranians-bring-down-khamenei-2025-06-24/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode12 #Iran #MEK #PMOI #NCRI #IranianOpposition #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #AIDeception #AIImpersonation #IdentityImpersonation #SyntheticIdentity #InteractiveDeepfake #DigitalImpersonation #PersonaCloning #BehaviouralCloning #Telegram #PsychographicProfiling #TargetProfiling #AudienceTargeting #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #SyntheticPersonas #NarrativeLaundering #CoordinatedInfluence #PoliticalInfluence #DigitalInfluence #OppositionPolitics #IranPolitics #OSINT #WRLD

Unitatea 840, o structură secretă a Iranului, ar folosi bande criminale pentru a organiza atacuri în Europa, în contextul unor speculații privind un complot de bombă împotriva RAF Fairford, pe fundalul implicării Forței Quds în operațiuni clandestine internaționale. #Iran #terorism #securitate

UAE / Sudan – when an influence operation tried to enter the United Nations A network of roughly 300 apparently independent social-media influencers. A human-rights organisation borrowing the identity of a real NGO. Personal dossiers on European politicians and journalists. And testimony prepared for delivery at the United Nations without revealing the state interest behind it. These were elements of an influence operation uncovered by Anthropic and disclosed in September 2026. The company says it linked the activity with high confidence to UAE government officials. Tracked as GTG-84002, the operation targeted several overlapping issues: the Muslim Brotherhood, perceptions of the war in Sudan and international mechanisms examining the United Arab Emirates' role in the conflict. What distinguishes the case is not simply its use of artificial intelligence. It is the attempt to make state-aligned messaging appear to originate from independent influencers, human-rights organisations and potentially witnesses addressing an international institution. An influence network built around 300 fake voices Anthropic identified a single actor using Claude to support a sustained influence campaign. At its centre was an AI persona called “Deadshot”, running on the operator's own platform. A master doctrine file repeatedly instructed the system to support what it described as a coordinated international effort to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood. The operator simultaneously managed several components of the campaign, including approximately 300 inauthentic influencer accounts across social-media platforms. Internal material examined by Anthropic described the apparent independence of this network as its greatest strategic advantage. That phrase captures the central method. The objective was not simply to broadcast a political position but to conceal where that position originated. One visible example appeared on 4 June 2026, when accounts participated in a coordinated campaign using #SudanIslamists and near-identical graphics connecting Sudanese Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood with regional instability. Anthropic says the amplification network was centrally funded and coordinated. Its investigation also found that the operator financing the social-media network was connected to the wider influence operation. A human-rights organisation that was not what it appeared to be Social media was only one layer. The operator also created a front NGO that copied the identity of a genuine Swiss organisation and used that borrowed legitimacy to publish human-rights material produced for the campaign. Anthropic's description elsewhere also refers to the identity of a real Sudanese human-rights organisation being used in connection with the preparation of testimony. The public report does not fully clarify whether these references describe the same front or separate elements of the operation, so they should not be treated as definitively identical. The underlying technique, however, is clear: political material was designed to appear as if it originated from independent civil society rather than from actors linked to a government. This is particularly significant in the human-rights environment, where the perceived independence of an organisation or witness can determine how seriously evidence is received by journalists, diplomats and international institutions. The attempt to reach the UN The most consequential part of the operation concerned the 62nd session of the UN Human Rights Council. According to Anthropic, the operator used Claude to ghost-write complete testimony intended to be delivered by two individuals during the session. The texts were prepared under explicit constraints ensuring that neither statement would mention the UAE. This did not amount to a conventional government submission. The intention, according to Anthropic's reconstruction, was for material serving the interests of a party connected to the Sudan conflict to reach an international forum through apparently independent voices. But an important limitation remains: Anthropic could not confirm that the testimony was ultimately delivered. The company similarly could not establish whether other dossiers produced by the operation reached their intended recipients or influenced policy. It therefore assessed the campaign as Category Three on the Brookings Breakout Scale – activity distributed across several platforms, but without evidence of broad public impact sufficient for a higher classification. The distinction matters. The evidence demonstrates a sophisticated attempt to influence international debate; it does not demonstrate that the attempt succeeded. Politicians, journalists and UN investigators became targets The operation was not limited to generating public content. Anthropic found that the operator researched and compiled detailed profiles of 18 members of the European Parliament and prominent journalists. Some material was prepared for direct delivery to senior UAE officials. The network also assembled what Anthropic describes as “counter-accountability dossiers” on UN Special Rapporteurs who had criticised the UAE's conduct in relation to Sudan. This places the campaign in a broader context. Since Sudan's civil war began in April 2023, the role of external powers has become an increasingly important part of international scrutiny. Sudan has accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, allegations Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied. In 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE before the International Court of Justice, accusing it of complicity in genocide against the Masalit through alleged support for the RSF. The UAE rejected the allegations. The ICJ subsequently removed the case from its list after finding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the UAE's reservation to the relevant provision of the Genocide Convention. The ruling therefore did not determine whether Sudan's substantive allegations were true or false. That contested international environment helps explain why narratives about Sudan, human rights and accountability were valuable targets for an influence operation. AI as an operating system for influence The role played by Claude is also important to understand accurately. Anthropic did not find that artificial intelligence independently conceived or directed the campaign. Human operators established the objectives, political doctrine and targets. AI instead helped operationalise them. Across hundreds of sessions, Claude was used to transform predetermined political objectives into social-media narratives, human-rights reports, testimony, intelligence-style briefs and detailed profiles of individuals. The same system could support narrative production, target research and preparation of material for different audiences. That represents a more significant development than simply using generative AI to produce propaganda faster. Traditional influence operations require different teams to research targets, write content, manage personas, adapt messages and prepare briefing material. Generative AI can compress several of those functions into a single operational workflow. The result is not necessarily more convincing propaganda. It is potentially cheaper, faster and more scalable influence infrastructure. From fake influencers to institutional influence Anthropic says it linked the operation to UAE government officials with high confidence. Its assessment was based partly on internal material naming senior Emirati officials as intended recipients of the work, alongside other evidence available to its investigators. That remains an attribution by Anthropic rather than a judicial finding or publicly released forensic attribution by a government agency. The distinction should be retained. The larger significance of GTG-84002 lies in the architecture of the campaign. A network of fake influencers could create the appearance of public opinion. A cloned human-rights organisation could provide institutional credibility. AI-generated reports could give political narratives the appearance of research. Profiles of journalists and politicians could support more precise targeting. And ghost-written testimony could potentially carry the same message into an international institution without revealing the political interest behind it. This is a different model from the familiar troll farm. The objective is no longer simply to make propaganda look popular. It is to make state-aligned messaging look independent – and, if possible, to move it from social media into the institutions where international policy and accountability are debated. SOURCES: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 International Court of Justice — Sudan v. United Arab Emirates https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197 International Court of Justice — press releases and case documents https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197/press-releases United Nations Geneva — Sudan v UAE proceedings at the ICJ https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/04/105241/world-court-begins-hearing-sudans-complicity-genocide-case-against UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs — UAE response to Sudan's allegations https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/4/10/10-4-2025-UAE-UAE UN Digital Library — Sudan's letter concerning alleged UAE support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091008?ln=en UN Digital Library — UAE response concerning allegations of support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4046224?ln=en Ultra Sudan — reporting on Anthropic's UAE-linked influence-operation findings https://ultrasudan.usawtiq.com/أنثروبيك-أحبطنا-عملية-تأثير-إماراتية-استخدمت-الذكاء-الاصطناعي-لاستهداف-السودان/عامر-صالح/أخبار KEYWORDS #DISINFORMED #Episode8 #UAE #Sudan #UnitedArabEmirates #UnitedNations #UNHumanRightsCouncil #HumanRights #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeInfluencers #FakeNGO #NGOImpersonation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #NarrativeManipulation #InstitutionalInfluence #SudanConflict #SudanWar #MuslimBrotherhood #InternationalRelations #Geopolitics #Anthropic #ClaudeAI #OSINT #WRLD

Amazon od 1 października podnosi wynagrodzenia pracowników godzinowych w 12 centrach logistycznych w Polsce. Po zmianach miesięczne pensje wraz ze specjalną premią za obecność zgodnie z grafikiem wyniosą od 6472 do 8404 zł brutto. Najwięcej otrzymają liderzy zespołów z ponad #Amazon #wynagrodzenia #Polska #PL

Od 1 października wynagrodzenia wyniosą od 6472 do 8404 zł brutto miesięcznie wraz z 15-proc. premią, Podstawowe stawki godzinowe wzrosną do 38,52–50 zł brutto, zależnie od stanowiska i stażu, Nowe stawki mają obowiązywać zarówno osoby zatrudnione bezpośrednio przez Amazon, jak i #Amazon #wynagrodzenia #Polska #PL

❌❌ La division poids-lourd de l’UFC est prise en otage depuis plus de 3 ans maintenant ! Jon Jones: - a gagné sa ceinture contre Ciryl Gane le 4 mars 2023. - n’a défendu qu’une seule fois (contre Stipe le 16 novembre 2024) - a retenu la caté en haleine avant de prendre sa retraite le 21 juin 2025 -> 1 seule défense de titre en 840 jours Tom Aspinall: - récupère la ceinture de Jon Jones sans combattre - une seule tentative de défense non aboutie contre Ciryl Gane le 25 octobre 2025 qui finie en no-contest - depuis: en convalescence et n’est pas prêt à revenir selon Dana White -> 0 défense de titre réelle en 446 jours Pendant ce temps Ciryl Gane a récupéré la ceinture intérimaire contre Alex Pereira… et devra surement la défendre à nouveau contre Pereira dans une revanche à venir. #UFC #MMA #PoidsLourd

#840 Na Wschód od Bliskiego Wschodu https://t.co/r87luMNLoE - Atak na samoloty USA. - Wojna potrwa jeszcze 2 lata? - Ukraina chce więcej miliardów - Trump: 5 tysięcy USD dla każdego obywatela USA - Ukraina zaatakowała w Arktyce - Nowa rola szefa CIA? - Saudyjskie naloty na Jemen https://t.co/iIvt6X2Chl #bliskawschód #wojna #Ukraina #US #UA #SA #YE #UA

Tο non paper που διένειμε χθες το νέο κόμμα-συμμορία Τσίπρα στους συντάκτες με τίτλο "Δημοσιονομικό Πρόγραμμα 2027-2030", λύνει κάθε απορία και αποδεικνύει το μέγεθος του ΑΠΑΤΕΩΝΑ ΤΣΙΠΡΑ. Ο κατσαπλιάς στην ομιλία του είπε ότι "στηρίζουμε αυτούς που κρατούν όρθιο το σχολείο με πρόσληψη 30.000 εκπαιδευτικών", από το σημείωμα του κόμματός του προκύπτει ότι δεν προβλέπεται καμία απολύτως πρόσληψη μόνιμων εκπαιδευτικών για τα έτη 2027 και το 2028. Ο κατσαπλιάς στην ομιλία του είπε για τους συνταξιούχους ότι "Αλλάζουμε άμεσα και βάζουμε τέλος στη συμμετοχή των συνταξιούχων στα φάρμακα, μηδενική συμμετοχή, ούτε ένα ευρώ από την τσέπη του ασθενούς", από το σημείωμα προκύπτει ότι η υπόσχεση μεταφέρεται για το 2029. Ο κατσαπλιάς στην ομιλία του είπε ότι "μειώνουμε την προκαταβολή φόρου για τα νομικά πρόσωπα" από το σημείωμα προκύπτει ότι δεν προβλέπεται καμία μείωση προκαταβολής φόρου μέχρι και το 2029. Και αυτή η υπόσχεση μεταφέρεται για το 2030 και μάλιστα με κόστος 400 εκατομμυρίων που αντιστοιχεί σε μείωση της προκαταβολής μόλις κατά 5%. Είπε ο κατσαπλιάς στην ομιλία του ότι "αυξάνουμε αρχικά, κατά μέσο όρο 500 € τον μήνα τις αποδοχές των γιατρών και νοσηλευτών", από το σημείωμα του κόμματος προκύπτει ετήσιο κόστος 900 εκ.€, το οποίο όμως το διαιρεί στα 4, δηλαδή σε 225εκ. το 2027, 225 εκ. το 2028 κτλ. Με 225 εκ. όμως η "αύξηση" είναι 125 €. Το "αρχικά 500 €" του κατσαπλιά έγινε 125 € κάθε χρόνο. Δηλαδή στην κοστολόγηση έχει διαιρέσει το ετήσιο κόστος των μέτρων δια 4. Για τους εκπαιδευτικούς, ενώ στην ομιλία του κατσαπλιάς έταξε "μισθούς αξιοπρέπειας για τους εκπαιδευτικούς με αυξήσεις αρχικά ύψους 300 ευρώ το μήνα", από το κομματικό σημείωμα προκύπτει ότι η αύξηση είναι 75 ευρώ κάθε χρόνο, καθώς αντί για ετήσιο κόστος 840 εκ. έχει βάλει 210. Δηλαδή, το ψέμα του κατσαπλιά για αυξήσεις "αρχικά 300 ευρώ"κατέληξε σε 75 €. Υποσχέθηκε ο κατσαπλιάς "στήριξη 80.000 φοιτητών με 500 € μηνιαίως" ,αλλά από στο σημείωμα διαιρεί το ετήσιο κόστος των 400 εκ. δια 4, σε 100 εκ. τον χρόνο. Αυτό αντιστοιχεί σε στήριξη 125 ευρώ το μήνα και όχι 500. Στην κοστολόγηση ο ΚΑΤΣΑΠΛΙΑΣ δεν περιλαμβάνει καθόλου το κόστος για τις 50.000 κατοικίες, ούτε για όσα έχει τάξει στους δήμους... #ΚΑΤΣΑΠΛΙΑΣ #Τσίπρας #πολιτική #εκπαίδευση

🚨🚨🚨 AL-HILAL, SVOLTA STORICA! 🇸🇦💣 💰 Il Principe Al-Waleed bin Talal acquisisce ufficialmente il 70% delle quote dell’Al-Hilal! 💸 Operazione da 840 M DI RIYAL SAUDITI 🔵 Nuova era per l’Al-Hilal: Al-Waleed bin Talal diventa l’azionista di maggioranza del club. https://t.co/acnqZ00qyr #AlHilal #Calcio #Sport

Under sossarnas tid vid makten fick en dömd våldtäktsman 840 000 kr i skadestånd för att han ”suttit lite för länge”, kvinnan han gruppvåldtog fick inget. Vi har ändrat de reglerna så att brottsoffer alltid ska få ersättning och så att sådana som han aldrig ska få det. #Brottsoffer #Rättvisa #Skadestånd #SE

Jonatan Alfvén: Här står vi framför din grav. Det var ju inte så här det skulle sluta, du skulle ju varit kvar med oss. Två män gjorde inbrott i din lägenhet. Du vaknade upp till att de skrek och grep tag i dina ben. De gick sedan till angrepp och turades om att våldta dig. Männen både hotade, slog och sparkade dig. De tog strypgrepp tills det svartnade för dina ögon. Männen dömdes till fängelse, men du fick bara 3000 kronor i skadestånd, då det var allt de ägde. Samtidigt betalade staten ut 840 000 till en av dina förövare, eftersom de ansåg han suttit i fängelse för länge – trots att han i timmar hade torterat dig. Samhället svek dig Petra och till slut blev demonerna för många. Mörkret tog ditt liv… Idag tände jag och min dotter ett ljus vid din grav. Lila blommor, vita liljor och ett kort med en fjäril på. Min dotter ska veta vilken fin människa du var. På onsdag riskerar jag att dömas till fängelse efter att ha skrivit om en av dina förövare. Jag är glad att du slipper se hur våra myndigheter fortsätter belöna de män som så kallsint förstörde ditt liv. Men folket, Petra. Folket hade du med dig. Jag är glad att jag fick lära känna dig innan din död. Att vi fick dela ut gåvor på nästan 200 000 kronor och visa en kärleksfull hälsning från Pernilla Wahlgren. Älskade vän. Förlåt för hur samhället behandlade dig. Och förlåt för att jag inte fanns där mer för dig. Fortsätt vila i frid, saknade ängel. Den ena förövaren utvisades. Den andra är kvar och fortsätter begå nya brott. Så sent som förra året dömdes han till fängelse för att ha misshandlat en 16-årig flicka. Samma dag gick han till ytterligare angrepp. Det offret blev medvetslöst, fick hjärnskakning och kvarstående men som synbortfall. Från fängelset (!) fick mannen sedan hjälp att polisanmäla mig för grovt förtal. Och när rättegången ägde rum förra veckan vägrade han ta något som helst ansvar för Petras död. Han skrek istället hejvilt, tilltalade mig som ”gärningsman” och fick till slut sin mikrofon avstängd innan han stormade ut. Jag kan bara inte begripa varför våra myndigheter lägger miljontals kronor på att ge dessa hänsynslösa individer upprättelse? #Rättvisa #Brott #Samhälle

🚨 FECHADO! Barcola deixa o PSG e é o novo reforço do Liverpool. Entre valor fixo e bônus por metas, o valor total da operação chegará a 140 MILHÕES DE EUROS (R$ 840 MILHÕES). Os clubes vão trocar as documentações em 24 horas. 🗞️ | 📸 @FabrizioRomano https://t.co/XehShnEddL #TransferNews #LiverpoolFC #PSG