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The author accused Donald Trump of maintaining a politically treacherous relationship with Putin’s Russia, saying he had repeatedly deferred to Putin, attacked Ukraine, weakened confidence in NATO and advanced positions that served Moscow’s strategic interests. The author also referred to the “Krasnov” story. https://t.co/rwwfFV4YYK #Trump #Putin #NATO #US #RU #UA #NATO

Ireland has proposed a revised European budget for the period 2028-2034, planning cuts of 140 billion euros compared to the Commission's initial proposal, with the aim of reviving discussions on EU funding among member states with divergent positions. #BudgetUE #Irlande #UnionEuropéenne (translated)

Students from the University of Paris Panthéon Assas, traditionally known for its conservative positions, mobilized in support of the high school movement by blockading the entrance of the institution on October 8, 2026, marking a significant turning point in their activist engagement. #Assas #MobilisationEtudiante #SolidaritéLycéenne (translated)

Rima Hassan indicated that the man had not asked her to withdraw her complaint and had said he was ready to face the consequences. However, he had spoken to her about the professional difficulties his wife faced after the widespread dissemination of the video and its repercussions on their children at school. Hassan explained that she did not engage in politics so that people would find themselves in such a situation and that, while their exchange had shifted some of her positions without exempting her from responsibility, empathy had seemed to her to be the right approach. #empathie #conséquences #justice (translated)

The post said that after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, regional alignments became apparent within days, citing Hezbollah’s fire across Israel’s northern border, Iraqi militias’ strikes on US positions and Iran-backed Houthi attacks from Yemen targeting Israel and commercial interests. #Israel #Hamas #MiddleEast #IL #IQ #YE #IR

Today, at the COREPER level, the Hungarian side gave the “green light” to the negotiating positions on Cluster 2 “Internal Market,” and Cluster 3, “Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth.” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha thanked Hungary for its “green light” for opening the second and third clusters of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine, according to MTI. #EUAccession #UkraineHungaryRelations #MinorityRights (translated)

Police officers were also suspected in the gold convoy case, where a total of five people, including János Hajdu, the former head of TEK, and István Szathmáry, the head of the legal department of the Constitutional Protection Office, were accused of document forgery in the case of the detained Ukrainian citizens. #EUAccession #UkraineHungaryRelations #MinorityRights (translated)

The author denounced what he described as the absence of political and media reactions to these threats. He estimated that a person armed with a rifle, claiming to defend the Palestinian cause and addressing an elected official in this manner due to his pro-Israel positions, would have already been prosecuted and arrested. #Palestine #Israël #Justice #IL #PS (translated)

The French Mileists contested information that they claim was relayed by Le Canard enchaîné and several accounts on X, alleging that accounts linked to David Lisnard's campaign had bet on Polymarket to artificially inflate his chances. They stated that the bets against Lisnard were, on the contrary, very concentrated on a single account named LLamaLoco, which reportedly wagered more than 420,000 dollars against him. The largest bet in favor of Lisnard was said to be 18,000 dollars, which, according to them, represents a ratio of 25 to 1 in amount and 2.5 to 1 in the number of shares bought. They added that LLamaLoco also wagered 200,000 dollars against Marine Le Pen and 28,000 dollars on a victory for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and that Lisnard and Le Pen represented 70% of the current positions of the account on Polymarket. The account allegedly continued to bet against Lisnard and had been active for some time. The French Mileists stated that they do not draw any conspiracy-like conclusions from these elements but believe that, without these bets, Lisnard would be even higher. Finally, they indicated that Polymarket, on its site reserved for American citizens, estimated his chances of winning at 16%. #Politique #DavidLisnard #Polymarket (translated)

Mark van Bommel, the new coach of the Red Devils, is implementing a 4-3-3 tactical scheme with walking training to enhance the understanding of positions, although his substitution choices and lack of strategic alternatives have raised questions after a defeat against France. #DiablesRouges #MarkVanBommel #FootballBelgique (translated)

In a controversial position paper, four groups within the SPD demand stricter working time regulations and warn against a possible introduction of the 78-hour workweek, while aiming for a legal maximum working time of 40 hours per week and payment for overtime from the first hour. #Arbeitszeitgesetz #SPD #Gleichstellung (translated)

"We must allow athletes the right to have an opinion, just as we must accept that they may not want to share it as well. They are citizens, like artists, who often express political positions. These do not always go in the same direction. For example, Brazilian players supported Bolsonaro. We cannot confine the world of sports in a bubble where only tactics and 4-4-2 are discussed. The image of the apolitical footballer is a myth that is increasingly collapsing, says Jean-Michel De Waele, a professor of political science at ULB, specializing in issues related to sport." #Football #Politique #ConflitIsréloPalestinien (translated)

Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD

🚨 When Zinédine ZIDANE 🇫🇷 talks about Désiré DOUÉ 🇫🇷 at a press conference 👇 : "The player needs to express himself in his best position. Désiré has ONE, TWO, THREE POSITIONS where he can really play well, so there you go." 😁💎 https://t.co/0zVe1PreA8 #Football #Zidane #Doué (translated)

The article presents the various proposals of the candidates for the 2027 presidential election concerning pension reform, highlighting a range of positions from increasing the legal retirement age to 65 years to returning to 60 years. #retraites #électionprésidentielle2027 #réforme (translated)