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The author asked what the DNA of the oldest known land animal, which they said had lived 194 years, might reveal about ageing. They wrote that exceptional longevity may depend not on avoiding ageing, but on maintaining stable regulation of genes involved in energy production, RNA processing and DNA repair.

Operation Dark Clark – Russia built a real organisation around a false identity Most influence operations create fake people, fake websites or fake news stories. Operation Dark Clark appears to have gone considerably further: Russian operators built what looked like a functioning research organisation in Latin America, employed real people to produce genuine research and concealed from those employees who was ultimately directing their work. OpenAI disclosed the operation on 8 October after banning a cluster of accounts originating in Russia. The actors used ChatGPT while targeting countries across Latin America, principally to damage Ukraine’s reputation, manipulate domestic political debates and manage a self-described research organisation called the Social Research Center, or SRC. OpenAI assessed Dark Clark as Category Five on the six-level Breakout Scale, the first operation it has disrupted since beginning its influence-operation reporting to reach that level. A front organisation with real employees The SRC presented itself as a research platform studying subjects including Latin America’s relationship with India and the Indian diaspora. OpenAI found more than 60 articles on its website, most of them apparently original rather than plagiarised. Internal reports produced by the Russian operators discussed hiring, dismissals, salary scales, staffing and unfinished research projects, strongly suggesting that the operators controlled the organisation rather than merely collaborating with it. At the centre of the structure was “Mia Clark”, a fictitious identity reportedly used to manage social-media activity and communicate with staff. According to OpenAI, the available evidence indicates that employees working for SRC in Latin America were probably unaware that the organisation was being directed by Russian actors. They interviewed experts, conducted research and wrote papers in what appears to have been good faith. The deception therefore existed primarily at the organisational level: much of the work was real, but the identity and strategic purpose of the institution commissioning it were not. OpenAI This is one reason Dark Clark differs from the familiar model of a troll farm. A reader encountering an SRC paper might be looking at research genuinely written by a Latin American employee based on genuine interviews. The manipulation lies further upstream, in who built the institution, selected its direction and controlled its infrastructure. From forged emails to real events The operation also appears to have attempted something more ambitious than online persuasion: inducing real people to produce events that could later be turned into propaganda. In May 2026, according to the operators’ internal reports, they created an email address impersonating Lima’s regional education authorities and instructed schools to organise activities about Ukraine for a cultural-diversity event. The instructions included references to Stepan Bandera, whose historical legacy remains particularly contentious in Poland and parts of Eastern Europe. The operators claimed that some schools complied, replied to the false address and sent photographs of the events. OpenAI could not independently verify every claim contained in the operators’ reports. It did, however, find Peruvian reporting matching the story, followed by publications in Poland and an English-language outlet in Hungary. Some coverage included comments from a Polish MEP calling for people displaying what he described as anti-Polish attitudes to be declared persona non grata. OpenAI therefore concluded that the fabricated starting point appears to have entered genuine political debate across national borders. The mechanism is unusually effective because the final photographs need not themselves be fabricated. If people can be tricked into staging a real event on the basis of a forged instruction, the operation creates authentic visual evidence of something that was artificially initiated. The same method in Ecuador and Bolivia Dark Clark’s internal reports describe similar efforts elsewhere. In Ecuador, the operators claimed they used a fake education email to encourage schools to stage ceremonies involving President Daniel Noboa and Erik Prince, the former head of Blackwater. Ecuadorian media subsequently covered a matching controversy, and the country’s education minister issued a detailed denial. Other Ecuador-focused material included fabricated audio attributed to Ukraine’s consul and a false television report alleging that Noboa’s government was recruiting Ecuadorians to fight in Ukraine. Local fact-checker Lupa found that the supposed Teleamazonas report had never been broadcast, that images had been taken from Instagram, that the audio was AI-generated and that a company named in a supposed recruitment contract did not exist in Ecuador’s corporate registry. In Bolivia, an internal report described a fake audio recording supposedly made by an employee of state water company EPSAS during anti-government protests. It claimed that water supplies to La Paz would be cut and a state of emergency declared. The allegation produced a fact-check and an official denial. OpenAI says the operators explicitly described their objective as worsening the political crisis surrounding the demonstrations. Possible links to the post-Wagner influence machine Dark Clark did not emerge in a vacuum. The operators repeatedly asked ChatGPT about Politology and La Compania, names associated in previous investigations with the Russian influence apparatus that developed from structures once connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Forbidden Stories and its partners obtained 1,431 pages of internal documents describing a network known as “The Company”, which they reported had grown to almost 100 operatives and was conducting influence projects across roughly 30 Global South countries. Their investigation found that the organisation moved under the supervision of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, after Prigozhin’s death. Its documented budget for ten months of activity in 2024 was approximately €7.3 million. Two older Argentina campaigns claimed in Dark Clark’s internal reports — a false story about Javier Milei buying Cartier collars for his dogs and the staging of anti-Milei graffiti — had already been independently attributed by investigative journalists to Politology/La Compania. That is significant corroboration, but it is not enough to prove that every Dark Clark activity was run by the same organisational structure. AI was the back office, not the mastermind Perhaps the most important finding concerns artificial intelligence itself. In most documented cases, the Russians were not using ChatGPT to generate the propaganda seen by the public. Their principal use was administrative: drafting reports for an unknown superior, summarising operations, translating material and recording the supposed success of campaigns. Those reports also expose a weakness in the operators’ own measurement. OpenAI found instances in which they tried to claim credit for developments they had probably not caused, suggesting that they were not only attempting to manipulate Latin American audiences but also presenting an inflated picture of their effectiveness to whoever was supervising them. Dark Clark nevertheless broke further into the real world than any influence operation OpenAI had previously disrupted. Under the Brookings framework, Category Five means that an operation has escaped its original network and been amplified by high-profile individuals such as politicians. Dark Clark crossed that threshold because fabricated narratives appear to have provoked governmental denials, mainstream reporting and political comment in several countries. Its most important innovation was therefore not a particularly convincing deepfake. It was the construction of a partly genuine institution around a concealed foreign controller. The research could be real. The employees could be real. The interviews could be real. What was false was who they were ultimately working for. Sources OpenAI — Disrupting AI-enabled “false front” operations https://openai.com/index/disrupting-ai-enabled-false-front-operations/ Forbidden Stories — Propaganda Machine: Russia’s foreign influence strategy across three continents https://forbiddenstories.org/propaganda-machine-secret-documents-reveal-russias-foreign-influence-strategy-across-three-continents/ Forbidden Stories — Ghost Journalists, Cash and Kremlin Scripts: Argentina https://forbiddenstories.org/ghost-journalists-cash-and-kremlin-scripts-how-russian-operatives-tried-to-influence-argentinian-media/ openDemocracy — Russian influence operation in Bolivia https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia-bolivia-south-america-putin-evo-morales-wagner-prigozhin-covert-operations-propaganda-disinformation-foreign-interference/ Lupa Media — Fake Teleamazonas report about recruiting Ecuadorians for Ukraine https://lupa.com.ec/verificaciones/noboa-mercenarios-ucrania-ecuador/ Brookings Institution — The Breakout Scale https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-breakout-scale-measuring-the-impact-of-influence-operations/ Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode17 #OperationDarkClark #DarkClark #Russia #LatinAmerica #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #FalseFront #FrontOrganisation #FakeInstitution #SocialResearchCenter #SRC #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ChatGPT #OpenAI #NarrativeManipulation #SourceLaundering #InstitutionalManipulation #ForgedDocuments #FakeAudio #PoliticalInfluence #CovertInfluence #Peru #Ecuador #Bolivia #Argentina #Ukraine #Politology #LaCompania #TheCompany #SVR #WagnerLegacy #PropagandaMachine #GlobalSouth #BreakoutScale #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

The author said they understood NATO did not want to disclose secret information about electronic warfare and GPS jamming during the Steadfast Noon 2026 nuclear drill. They recalled that a US electronic-warfare aircraft had killed 20 people during a training mission in Italy in 1998, referring to the incident as the Cermis massacre. https://t.co/o7G2pY7O5P #NATO #ElectronicWarfare #Military #US #IT

The author said they understood NATO’s reluctance to disclose secret information about electronic warfare and GPS jamming during the Steadfast Noon 2026 nuclear drill. They recalled that, during a training mission in Italy in 1998, a US electronic warfare aircraft killed 20 people in what they called the Cermis massacre. https://t.co/D1sUnVOt7H #NATO #ElectronicWarfare #GPS #IT #US

Russia’s war propaganda gets a soundtrack – how AI-generated songs reached global streaming platforms Russian war propaganda is no longer confined to television broadcasts, Telegram channels or political videos. A study by the Ukrainian threat-intelligence organisation Terrecon has identified 981 songs combining signs of AI generation with pro-Russian military narratives, distributed through an ecosystem that reaches YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music, Deezer and SoundCloud. The songs range from sentimental ballads to rock and heavy metal. Their recurring themes are familiar from conventional Russian wartime propaganda: the heroisation of Russian soldiers, romanticisation of the war, mobilisation, the “Russian world”, commemoration of fallen troops and attacks on Ukraine and its armed forces. Some contain derogatory or dehumanising references to Ukrainians. What is new is not necessarily the message, but the production and distribution model: generative AI allows propagandistic music to be produced rapidly, cheaply and in quantities that would previously have required musicians, studios and producers. Nearly 1,000 tracks identified Terrecon examined 3,725 tracks collected from YouTube, YouTube Music, SoundCloud and the AI music platform Suno. After manual review, researchers classified 981 as showing both indications of AI generation and pro-Russian war propaganda. In 681 tracks they identified 728 propaganda-related keywords or phrases. The largest category was the glorification of the Russian military, followed by romanticised treatment of Moscow’s so-called “special military operation”, mobilisation appeals, narratives about the “Russian world”, and the cult of fallen soldiers and the state. The reach was not merely theoretical. Listening or viewing statistics were available for 608 of the identified tracks; together they had accumulated 86.8 million plays and views, according to Terrecon. A smaller group of 13 high-performing songs accounted for more than 53 million YouTube views and more than 67 million when YouTube Music was included. Among the better-known examples is “Power of Artillery”, a Russian-language rock song praising artillery weapons that passed two million views on YouTube. Most of the tracks for which publication dates could be established appeared after 2024, broadly coinciding with the rapid expansion of consumer AI music generators such as Suno and Udio. That correlation does not prove that AI alone caused the increase, but it illustrates how drastically the economics of production have changed. A propaganda song for as little as $11 Terrecon also tested how difficult it would be to commission such material. Researchers approached 25 creators producing AI-assisted militaristic music; 15 agreed to take commissions. Prices ranged from approximately $11 to $330, while delivery times ranged from two hours to three days. According to Terrecon, some were prepared to produce highly aggressive anti-Ukrainian material, including content intended for audiences involving children from occupied Ukrainian territories. Some creators used Russian intermediary services that provided access to Western AI tools such as Suno and Udio despite restrictions. The researchers then tested several AI generators themselves. Across 40 prompts submitted to Suno, Udio, Mureka, Google Flow Music and ElevenLabs, 25 resulted in successful generations, while safeguards were circumvented in 15 cases. Terrecon reported that four of the five services tested produced Russian-language material containing wartime narratives, although technical problems prevented comparable testing on some systems. In one Udio experiment, the researchers said the model itself introduced more explicit violent language than had appeared in the original promp These tests do not demonstrate that the commercial platforms knowingly support Russian propaganda. They show something narrower: existing safeguards can be inconsistent when political messaging is packaged as music. From generation to Spotify The distribution experiment may be the most revealing part of Terrecon’s research. The team deliberately uploaded test tracks containing explicit hostile language to YouTube, SoundCloud, Spotify and Deezer. Terrecon says none was blocked during the experiment. On SoundCloud, researchers used an account identifying its location as Moscow, disclosed the use of AI and added markers including references to the Russian military and the war. The platform accepted the upload and subsequently offered paid promotional and distribution tools. This does not prove that streaming recommendation systems systematically promote pro-war music. There is currently insufficient public evidence to make that claim. It does demonstrate that material can enter the same commercial distribution infrastructure as ordinary music and, once there, potentially benefit from playlists, searches, sharing and recommendation mechanisms available to other releases. That distinction is important. Propaganda no longer has to announce itself as political communication. On a streaming platform it can look like another song. Culture as a delivery mechanism Music has always been used in wartime propaganda. What generative AI changes is scale. Instead of investing heavily in a limited number of patriotic performers or officially commissioned productions, creators can generate variations across styles, audiences and emotional registers at very low cost. Terrecon found material ranging from war rock to sentimental songs and content styled for younger audiences. Some creators also experimented with cloned celebrity voices and stylistic imitation of established musicians. The format also offers a different relationship with the audience. A political video asks a viewer to consume an argument. Music can accompany commuting, exercise or entertainment and may be encountered outside explicitly political spaces. This does not automatically make it more persuasive, and Terrecon’s research does not establish measurable effects on political attitudes. It does, however, place wartime narratives inside a cultural environment where users may not initially perceive themselves as consuming political messaging. An ecosystem, not a proven Kremlin command structure The strongest evidence supports describing this as a growing AI-assisted pro-Russian propaganda-music ecosystem, not a single operation controlled from Moscow. Terrecon did not establish that the Russian government created, financed or coordinated all 981 tracks. Reporting on the study likewise notes that the extent of direct state involvement remains unclear. There is broader evidence that the Russian state finances cultural projects and digital content supporting the war, including through state-backed funding bodies. That context matters, but it does not allow individual songs in Terrecon’s dataset to be attributed to the Kremlin without additional evidence. The significance of the case lies elsewhere. AI has reduced the cost of producing ideological content, intermediaries can help creators access generation tools, and global platforms can provide distribution. The result is a pipeline in which wartime propaganda no longer has to resemble propaganda at all. It can simply appear in a playlist. Sources Terrecon / Ukrainska Pravda — Daria Verbytska on the research https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2026/10/05/8056229/ Suspilne Culture — detailed breakdown of Terrecon findings https://suspilne.media/culture/1417933-rosijsku-voennu-propagandu-maskuut-pid-anime-karaoke-ta-rok-doslidzenna-si-pisen-vid-terrecon/ The Insider — AI-generated Russian war propaganda music https://theins.ru/news/297839 Institute of Mass Information — summary of New York Times reporting https://imi.org.ua/en/news/doslidzhennya-rf-masovo-stvoryu%D1%94-propagandistski-pisni-za-dopomogoyu-shi The Bridge Media — AI-generated songs and Russian military propaganda https://thebridgemedia.com.ua/en/ai-generated-songs-russian-military-propaganda/ Center for Strategic Communication — cost and production of AI propaganda music https://spravdi.org/propaganda-za-11-yak-rosiya-shtampuye-shi-pisni-z-miljonamy-prosluhovuvan/ Times of India — AI-generated Russian war songs https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/ai-sings-russias-war-story-inside-the-rise-of-generative-songs-about-ukraine-conflict/articleshow/134650594.cms EU Council / EUR-Lex — Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32026D1351 Human Rights Watch — Russian state funding of digital and patriotic content https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/07/30/disrupted-throttled-and-blocked/state-censorship-control-and-increasing-isolation #DISINFORMED #Episode16 #Russia #Ukraine #RussianPropaganda #WarPropaganda #MusicPropaganda #AIMusic #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticMedia #AIPropaganda #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #CulturalPropaganda #DigitalInfluence #NarrativeManipulation #PropagandaMusic #StreamingPlatforms #Spotify #AppleMusic #YouTube #YouTubeMusic #Deezer #SoundCloud #Suno #Udio #RussianWorld #RusskiyMir #MilitaryPropaganda #WarNarratives #Mobilisation #AlgorithmicDistribution #RecommendationAlgorithms #MusicStreaming #PlatformManipulation #Terrecon #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Discover algebra through a coastal adventure on Vancouver Island. https://www.amazon.ca/dp/B0HM5FL7BD Chitakin aala nachual suwa! We are happy to see you! The Ants’ Treasure on Vancouver Island: Where the Paths Meet invites children and families in Nuu-chah-nulth communities to explore mathematics through story, pictures, and discovery. On a Pacific shoreline of pebbles, driftwood, and ocean waves, Mia and Alex follow two mysterious ant paths. With Mr. Numberwise as their guide, they discover how equations describe paths—and how their meeting point can reveal a treasure. Wooden staircases make slope visible. A treasure map introduces coordinates. Red and blue paths help children understand graphs and intersections. Young learners explore: • linear equations • slope and starting values • coordinates and graphing • intersections of straight lines The book combines colorful illustrations, step-by-step explanations, solved exercises, and practice worksheets. Its visual approach helps children connect mathematical symbols with ideas they can see. Designed mainly for ages 10–14, it can be enjoyed at home, in classrooms, or with an adult supporting a younger learner. An English-language mathematics adventure in a contemporary Nuu-chah-nulth setting. Follow the paths. Find their meeting point. Discover the mathematics behind the treasure. Chuu wey! Goodbye! #NuuChahNulth #NuuChahNulthLanguage #VancouverIsland #WestCoast #PacificCoast #BritishColumbia #Canada #CoastalLife #Ocean #Crabs #Octopus #Ants #TreasureHunt #Adventure #Kids #HappyKids #LearningThroughStories #VisualLearning #VisualAlgebra #MathMadeClear #Happy #HappyEdu #HappyKids #HappyMath #OceanFauna #MarineLife #VancouverFauna #PacificKids #MrNumberwise 20261007_0026_00(00)0 20261009_0834_70(17)1 20261012_0030_447(128)4

Tanshi! Hello! Discover algebra through a treasure adventure at Batoche. https://www.amazon.ca/dp/B0H4SGZ6PL The Ants’ Treasure at Batoche: Where the Paths Meet invites children and families in Métis communities to explore mathematics through story, pictures, and discovery. Paywiichaywin! Come with me! Join Mia and Alex near the South Saskatchewan River, where two mysterious ant paths lead to a mathematical surprise. With Mr. Numberwise as their guide, they discover how equations describe paths—and how their meeting point can reveal a treasure. Aen pchi shmayn—a small path—becomes the starting point for a big discovery. This English-language adventure brings visual mathematics into a contemporary Métis setting, with family connections, fiddle music, and details inspired by Métis beadwork and woven sashes. Staircases make slope visible. A treasure map introduces coordinates. Red and blue paths help children understand graphs and intersections. Young learners explore: • linear equations • slope and starting values • coordinates and graphing • intersections of straight lines Memorable visual explanations turn an equation into the recipe for a path, coordinates into the address of a point, and an intersection into the place where two path-stories meet. The book combines colorful illustrations, step-by-step explanations, solved exercises, and practice worksheets. Designed mainly for ages 10–14, it can be enjoyed at home, in classrooms, or with an adult supporting a younger learner. Shipwayhtaytaak! Let’s go! Follow the paths. Find their meeting point. Discover the mathematics behind the treasure. Miina kawaapamitin! See you again! #Michif #MichifLanguage #Métis #MétisCulture #Batoche #SouthSaskatchewanRiver #Saskatchewan #Canada #CanadianKids #IndigenousEducation #FiddleMusic #Beadwork #MétisSash #Ants #TreasureHunt #Adventure #Kids #Happy #HappyEdu #HappyKids #HappyMath #LearningThroughStories #VisualLearning #VisualAlgebra #MathMadeClear #MrNumberwise 20261007_0050 20261007_2343 #0271 20261009_0827 197(122)2 20261009_1835_214(216)2 20261012_0032_674(341)6

The author wrote that October 7 had again shown antisemitism remained a serious threat, warning that it continued to spread and attack society’s foundations. They called for an end to complacency and indifference and urged Europe to show greater resolve. #Antisemitism #Europe #StopHate #EU

We are happy to see you! Discover algebra through a coastal adventure on Vancouver Island. The Ants’ Treasure on Vancouver Island: Where the Paths Meet invites children and families in Nuu-chah-nulth communities to explore mathematics through story, pictures, and discovery. On a Pacific shoreline of pebbles, driftwood, and ocean waves, Mia and Alex follow two mysterious ant paths. With Mr. Numberwise as their guide, they discover how equations describe paths—and how their meeting point can reveal a treasure. Wooden staircases make slope visible. A treasure map introduces coordinates. Red and blue paths help children understand graphs and intersections. Young learners explore: • linear equations • slope and starting values • coordinates and graphing • intersections of straight lines The book combines colorful illustrations, step-by-step explanations, solved exercises, and practice worksheets. Its visual approach helps children connect mathematical symbols with ideas they can see. Designed mainly for ages 10–14, it can be enjoyed at home, in classrooms, or with an adult supporting a younger learner. An English-language mathematics adventure in a contemporary Nuu-chah-nulth setting. Follow the paths. Find their meeting point. Discover the mathematics behind the treasure. Goodbye! (translated)

Peter Magyar, the Prime Minister, announced the details of the planned changes to the wealth tax for billionaires and the KATA taxation, which will come into effect in 2027, aiming to improve social protection and expand the tax options for small businesses. #Mészáros #Fidesz #ViktorOrbán (translated)

Arthur Schopenhauer: Knowing too many truths about man, I cannot expect anything good from him. Absolute proof of the truth of this statement is the contemplation and possibility of realizing the greatest crime of the destruction of the Earth and all humanity by the ruling global elite, as well as the endless wars and genocides committed by it. What negative qualities in humans did Schopenhauer discover that deeply disappointed him? A blind, irrational, and insatiable drive that governs all people and pushes them towards selfishness and suffering. Inherent selfishness and malice Selfishness is the main driving force of man. It is the desire for one's own well-being, which is often limitless. A person is willing to sacrifice the happiness of others to satisfy even the smallest whims. Malice (malevolence): The desire to cause harm or suffering to another without any personal gain, simply out of envy or sheer cruelty. Schopenhauer believes that humans are the only beings that take pleasure in the suffering of their kind. Lack of true morality. Most people do not possess true compassion. They behave "morally" or "civilized" only out of fear of the law, public opinion, or loss of reputation. If these external constraints are removed, a person quickly reveals their true, savage nature. Intellectual superficiality and stupidity. Schopenhauer was deeply disappointed by the low intellectual level of the majority. According to him, most people are: Herd animals: Prone to blindly follow fashion, authorities, and public opinion rather than think critically. Incapable of higher spiritual pleasures: Satisfied only with material goods, sensory pleasures, and empty conversations. Hypocrisy and falseness The philosopher views social rituals and etiquettes as a mask behind which people hide their hostility and selfishness. Politeness is merely "artificial skin," protecting us from mutual harm with our true intentions. Insatiability and eternal dissatisfaction Humans are doomed to an eternal cycle between desire (which brings pain until fulfilled) and boredom, devaluation, and weariness (which occur immediately after the desire is satisfied). This psychological trap makes people eternally grumbling, ungrateful, and unhappy beings. (translated)

The author wrote that they analyzed the academic affiliations of nearly 6,000 award-winning researchers across 18 major fields in the natural sciences, engineering and social sciences, covering the 1820s to the 2020s and focusing on the period from the 1960s onward. They said the analysis showed a trend of declining concentration.