The author wrote that quotes circulating in the information space, which they said suggested Russians were mocking the United States, had made the saga seem like a circus. They argued that the issue remained serious and described the US energy deal with Putin’s Russia as harmful and irrational. #US #RU
The author asked how Europe was preparing for a historic enlargement and said European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos had presented a new EU enlargement strategy in Strasbourg. They described the geopolitical context as shaped by Russia’s aggression. https://t.co/nejz0HkH6U #UE #Élargissement #Géopolitique #EU #FR #RU
Nigeria – how pro-Russian influence networks sell military rule as the answer When Nigerians took to the streets in August 2024 to protest soaring living costs and frustration with government, some demonstrations acquired an unexpected symbol: the Russian flag. In Kano, Kaduna and other northern cities, protesters were filmed carrying Russian colours and calling for Moscow’s intervention. Some demanded a military takeover. What initially looked like an unusual expression of anger has since become part of a much larger picture. A September 2026 assessment by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies describes Nigeria as a major target of overlapping foreign information operations, with Russia the most active external actor in its information space. The report does not identify a single centrally controlled campaign. Instead, it maps an ecosystem in which genuine dissatisfaction over insecurity, corruption and living standards is repeatedly redirected towards a broader proposition: democratic government has failed, while the military-led regimes of the Sahel offer a more effective alternative. Turning a real protest into a pro-Russian message The clearest example emerged during the 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests. Nigerian investigative reporting found that a Kano-based TikTok influencer with more than 100,000 followers had been paid through a Telegram channel associated with African Initiative, a Moscow-based media operation linked by researchers to Russian influence activity in Africa. The influencer said the channel supplied photographs, videos and talking points for redistribution on TikTok and Instagram. Among the messages provided were phrases such as “Putin please come and save Nigeria” and “The army is the answer for Nigeria”. Influencers were encouraged to use Hausa-language hashtags including #Zangazanga – “protest” – alongside references to Putin and Russia. Investigators identified 38 accounts circulating similar pro-Russian and pro-military narratives during the demonstrations. Russian flags subsequently appeared among protesters in several northern cities. This does not mean the protests themselves were created by Russia. They were driven by genuine economic and political grievances, and Nigerian protesters gave different reasons for carrying Russian flags. The important feature of the influence activity was precisely that it did not need to manufacture the original anger. It could attach a geopolitical message to an existing domestic crisis. From frustration to the idea of military government The narrative fits a wider pattern seen across West Africa. Russia has developed close relations with the military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while pro-Russian media ecosystems routinely portray those states as examples of sovereignty, stability and resistance to Western influence. Nigeria, by contrast, has remained under constitutional civilian government since 1999. Africa Center researchers say information networks targeting Nigerians increasingly contrast these two models. Recurring messages depict elections as wasteful or predetermined, civilian institutions as incapable of protecting citizens and military governments as more decisive on security and development. Some content portrays the Sahelian juntas as delivering better roads, lower prices and stronger security even where available evidence points to continuing or worsening instability. Language is central to the strategy. Hausa is spoken across northern Nigeria and neighbouring Niger, allowing political narratives to travel across borders that are far less important online than they are on maps. HumAngle documented efforts involving Nigerien state-linked actors to cultivate Hausa-speaking journalists and distribute material favourable to Niger’s junta and hostile to France and Western influence. The Russian and Sahelian-junta information ecosystems are not identical, but their narratives frequently reinforce one another. Fake journalists inside real Nigerian media The campaign environment extends beyond social media. A 2026 investigation by Graphika and Code for Africa identified 44 ghost reporters and fake experts whose identities were used to place Russia-aligned narratives in African media. Thirty-eight were assessed with high confidence to be fabricated. Their articles or quotations appeared across 138 websites and were amplified by at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages. Nigeria was one of the most heavily targeted countries. According to the Africa Center’s analysis of the research, Daily Post Nigeria carried 39 articles involving 14 identified ghost authors. Once published by a genuine Nigerian outlet, such material could then be cited by other websites, social-media accounts or even Russian official channels as though it had originated independently in Africa. This is information laundering rather than simple propaganda: the most valuable asset being borrowed is the credibility of the local newsroom. Generative AI added another layer. OpenAI and Meta separately disrupted a Russia-origin network that produced Africa-focused political content and operated Facebook Pages posing as local media organisations. One fabricated commentator, “Dr Manuel Godsin”, was presented as a European-trained geopolitical expert although investigators found no evidence supporting his academic biography. ChatGPT had been used to generate articles under the persona’s name, while Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the broader network. Different networks, similar strategic direction It would be misleading to merge all these activities into a single Russian command structure. The African Initiative-linked influencer campaign, the ghost-reporter network and the AI-enabled operation disrupted by OpenAI and Meta were uncovered separately and used different infrastructure. Public evidence does not demonstrate that every actor reported to the same organisation. What connects them is a recurring set of themes and methods: portraying Western partnerships as exploitative, presenting Russia as an alternative security partner, amplifying failures of civilian government, and giving military-led rule greater legitimacy. Investigative reporting on leaked Russian documents has meanwhile described a much wider influence apparatus operating across Africa, involving political consultants, paid journalists, influencers and locally tailored campaigns intended to reduce Western influence and expand Moscow’s position. The underlying technique is less about inventing dissatisfaction than redirecting it. Nigeria faces real security threats, economic pressure and public frustration. Influence operators do not need to persuade Nigerians that those problems exist. They need only influence the explanation for why they exist – and which political model appears to offer the answer. That is what makes the Nigerian case significant. The most effective propaganda does not necessarily introduce a completely false reality. It takes a real crisis and changes where the audience is encouraged to look for the solution. Sources Africa Center for Strategic Studies — The Raging Information Battle in Nigeria https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-raging-information-battle-in-nigeria/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ TheCable — Ghost reporters in African media https://www.thecable.ng/ghost-reporters-how-fabricated-african-voices-carried-pro-russia-narratives/ HumAngle — Nigeria Is Facing an Information War in Its Own Language https://www.humanglemedia.com/nigeria-is-facing-an-information-war-in-its-own-language DAIDAC / CJID — Russian influence during #EndBadGovernance https://daidac.thecjid.org/how-telegram-tiktok-aided-russian-disinformation-that-led-to-incarceration-of-nigerian-minors/ FactCheckHub — How Nigeria’s hunger protest took a radical turn https://factcheckhub.com/from-economic-protests-to-coup-agitation-how-nigerias-hunger-march-took-a-radical-turn/ News24 — Fake Kremlin-linked analyst planted stories in African media https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard — AI ‘expert’ exposed https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Africa Confidential — How Moscow wages social media war https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/15961/how-moscow-wages-social-media-war Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode15 #Nigeria #Russia #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Africa #WestAfrica #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Propaganda #MilitaryRule #MilitaryGovernment #Democracy #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #AfricanInitiative #EndBadGovernance #Hausa #LocalInfluencers #GhostReporters #FakeExperts #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPersonas #SyntheticMedia #AIPropaganda #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #Telegram #TikTok #DigitalInfluence #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #MediaManipulation #Sahel #Geopolitics #OSINT #WRLD
The author argued that EU enlargement was a geopolitical imperative and said Europe needed to prepare its institutions, uphold its standards and ensure a level playing field. They added that farmers should be protected where necessary during the transition, saying the aim was to make the EU stronger, not simply bigger.
The author described diplomacy in Rome as facing intense conditions, citing what they called unprecedented challenges to multilateralism and a further escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine. They said this threatened European and global food security. The post ended with an incomplete reference to an official website. https://t.co/G0eKVyKGVC #Geopolitics #Diplomacy #Ukraine #IT #RU #UA #EU
At PfE Foundation Academy, the author argued that an irreversible shift in transatlantic relations from the arrangement Europe had known since at least 1989 would be one of the continent’s defining future issues. They said Europe needed to develop an appropriate geopolitical and economic response soon. #TransatlanticRelations #Geopolitics #Europe #EU
Eduardo Bolsonaro called for Brazil to leave BRICS, saying the country’s future did not lie with what he described as Putin’s authoritarian geopolitical bloc. He said Brazil should strengthen democracy, complete its OECD accession and deepen its partnership with Europe, aligning itself with what he called the democratic, prosperous and open world. https://t.co/pidirF2tDm #Brasil #Democracia #Geopolítica #BR #RU #EU
The author argued that BRICS was no longer a viable vision for Brazil, saying the country belonged with free democracies, the OECD, Europe and the United States rather than in Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical project. They claimed millions of Brazilians had voted for change and said a decisive choice lay ahead, which they associated with freedom and prosperity. https://t.co/evwn2bOq1d #Brasil #Liberdade #Democracia #BR #US #RU #OECD #EU
The post argued that Brazil faced a choice between remaining in what it described as an authoritarian bloc dominated by Russia and China and moving towards the “Free World.” It said a Bolsonaro victory should lead Brazil to leave BRICS and rebuild, and included a link. https://t.co/lE0qGMhJR4 #Bolsonaro #Brasil #Liberdade #BR #RU #CN #US (translated)
The author argued that Brazil faced a choice between staying in what they described as an authoritarian bloc dominated by Russia and China and moving toward the “Free World.” They said a Bolsonaro victory should mean leaving BRICS and called for rebuilding, attaching a link. https://t.co/eAkHqOIzpL #Brasil #Liberdade #Geopolítica #BR #RU #CN #US (translated)
The police apprehended two young men in Rakvere who are suspected of being involved in drug trafficking and who were linked to more than 450 drug hiding places across Estonia, confiscating several kilograms of various narcotic substances from their possessions. #Venemaa #Euroopa #tuumarelvad (translated)
The author wrote that Lula openly supported BRICS and a multipolar world order, while his government described BRICS’ consolidation as a major advance. The author also said Lula had called Vladimir Putin a founding creator of an entity linked in the post, which was not identified in the text. https://t.co/sA3920SC2m #Brasil #BRICS #Geopolítica #BR #RU
The author wrote that Lula openly supported BRICS and a multipolar world order, and said his government had described BRICS’ consolidation as a major advance. The post also said Lula had personally called Vladimir Putin a founding figure of BRICS. https://t.co/R61W3136Sw #Brasil #BRICS #Geopolítica #BR #RU
The author said they had just returned from Saint Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai, which they described as the world’s oldest operating Christian monastery and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. They said it was in the Sinai Peninsula, in the desert and in a geopolitically critical region of the Middle East. https://t.co/PAmFX3nVrx #Sinai #UNESCO #ChristianMonastery #EG #EU
Time for EXUNO? My argument is simple: Ukraine, Israel, Kosovo and Taiwan expose fundamental weaknesses in today’s UN system. The problem is not international cooperation. The problem is a global security architecture in which geopolitical power can override collective action. https://t.co/bEo715bT5I #UNReform #GlobalSecurity #Geopolitics #UA #IL #XK #TW
China is a great power — but GDP per capita tells another story. China has a huge economy, extraordinary industrial capacity, global technological ambitions and real geopolitical weight. But prosperity per person still remains far below the EU level. World Bank 2025: China GDP https://t.co/9r8iMgugqI #China #GDP #Economy #CN #EU
I spoke with @EurasiaGroup Founder and President @ianbremmer about transatlantic relations amid geopolitical uncertainties, efforts to strengthen energy security, role of the AI, the situation in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as investments in defense technology. Croatia https://t.co/Vn5qqvCDbN #TransatlanticRelations #EnergySecurity #Geopolitics #UA #HR #ME
The Return to Feudalism in 21st Century Garb A simple observer's viewpoint, with no claim to hold any absolute truth. The Veneer Cracks There is something strangely archaic about the world unfolding before our eyes, despite its satellites, artificial intelligence, and promises of infinite progress. Here and there, we witness heads of state behaving like feudal lords of another age, patiently nibbling away at the neighboring territory, redrawing borders through force rather than law, as if governing a nation mattered less than expanding one's fiefdom. No names need be mentioned here: current events provide plenty of illustration, and each reader will recognize, according to their own geography and moment of reading, the faces that embody this observation. But this return to the archaic is not confined to grand geopolitical stages. It also permeates the most ordinary daily life—that of social media, where anyone can pour out venom against another without filter, without form, and often without the slightest argument. The verbal jousting of yesteryear, with its codes, its rhetoric, its tacit limits, has given way to raw invective, snap judgment, instant condemnation. We no longer debate: we execute, verbally—and sometimes it doesn't stop at words. The Vanished Inhibition What strikes one, in this dual observation—macro-political and micro-social—is the lifting of an inhibition we thought firmly anchored. Centuries of cultural construction, education, philosophy, sometimes religion, had patiently shaped mechanisms of restraint: politeness as social ritual, argumentation as a mode of resolving disagreement, respect for one's opponent as the very foundation of democratic debate. This civilizational veneer, however fragile it always was, seemed to hold. Today it is cracking, and the question—which for me remains a simple hypothesis, not a certainty—is why. A convenient explanation would blame social media: anonymity, the distance of the screen, the instantaneousness of publication would favor verbal acting-out without the usual mediation of reflection. This is probably true, but likely insufficient. For technology here is only an accelerant, an amplifier—not necessarily a root cause. A Poorly Formatted Neocortex? The more unsettling hypothesis—and I frame it explicitly as hypothesis, not scientifically established fact—is that of a failure in the formation of moral judgment and tolerance toward otherness. The human brain possesses the neural structures enabling empathy, the distancing of impulsive reaction, the acceptance of difference—but these capacities are not innate in their full exercise: they must be built, educated, cultivated, like a muscle that needs patient training from childhood onward. If this education in otherness, nuance, and tolerance of disagreement erodes—for multiple and undoubtedly complex reasons that are not mine to settle here—then older reflexes resurface: instinctive distrust of the stranger outside the clan, the law of the strongest, the logic of territorial or symbolic predation. The other ceases to be a possible interlocutor and becomes once again a potential threat, unless they belong to my tribe, my clan, my party, my digital bubble. Two Scales, One Logic What is striking, in this deliberately provocative reading, is the structural similarity between these two scales. The leader who invades a neighbor in the name of a rediscovered greatness or a reinvented historical right, and the anonymous internet user who insults a stranger in the name of an unnegotiable conviction, may obey the same underlying grammar: that of territory to defend, clan to protect, the other to subdue or exclude rather than understand. The form has changed—satellites instead of horses, tweets instead of heralds—but the substance, in this reading that remains mine alone and commits no one else, seems strangely identical to that of feudal rivalries: the absence of a recognized third party, of an accepted common rule, of a respected arbitrating authority. Everyone becomes judge and party, lord of their own digital or territorial fiefdom. A Civilization on a Knife's Edge Norbert Elias, in his Civilizing Process, showed how Western societies had historically built, with remarkable slowness, an increasing control over impulses and direct violence, in favor of more sublimated forms of social regulation. What we may be observing today—and I stress again the conditional—is a form of regression in this process, or at least a fragilization of the veneer it had patiently laid down. Should we see this as an effect of great technological accelerations, which shake up our cognitive rhythms without leaving education time to adapt? A deeper crisis of the institutions tasked with transmitting these values of tolerance—school, family, religion, the rule of law? Or simply a cyclical movement of human history, where phases of policed civilization alternate with darker backlashes? I have no certain answer, and I would be wary of anyone claiming to hold one. In Conclusion, a Shared Concern This text is only a viewpoint, necessarily partial and subjective, on a world that sometimes seems to replay ancient logics in new clothing. Perhaps I am wrong to perceive a continuity between the feudal lord and the contemporary dictator, between the anonymous online insult and the absence of education in nuance. Perhaps these phenomena are unrelated, or too complex to be thus summarized. But if this reading, even partially, hits the mark, then the question that arises is less one of technological regulation—though necessary—than the far more arduous question of how to rebuild, generation after generation, this capacity to accept the other in their difference, to debate without destroying, to coexist without necessarily dominating. This undertaking, if it exists, will not be resolved by an algorithm nor by an international treaty. It plays out, patiently, in the most elementary education—the one that teaches a child that the other is not a threat, but a possibility. Bibliography Elias, N. (1939). Über den Prozess der Zivilisation [The Civilizing Process]. Oxford: Blackwell (Eng. trans. 1978-1982). Lorenz, K. (1963). Das sogenannte Böse [On Aggression]. London: Methuen (Eng. trans. 1966). Arendt, H. (1970). On Violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Han, B.-C. (2013). Im Schwarm [In the Swarm: Digital Prospects]. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Eng. trans. 2017).
Russia’s fake African newsrooms – propaganda designed to look local A Facebook user in Nairobi, Accra, Johannesburg or Luanda encounters what appears to be a local news page. It publishes stories about African politics, Western influence and relations with Russia. The language is tailored to an African audience and the page presents itself not as a foreign broadcaster, but as part of the local information landscape. Behind some of these outlets, however, Meta found operators based in Russia. In its 2026 threat research, the company disclosed a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour network targeting audiences in Angola, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the operation. Around 30,000 users followed at least one of the Pages, while the operators spent approximately $7,000 on Facebook and Instagram advertising, mostly in euros and US dollars. The numbers are relatively modest. The method is considerably more important. Rather than openly distributing Russian state messaging, the network posed as local African news sources and grassroots organisations, promoting narratives about Western colonialism and political interference while presenting Russia as a credible economic and political alternative. It was an old geopolitical message delivered through a much more effective identity: not Moscow speaking to Africa, but Africans apparently speaking to one another. A news outlet that was actually an influence operation Meta's investigation found that the network attempted to conceal its Russian origin while creating media brands that appeared indigenous to the countries they targeted. Its content amplified historical grievances against former colonial powers, criticised Western involvement in Africa and promoted closer relations with Russia. One example helps illustrate how the infrastructure was assembled. A Facebook Page targeting Kenya was called Kenya Watchtower. According to OpenAI's subsequent investigation, Facebook transparency records showed that the Page had previously been named “Farmtown5”. It appears to have been acquired or repurposed rather than built from scratch as a Kenyan news organisation. Some Pages also exposed administrator locations in Russia and Ukraine. Other elements of the network had previously targeted audiences in Zambia and Namibia. This use of apparently local identities is particularly important in the African information environment. A story published by RT or another identifiable Russian outlet arrives with an obvious geopolitical provenance. The same narrative presented by something resembling an independent Kenyan, Ghanaian or South African newsroom carries a different kind of credibility. The source appears closer to the reader, and the geopolitical interest behind the message becomes less visible. Then investigators found Dr Manuel Godsin The Facebook operation was only one part of a broader information ecosystem. OpenAI investigated related activity after receiving information from Meta and subsequently banned a ChatGPT account it assessed as likely originating in Russia. OpenAI called the campaign Operation No Bell. The account was being used to generate long-form articles and social-media posts about African geopolitics. Prompts were primarily written in English, but OpenAI also observed Russian-language instructions that the user described as coming from a manager. The operator sometimes explicitly asked the model to make the material appear less AI-generated – including requests to avoid stylistic features associated with machine-generated text and to write more like a human journalist. Many articles appeared under the name “Dr Manuel Godsin”, presented as an academic with a PhD from the University of Bergen and an affiliation with an organisation called the International Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. OpenAI could find no credible evidence that Godsin existed. Searches of Norway's National Research Information Repository and the University of Bergen library produced no record of him. Investigators subsequently discovered that a photograph used to represent Godsin had appeared years earlier on a Russian professional networking site and apparently belonged to a law student in St Petersburg. The fabricated academic identity was nevertheless remarkably productive. OpenAI identified 53 online articles carrying the Godsin byline. The fiction had moved beyond fake social-media pages and into the real media ecosystem. When propaganda enters genuine newsrooms This is the most consequential aspect of the operation. The articles were not confined to websites controlled by the influence network. Some were published by genuine African news organisations, including established South African outlets. The content mixed local political issues with broader geopolitical narratives. Some pieces criticised the United States and Britain or defended Russia's role in Africa. One accused the British NGO Crisis Action of fomenting protests in South Africa. Another praised Russia's presence in the Central African Republic. Other material addressed Kenya, Angola and relations between African governments and Washington. The mechanism represents a significant evolution from the classic troll-farm model. Instead of building an audience entirely on its own platforms, an influence operator can manufacture an apparently credible expert, generate articles in his name and persuade genuine news organisations to publish them. Once this happens, the propaganda acquires something a fake Facebook Page cannot provide: the institutional credibility of a real newsroom. OpenAI assessed No Bell's social-media impact as limited. One Facebook Page had around 3,000 followers before Meta removed it, while several others had very small audiences. But the operation was more successful in placing material in established media. In OpenAI's impact framework, it approached the level at which an influence operation breaks into mainstream media. For information operators, a single article published by a recognised outlet can potentially be more valuable than thousands of impressions generated by an obviously artificial account. A much larger network of ghost journalists Subsequent research suggests that Manuel Godsin was not an isolated experiment. In August 2026, Graphika, working with Code for Africa and with support from Meta, published a much broader investigation into Russian ghostwriting operations across African media. Researchers identified 44 ghost writers and fake experts, 38 of them assessed as high-confidence fabricated personas, operating between 2021 and 2026. Their material appeared or was quoted across 138 websites and was subsequently republished through at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages, including authentic users, coordinated inauthentic networks and official Russian communication channels. The narratives were strikingly consistent. They included criticism of France, Ukraine and the United States; attacks on organisations such as ECOWAS and the International Criminal Court; positive portrayals of Russian involvement in Africa; praise for Russian paramilitary forces; and support for sovereignty-oriented political projects such as the Alliance of Sahel States. The operation therefore extends beyond creating fake news websites. It attempts to insert Russian-aligned narratives into the legitimate African media ecosystem using identities that appear African, independent or academically authoritative. This also explains why measuring reach through the original Facebook network alone is misleading. A fabricated article may begin with an influence operator, appear in a genuine African publication, be republished elsewhere and eventually circulate without any visible connection to Russia. At that point, the provenance of the narrative has effectively been laundered. An old Russian strategy with increasingly local faces Russia's use of local intermediaries in Africa is not new. Meta documented Russian networks using African nationals as early as 2019. In 2020 it dismantled another operation involving people in Ghana and Nigeria working on behalf of individuals in Russia, with links to previous activity associated with the Internet Research Agency. More recent Meta investigations suggest that this model has continued to evolve. Networks have increasingly relied on local freelancers, social-media managers and authentic media outlets rather than exclusively operating armies of obviously fake Russian-controlled accounts. This decentralisation offers several advantages. Local operators understand language, political sensitivities and cultural references. Authentic accounts are harder to identify than newly created synthetic personas. Local media brands can also deliver narratives without immediately triggering the scepticism associated with Russian state outlets. There is no evidence that every African journalist, freelancer or publication carrying such material knowingly participates in Russian influence activity. Meta explicitly notes in its investigations that some local contractors may not know who ultimately commissioned their work. That distinction is essential. The operation's effectiveness partly depends on precisely this ambiguity between deliberate participation, commercial content placement and unwitting amplification. The objective is to make Russian narratives look African The significance of this network is therefore not its 30,000 Facebook followers or its $7,000 advertising budget. Those figures are small compared with the audiences of major African media organisations. What matters is the distribution model. Traditional foreign propaganda asks an audience to trust a foreign source. These operations attempt to remove the foreign source from the equation altogether. A Russian geopolitical narrative can be generated with AI, attributed to an expert who does not exist, published by a media organisation that does, amplified through a Facebook Page presenting itself as local, and then rediscovered elsewhere as apparently independent African analysis. By the time the reader encounters it, Moscow may have disappeared completely from the chain of attribution. The resulting information operation is therefore less about making Russian propaganda more persuasive than about making it look as though it is no longer Russian propaganda at all. In an increasingly fragmented African media environment, that may be the more important evolution to watch. SOURCES: Meta Threat Research https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h1-2026-russia-based-cib-network-1/ OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina News24 https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2019 https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/removing-more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2020 https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta Threat Research — Russian Use of Authentic Operators in Sub-Saharan Africa https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h2-2025-russia-based-cib-network-2/ KEYWORDS: #DISINFORMED #Episode7 #Russia #Africa #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeNews #FakeMedia #FakeNewsrooms #MediaImpersonation #GrassrootsManipulation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SyntheticMedia #FakeInfluencers #SocialMediaManipulation #Facebook #Meta #OperationNoBell #AfricanMedia #MediaManipulation #Propaganda #DigitalInfluence #Angola #Ghana #Kenya #SouthAfrica #OSINT #WRLD
3⃣ We also discussed current geopolitical developments as well as the potential risks related to AI, including Lethal Autonomous Weapons. (vdb) #Geopolitics #AI #LethalAutonomousWeapons #Nospecificcountriesmentioned.
