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Jamesons stated that Meta reactivated its Instagram page after removing it in July, when it had more than 30,000 followers. According to the author, the company informed via email that the account did not violate Community Standards and could be used normally again. He said the page was deactivated for more than three months, including the entire first round of elections, and that the absence caused losses in reach, engagement, events, and content opportunities. Jamesons stated that he turned to the courts and that the process would continue, as the reactivation would not compensate for the damages. The author also alleged that Meta had been arbitrarily banning left-wing accounts while reducing their reach. He thanked those who followed the project during the period and asked for support to rebuild the page's presence on Instagram, with likes, comments, shares, and other interactions. #CulturaPop #LiberdadeDeExpressão #Justiça (translated)

Leandro Ruschel stated that a reporter from Veja considered that the attention given to the recording published by the magazine would be diverting focus from more serious allegations based on messages found on Daniel Vorcaro's cell phone. According to Ruschel, the reporter said that messages from 2024 and 2025 would indicate a collusion with executives from the pension funds of Banco do Brasil, Caixa, Petrobras, and Correios to raise R$ 10 billion, of which R$ 1 billion would be destined to the PT as a bribe. The account also mentioned more than 450 messages with an operator linked to the office of Minister Alexandre Padilha. Ruschel said that, according to the report, Banco Master entered in May 2024 a government list that would allow it to receive investments from the funds, despite having low credit ratings and being under investigation for fraud. During the same period, the bank reportedly negotiated R$ 500 million in credit letters with Caixa; the operation retreated after O Globo reported, in July 2024, the removal of two managers who had issued a negative opinion. The report also claimed that Padilha had said, in a meeting at the Palácio do Planalto, that agreements made with Olavo Noleto would count as agreements with the minister himself, and that, after dinner at Vorcaro's house in October 2024, the banker received a message saying that Lula would meet him and had liked the conversation. According to Ruschel, the reporter stated that Lula received Vorcaro in December and that messages from lawyer Walfrido Warde suggested pressure on the Central Bank to save Master. He added that Vorcaro would have presented the account to the Attorney General's Office (PGR), which had refused to receive the material, and that there would be evidence involving PGR members who had contact with the defense. Ruschel said that the reporter argued that Vorcaro should be heard and warned of the risk of diverting workers' resources to save the bank. #Corrupção #Política #Justiça (translated)

Felipe Moura Brasil shared the transcription of a reporter from Veja who defended a report amid the reactions to the publication of a recording. The journalist stated that, in addition to the audio, the article was based on messages found on Daniel Vorcaro's cell phone before he formalized a plea deal proposal. According to the reporter, Vorcaro had already presented a third proposal to the PGR, but the agency did not want to listen to him. In the transcription, the reporter claimed that messages from 2024 and 2025 indicated that Vorcaro had intermediaries at the Palácio do Planalto who were working with executives from the pension funds of Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica, Petrobras, and Correios. He asserted that the objective was to raise 10 billion reais from these funds, with 1 billion reais earmarked for bribes to the PT, as part of an agreement to save Banco Master. He also said that an operator linked to the office of Minister Alexandre Padilha sought fund executives and that meetings had been organized to facilitate the bank's operations. The reporter further stated that, in May 2024, Banco Master entered the so-called "exhaustive list," which, according to him, allowed the funds to invest in the institution. At the same time, he said, the bank was negotiating credit letters worth 500 million reais with Caixa Econômica. According to the journalist, the operation did not progress after the newspaper O Globo reported, in July 2024, that two managers from Caixa had been removed for issuing a negative opinion. He added that Vorcaro had reported, in a plea deal proposal to which the report had access, that Padilha and other PT members backed down after the case was disclosed. #Lula #Corrupção #Política (translated)

The water crisis in Almada, which left taps dry in July, was seen as a window of opportunity by the president of SMAS to reinforce resilience and solve long-standing disputes with Seixal, with the resolution of the CBR2 well problem expected soon. #Água #Almada #Seixal (translated)

Leonardo Dias wrote that, according to VEJA magazine (issue 3016, from 10/9/2026), Daniel Vorcaro reportedly detailed in audio and in material submitted to the PGR in June how Banco Master obtained access to the pension funds of state entities. In the version attributed to Vorcaro, Jaques Wagner allegedly facilitated the connection, and partner Augusto Lima reportedly met with João Vaccari Neto. Dias stated that Vorcaro described a payment of about R$ 30 million in cash for Oliver Stone's documentary about Lula, through Paulo Okamotto, in addition to an undisclosed amount to the Lula Institute. Later, according to the report, the Master would pay 10% of what it raised from the funds of BB, Caixa, Petrobras, and Correios: Vorcaro estimated R$ 1 billion for the PT and R$ 9 billion for himself. The author also mentioned messages found on Vorcaro's cell phone. According to Dias, an operator identified as Júlio introduced him to Olavo Noleto, the executive secretary of Alexandre Padilha. On 4/29/2024, Master was said to have entered a list that released the funds; on the same day, Júlio allegedly demanded R$ 500,000. Two days later, a dinner with Padilha was said to have occurred at the banker’s house. In October, Júlio reportedly wrote that the president would meet with Vorcaro. Dias added that Padilha allegedly said dealing with Noleto was equivalent to dealing with him. According to the author, the operation stopped in July 2024, after it became public that Caixa managers opposed to the deal had lost their positions. Vorcaro was said to have claimed that municipal funds yielded R$ 6 million to Padilha’s group. Dias compared this amount to the more than R$ 60 million from Dark Horse and reported that Vorcaro differentiated the payments linked to Lula from those related to Flávio. Dias noted that Lula, Padilha, and Noleto denied the accusations. He also stated that there was no evidence that the meeting with Lula promised by Júlio took place; the only confirmed meeting at the Planalto, on 12/4/2024 and outside the official agenda, reportedly dealt with the Master at the Central Bank. The author said that the PGR dismissed the attachment due to a lack of evidence of cash payments and that the same archived material mentioned payments to Davi Alcolumbre and members of the Judiciary. #Lula #Corrupção #PolíticaBrasileira (translated)

Renato Souza reported that Cleitinho stated they had been on vacation since July and argued that the end of the 6x1 schedule should have already been approved. According to Souza, Cleitinho also said that it would be great to approve it that day and that the agenda did not interfere with the election. #Férias #Trabalho #Eleições (translated)

More than 2,700 migrants who were in Ceuta voluntarily returned to Morocco last week, while the Spanish government dismantled illegal camps and declared that it is closer to solving the crisis triggered by the massive influx of migrants in July. #Migração #Ceuta #Marrocos (translated)

Alex Moretti stated that a college had caught fire due to the precarious state of abandonment. He also wrote that the Ministry of Education of the Lula government ended the schedule of weekly transfers to federal universities after the blocking of R$ 1.6 billion from the ministry's budget by the government. He identified the information as news from July 2026. #Educação #GovernoLula #Faculdade (translated)

Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the Popular Party, launched his campaign in Ceuta promising to expel migrants who remained in the enclave after the immigration crisis in July, emphasizing the defense of Spanish territorial integrity and criticizing the management of the socialist government of Pedro Sánchez. #EleiçõesLegislativas #Ceuta #Migração (translated)

Pri stated that the Attorney General's Office did not oppose Flávio's visit to Jair Bolsonaro. According to her, Gonet assessed that there was no new fact that justified maintaining the restriction, imposed in July after the reading of a letter during a live broadcast. Pri added that the deadline expired on Sunday and that the opinion paved the way for the visit, but the decision rested with Alexandre de Moraes. https://t.co/M6mPBEfEV9 #Política #JairBolsonaro #AlexandredeMoraes (translated)

Gustavo Tutinha wrote that the information presented in the follow-up of the Judicial Recovery detailed the financial situation of Vasco and the SAF in 2026. According to him, the updated balance of loans was R$ 287.9 million: R$ 282.4 million in principal and R$ 5.5 million in interest and adjustment. Of this total, R$ 84 million corresponded to Crefisa and R$ 203.9 million to Almirante. Tutinha reported that the loan from Crefisa had a yield of CDI + 7% per year and quarterly amortizations until September 2028. Of the contracts with Almirante, R$ 156.5 million were updated by the CDI, maturing in December 2027, and R$ 47.4 million by the INPC, with maturities in July and August 2027. In July and August, according to him, two loans were contracted with Almirante Participações, of R$ 40 million and R$ 5.6 million, both with a single payment due in 2027. The operation of R$ 40 million also provided for a fiduciary assignment of part of the LFU receivables linked to the commercial appeal criterion. The consolidated tax debt of the recovering companies was approximately R$ 271 million and reached R$ 334 million with adjustments, fines, and interest, wrote Tutinha. During negotiations with the PGFN, Vasco and the Prosecutor's Office supposedly agreed to temporarily reduce the installments of the installments to R$ 580 thousand monthly until the consolidation of a new transaction. The cash balance reported on August 31 was R$ 5.6 million. Between January and August, the cash flow recorded R$ 201.4 million in receipts related to economic rights of athletes, according to Tutinha. Rayan accounted for R$ 171.9 million; Leandrinho was also mentioned with R$ 9.3 million; João Victor, with R$ 5.6 million; Luiz Gustavo, with R$ 5.3 million; Loide, with R$ 2.1 million; and Galarza, with R$ 2 million. Tutinha attributed the increase in marketing revenues in June to the receipt, in a single installment, of R$ 25 million from the master sponsorship contract with SportingBet. The SAF reported, according to Tutinha's account, that cash outflows in August were lower because R$ 46.6 million in payments were deferred to September: R$ 32.6 million in transfer fees, R$ 5.5 million in commissions, R$ 4.5 million in signing bonuses, R$ 3.4 million in taxes, and R$ 630 thousand in TEF. The cash flow recorded R$ 56.8 million in restructuring disbursements between January and August. The breakdown presented by the SAF, however, totaled R$ 59.1 million: R$ 21.9 million for the CNRD, R$ 19.5 million for tax installment plans, R$ 6.8 million related to Judicial Recovery, R$ 5.3 million for the Judicial Administrator and legal and financial advisors, R$ 4.3 million in transfers to the CRVG and R$ 1.3 million for BACEN. Tutinha observed that the itemized amounts did not match the total recorded in the cash flow. According to the numbers disclosed by him, the SAF had 46,347 active clients in the supporter program in January and 35,790 in August, a reduction of approximately 10.5 thousand. Of the clients registered in August, 35,214 were up to date with their payments. Tutinha also wrote that Vasco claimed to be meeting its obligations under the Judicial Recovery Plan on time and settling debts incurred after the recovery request and extrajudicial credits. In the CNRD, the club was to allocate R$ 15 million per year for the payment of three plans; the credits were adjusted by the IPCA and were not subject to discounts. Regarding the agreement concluded in September, Tutinha reported that 777 declared it did not oppose the establishment of the New SAF, the creation of the UPI Equity, the judicial sale of 90% of the shares, nor the transfer of the shares to the winner of the competitive process. The former controller also reportedly stated that it would withdraw from incidents and appeals related to Judicial Recovery and relinquish respective claims. Tutinha affirmed that the numbers outlined the financial operation of Vasco as the club moved towards a new phase of restructuring and the completion of the sale of the New SAF. #Vasco #Futebol #Finanças (translated)

Brazil’s synthetic voters – when AI manufactures public opinion They look like ordinary street interviews. A reporter approaches a passer-by in a Brazilian square and asks a simple question: who will you vote for? A young voter explains why Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva deserves another term. An elderly woman says Brazil needs Flávio Bolsonaro because he represents political renewal and greater security. The locations look plausible, the microphones are visible and the answers sound much like the brief political opinions heard in television vox pops around the world. None of the people are real. Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election on 4 October, fact-checking organisation Aos Fatos identified at least 50 TikTok videos in which artificial intelligence was used to manufacture voters, reporters and apparently spontaneous political interviews. Together, the videos had accumulated around 7.4 million views by mid-August. Some promoted Lula, others Flávio Bolsonaro, while another group used synthetic characters to ridicule or stereotype supporters of one side. Aos Fatos found no apparent evidence linking the accounts producing the videos to either presidential campaign. The opinion poll that never took place The format is important. These were not conventional deepfakes in which a recognisable politician is made to say something he never said. Instead, the creators reproduced the visual language of the vox pop – the short street interview used by broadcasters and social-media creators to illustrate what ordinary people supposedly think. In pro-Lula videos, synthetic voters described themselves as beneficiaries of social programmes or credited the president with improving their lives. In videos supporting Flávio Bolsonaro, artificial interviewees associated him with political renewal, public security and fighting corruption. Other clips were openly hostile: AI-generated characters presented as poor or living in parts of Brazil’s north-east were shown in dirty clothes or run-down surroundings, declaring support for Lula because they supposedly preferred welfare payments to work. The deception is therefore subtler than fabricating a candidate’s statement. It manufactures something that political communication normally treats as evidence of public sentiment. A real vox pop may be unscientific, but the people interviewed at least exist. These videos created the appearance that identifiable social groups – young people, pensioners, welfare recipients or residents of particular regions – were spontaneously expressing political preferences when no such encounters had taken place. An electoral-law specialist interviewed by Aos Fatos described the technique as the fabrication of a “social fact that never occurred”. That captures the central innovation: AI is being used not merely to falsify political speech, but to manufacture the impression of grassroots opinion. Fifty videos, but not one proven network The available evidence does not support describing the 50 posts as a centrally controlled influence operation. Aos Fatos located them through TikTok searches and recommendations produced by the platform itself, then examined the accounts responsible for publication. Most had relatively small individual audiences, although their combined reach was substantial. The first examples identified by the investigation appeared as early as March 2026. Activity increased in June and was concentrated particularly in July and the first half of August as Brazil’s election calendar intensified. Some accounts specialised in AI-generated videos generally, including fabricated podcast-style material. Others were explicitly political or supportive of a candidate, but Aos Fatos found no apparent links between those profiles and the official Lula or Bolsonaro campaigns. That distinction is essential. The evidence demonstrates a common technique and a shared political environment, not a single command structure. Some creators may have been motivated by ideology, others by engagement or monetisation. Publicly available evidence does not establish who commissioned the individual videos or whether any coordination existed between the accounts. This decentralised model also creates a different enforcement problem from a traditional bot network. There may be no headquarters to expose and no infrastructure whose removal disables the entire operation. The format itself can be copied by anyone with access to inexpensive generative-video tools. When the algorithm mixes real and synthetic citizens Aos Fatos documented another important feature of the phenomenon: TikTok’s recommendation system placed AI-generated interviews alongside genuine street interviews. For a user scrolling quickly through the platform, the transition between an authentic citizen and an entirely fabricated one could therefore be almost invisible. In 18 per cent of the 50 videos analysed, there was no indication that the people shown had been generated using AI. After Aos Fatos provided TikTok with the videos, the company said it had removed all of them for violating its rules on edited and AI-generated media. TikTok said its policies require creators to identify synthetic content and prohibit manipulated media capable of misleading users about matters of public importance or impersonating genuine journalistic material. The issue extends beyond one platform. Factchequeado’s review of Brazil’s 2026 election campaign found that synthetic endorsements and other deepfakes had become one of the most visible forms of AI-assisted electoral misinformation, alongside fabricated candidate statements and invented scenes. Brazil already had rules for synthetic politics Brazil entered the campaign with unusually detailed electoral rules governing artificial intelligence. The Superior Electoral Court, the TSE, requires electoral propaganda using synthetic multimedia to disclose clearly that AI was used. More importantly for the fake-voter videos, its rules prohibit synthetic audio or video used to favour or harm a candidacy when it creates or alters the image or voice of a living, deceased or fictitious person. The difficulty is attribution and enforcement. When a synthetic video is published by an official campaign, responsibility can be relatively straightforward to investigate. When it comes from an apparently independent account with no demonstrated relationship to a candidate, lawyers interviewed by Aos Fatos said responsibility is more likely to fall on the individual creator, while imposing electoral sanctions on a campaign would require evidence of a connection. For the final 72 hours before the election and the 24 hours following it, the TSE has imposed additional restrictions on newly published or republished synthetic material involving candidates or public figures, reflecting the particular difficulty of correcting fabricated content immediately before voting. From deepfake politicians to synthetic electorates The Brazilian case illustrates a broader change in political manipulation. The first generation of electoral deepfakes concentrated on famous people: make a politician appear to say something damaging, or fabricate an endorsement from a celebrity. Synthetic vox pops reverse the perspective. The politician can remain completely authentic; it is the electorate around the politician that is fabricated. That changes the psychological proposition of the message. Instead of saying the candidate believes this, the video suggests people like you believe this. Age, clothing, accent, neighbourhood and social class can all be generated to construct an artificial constituency around almost any political claim. There is no evidence that the 50 Brazilian videos identified by Aos Fatos constitute a single centrally directed campaign, nor evidence that they changed voting intentions. What they demonstrate is a technique whose barrier to entry has become extremely low. AI no longer needs to forge the politician. #DISINFORMED #Episode14 #Brazil #BrazilElection2026 #Elections #ElectionDisinformation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticVoters #SyntheticMedia #AIAvatars #AIGeneratedVideo #VoxPop #FakeInterviews #Astroturfing #AIPropaganda #PoliticalDisinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #SocialMediaManipulation #TikTok #PublicOpinion #ManufacturedConsent #SyntheticPublicOpinion #DigitalInfluence #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity #TSE #AosFatos #FactChecking #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD (translated)

🚨 Now! Corinthians has accumulated 4 overdue installments of an agreement that reduced its debt with the Union from R$ 1.2 billion to R$ 679 million. Timão failed to pay the installments for June, July, August, and September, totaling R$ 27.3 MILLION overdue. The contract allows for CANCELLATION after 3 overdue installments. The Attorney General of the National Treasury notified the club in August but stated that the agreement remains in effect and that Corinthians has 30 days to pay or present a defense. If canceled, the ORIGINAL amount of the debt will return, deducting only the amounts paid. Corinthians will also be 2 YEARS unable to enter into new tax agreements. The club stated that it relies on its good relationship with the PGFN to resolve the situation. 🗞️ @geglobo #Corinthians #Futebol #Dívidas (translated)

🚨 VASCO CONTESTS TECHNICAL CRITERIA OF FLA-FLU, POINTS OUT VIOLATION OF CONCESSION RULES AND CITES DECISION FROM TJRJ IN ACTION FOR MARACANÃ Vasco filed an obligation lawsuit on Wednesday (1st) with a request for urgent protective measures to try to secure the Maracanã against Boca Juniors on October 20, for the semifinal of the South American Cup. In the action, the club directly questions the technical criteria used by Fla-Flu to deny the stadium, points out unequal treatment, supports violations of concession rules, and also explores a contradiction involving the Memorandum of Understanding. 📌 WHAT FLA-FLU ALLEGED In response to Vasco, the concessionaire pointed to the accumulated wear of the lawn, the climatic conditions of July and August, and the need to preserve the intervals designated for field maintenance. For 10/20, Fla-Flu specifically mentioned games of Fluminense on 10/18 and Flamengo on 10/22. With Vasco x Boca between these matches, there would be three games in five days. According to the concessionaire, this sequence would prevent procedures such as helical mowing, targeted fertilization, supplemental lighting, and repair of damage to the lawn. 📌 VASCO QUESTIONS THE TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION The first counterpoint is the lawn itself. Vasco highlights that, three days after the denial, it was announced that the existing field would be removed and new Bermuda Celebration rolls would be placed, with the return of football scheduled for 10/08. Vasco x Boca will be on 10/20. The club's thesis is that it would not be possible to use the accumulated wear of the old lawn as justification for a match that will take place 12 days after the return of football to the renewed field. 📌 GREENLEAF DOCUMENT IS USED BY VASCO Vasco also retrieves the technical planning prepared by Greenleaf, the company responsible for lawn maintenance, in August. According to the action, the document shows that the same procedures cited by Fla-Flu to deny Vasco x Boca have already been carried out in a concentrated manner between matches. The petition states that helical mowing, targeted fertilization, supplemental lighting, and damage repair have even been grouped in a single day after a match, even in a winter scenario and lawn wear. The question posed by Vasco is direct: if this work could be done in August to accommodate the sequence of games from Flamengo and Fluminense, why couldn't it be repeated in October, after the complete lawn replacement? 📌 INTERVAL BETWEEN GAMES Vasco also contests the argument of three games in five days by comparing the situation with the recent calendar of the Maracanã. The action argues that sequences with reduced intervals for Flamengo and Fluminense matches have already been admitted. For Vasco, if the necessary interval for lawn recovery is decisive for denying a match, that criterion must be applied equally to all clubs. 📌 SHOWS AND OTHER EVENTS The action also points out that the Maracanã hosts shows, religious gatherings, and events from other sports, including the installation of structures and occupancy of the field area. Vasco questions how the administration can reconcile these events with lawn preservation, yet considers it technically unfeasible to host a semifinal of CONMEBOL. According to the data presented in the action, at least seven extraordinary events unrelated to official football were held between 2025 and 09/30/2026. 📌 CONCESSION NOTICE Vasco cites item 3.4 of the Terms of Reference, which gives priority to football events from the official calendars of FIFA, CONMEBOL, CBF, and FERJ over other events. Vasco x Boca is an official semifinal of CONMEBOL. The action argues that there would be an "inversion of this priority" by accommodating shows and other events and denying the stadium for a match that, under the concession rules cited by the club, should have priority. The petition mentions "distortion of the concessionaire's obligations" and "violation of the equal treatment required by the Concession Notice." 📌 UNEQUAL TREATMENT Vasco summarizes its challenge in four points: • the lawn replacement would change the premise of accumulated wear; • Greenleaf's own planning would demonstrate that maintenance could be carried out between matches; • the calendar would show reduced intervals that have already been admitted for Flamengo and Fluminense; • other events are reconciled with the necessary care for field preservation. As a result, Vasco asserts that restrictions are being applied selectively. The action further cites clause 13.2 of the Concession Contract, which prohibits favoritism and unjustifiably different, discriminatory treatment, or "without technical criteria" that results in restricted access to the Complex. 📌 THE CONTRADICTION POINTED OUT BY VASCO Fla-Flu claims not to recognize the validity of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2025. At the same time, according to Vasco, it uses the document itself—especially the provision for four matches conditioned on availability and operational conditions—to justify the denial. Vasco points out contradictory behavior and invokes the principle of good faith. 📌 PREVIOUS DECISION OF TJRJ The action also cites the Instrument Appeal No. 3023517-70.2026.8.19.0000. On that occasion, Justice Alexandre Freitas Câmara analyzed the discussion regarding the absence of Fla-Flu's signature on the Memorandum. The magistrate stated that Flamengo and Fluminense, members of the concessionaire, had signed the document and pointed out that disregarding it later could represent contradictory behavior contrary to good faith. 📌 RECOMMENDATION FROM BEPE The issue of public safety also appears as an argument for the use of the Maracanã. According to the action, BEPE (Specialized Battalion for Policing in Stadiums) recommended holding the match at the Maracanã due to the magnitude of the confrontation and the expected public turnout. Vasco uses this recommendation to argue that the Maracanã is not just a preference of the club. The petition points to the stadium as the option that best meets capacity, location, structure, security, and operational conditions to host the match against Boca. 📌 SÃO JANUÁRIO IS NOT AN OPTION Vasco also differentiates the situation from the previous process involving Vasco x Vitória, when it did not obtain a preliminary injunction to use the Maracanã. This time, according to the action, São Januário cannot host the semifinal. The South American Manual requires a minimum capacity of 30,000 spectators starting from the semifinals, while the petition indicates São Januário has approximately 21,880 seats. Vasco acknowledges the Nilton Santos Stadium as an alternative but argues that having another stadium does not resolve the issue brought to Justice: is there legitimate technical and contractual basis for Fla-Flu to deny Maracanã? 📌 WHAT VASCO SEEKS Vasco is seeking a preliminary injunction requiring Fla-Flu to make the Maracanã available for Vasco x Boca on 10/20 at 9:30 PM. The request includes the maximum ticket allocation corresponding to the authorized capacity, the use of necessary facilities for organizing the match, the implementation of a mosaic, and temporary installation of banners in the same manner allowed for the clubs that are members of the concessionaire. In case of non-compliance, Vasco requests a daily fine of R$ 1 million. Vasco must inform CONMEBOL by October 5 where it will hold the return match of the semifinal. #Vasco #Maracanã #Futebol (translated)

🚨WENT VIRAL In 2022, Lula DOUBLED Bolsonaro's simultaneous audience on Flow! Lula reached 1.096 MILLION viewers, while Bolsonaro had 573 THOUSAND. Flávio, in July, had about 4 THOUSAND. 😂 BRAZIL WITH LULA ON FLOW TURN OFF GLOBO DO NOT WATCH THE DEBATE NEVER AGAIN COUP https://t.co/BA4VVdIdhx #Lula #PolíticaBrasil #FlowPodcast (translated)

The master sponsorship contract of Flamengo is on 'stand-by'. The parties decided to wait until there is a definition regarding the Provisional Measure that prohibited bets, which will still be analyzed by Congress. Flamengo has already received the payment for 2026. Regarding the payment for 2027 (BRL 268.5 million), the club is counting on an incoming BRL 120 MILLION in JANUARY. Some clubs are awaiting payment from Flamengo in January, such as West Ham (for Paquetá), Atlético de Madrid (Samuel Lino), Milan (Emerson Royal), and Al Sadd (Plata). In July, there are payments to teams such as River Plate (Joaquín Freitas) and Antwerp (Anthony Valencia). The Rubro-Negro is counting on the sponsor's funds for these commitments. #Flamengo #Patrocínio #Futebol (translated)

🚨 Now! Corinthians ends July with only R$ 8.9 million in cash and increases loans by R$ 140 million. • ACCOUNT AT THE LIMIT Timão ended July 2026 with R$ 8.9 million in cash, even after increasing its loans and financing by 56% since December 2025. Cash fell R$ 17 million compared to R$ 26 million at the end of 2025. Compared to July 2025, when there were R$ 14.9 million, the reduction was about 40%. Loans and financing reached R$ 390 million — R$ 140 million above the R$ 250 million accumulated by December. Between January and July of this year, the club recorded a DEFICIT of R$ 278.7 MILLION, R$ 200.8 million ABOVE the loss predicted in the budget. • REVENUE ANTICIPATION AND LACK OF CREDIT To maintain payments in 2026, Corinthians anticipated revenues. Part of the funds was allocated to salaries and image rights. The club also anticipated amounts from the master sponsorship. The CBF released funds to Corinthians during the season, but REJECTED A NEW REQUEST on September 11. August salaries were paid late after an advance from the sponsor. Despite the increase in loans, the club faces resistance from major banks in obtaining new credit assignments. 🗞️ @UOL | @FabioLazaro_ #Corinthians #FutebolBrasileiro #FinançasDoFutebol (translated)