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The author said the first-ever #EUScreeningWeek had concluded, with all 27 Member States taking part. They said nearly 300 organisations had helped bring prevention closer to people, with more than 360 activities in 23 languages across over 200 cities, and close to 900 opportunities for free health checks. https://t.co/AuX9UkjpHT #EUScreeningWeek #HealthAwareness #Prevention #EU #AT #BE #BG #CY #CZ #DE #DK #EE #EL #ES #FI #FR #HR #HU #IE #IT #LT #LU #LV #MT #NL #PL #PT #RO #SE #SI #SK (translated)

Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD

“PUGLIA IN”: “ORTA NOVA SOUND LAB” CONQUERS NEW YORK: THE “COMMUNITY BAND” LANDS ON “BROADWAY WORLD” SOURCE: https://www.pugliain.net/303862-orta-nova-sound-lab-new-york-banda/ I am delighted that my article submitted to editor Chloe Rabinowitz has been accepted and published. In any case, we are not talking about just any website, but the largest theatre website in the world on the internet, the one that covers Broadway, the West End and beyond, with over 6 million visitors per month, present in 100 US cities, 45 countries and in 12 languages worldwide. __________________________________________________________________________ Orta Nova (FG) — The social and musical project “Orta Nova Sound Lab” debuted last week on the prestigious US portal BroadwayWorld, an international live performance network based in New York. The initiative, born in Orta Nova in the heart of Capitanata, nothern Puglia region in South Italy, to create a youth community band, was presented overseas as an innovative model of inclusion and urban regeneration for the Mezzogiorno. The Pulgian model of social regeneration through music, promoted by the “Associazione Nazionale Bande da Giro (ANBG)” chaired by Benedetto Grillo and supported by the Municipality of Orta Nova, has been admitted for funding by the Ministry of Culture under the call for strengthening music in suburbs and vulnerable areas. The project follows in the wake of interventions to counter youth distress and educational poverty envisaged in the spirit of the “Caivano Decree”. The article published in the American outlet is co-authored by New York editor Chris Rabinowitz and by Orta Nova author and researcher Luciano Magaldi Sardella. The text illustrates how the centuries-old Puglian wind-band tradition has been reinterpreted as an instrument of prevention and civic cohesion, thanks to collaboration between the MAO FM 19.77 association, the Olivetti Institute, the Pertini Institute, Music Art and the C.I.S.A. of Foggia. Why the News Went International The “Orta Nova Sound Lab” band project demonstrates that when a project has anti-mafia roots, pedagogical value, and a credible institutional network, the press responds. From local and national outlets such as Cassarmonica, Ansa Puglia, TGNorba, Corriere della Sera Bari, RaiNews TGR Puglia, La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, Amica9TV, Brindisi In, Puglia IN, Blasting News Italia, TRM Network, Secolo XIX, FoggiaToday, PlayNews24, Stato Quotidiano, and many others, which thoroughly documented the press conference, coverage has now reached “Broadway World”, which has interpreted the Orta Nova experience as a “social laboratory” capable of answering the mafia with music. This leap in scale derives from joint work and from the liaison work carried out by Luciano Magaldi Sardella, who, together with New York editor Chris Rabinowitz, succeeded in translating for an Anglophone audience the profound meaning of a town band that in Puglia is not folklore, but a civic garrison, a concrete alternative to young people’s dependence on electronic screens and to social disintegration. In a southern Italy often narrated solely through its emergencies, Orta Nova chooses to be narrated for its capacity to generate community. And this time, the news has travelled around the world, starting from a square in the Basso Tavoliere. The Stages of the Programme and the Major Concerts in Capitanata The programme, entirely free of charge for participants, offers training courses for wind and percussion instruments alongside ensemble music lessons. During October 2026, the streets of Orta Nova will host band parades and processions, whilst between November and December the area will see performances by the prestigious Gran Concerti Bandistici of Conversano and Bisceglie. The bill will reserve a specific space for equal opportunities with the all-female performance of the Orchestra Note di Puglia. The journey will culminate in January 2027 with the first official concert of the newly formed Banda di Comunità of Orta Nova, the culmination of a training itinerary that projects the social redemption of the Province of Foggia onto the global cultural scene.

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

The author said minority languages were part of Europe’s future, not relics of the past. They wrote that they had marked the European Day of Languages at the European Parliament with an exhibition by the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), and argued that AI should learn to speak all of Europe’s languages. https://t.co/1FhmYeFYkJ #Languages #Europe #Diversity #EU

Fake NV – how a cloned newsroom turned an AI video into a $140 million corruption scandal For two days in September, a website that looked almost indistinguishable from one of Ukraine’s best-known news organisations carried an extraordinary corruption story. It claimed that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau had raided former defence procurement chief Arsen Zhumadilov and discovered more than $140 million in cash packed inside refrigerator boxes. One box supposedly carried the words “For the Servant of the People” – an apparent reference to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s political party. The raid never happened. The photographs and video presented as evidence were fabricated, and the news organisation reporting the story was not the New Voice of Ukraine but a cloned version of it. The episode is a compact example of an increasingly effective disinformation technique. Rather than inventing a new propaganda outlet and trying to build its credibility from scratch, an operator can simply steal the identity of an established newsroom and place fabricated material inside an otherwise convincing copy of its editorial environment. A newsroom copied almost in full The counterfeit site appeared at nvukraine.com, while the authentic New Voice of Ukraine operates at nv.ua and english.nv.ua. Registration records examined by fact-checkers show that the false domain was created on 21 September 2026, two days before the fabricated article appeared. According to NV’s own investigation, the imitation went much further than copying a logo: the operators reproduced the site’s visual design, sections, branding, contact information and genuine editorial material. A snapshot of legitimate NV content from 23 September appears to have been copied onto the counterfeit site, into which the operators inserted a single false article. That article claimed that NABU had searched premises connected to Zhumadilov, who had headed Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency until August, and seized $140 million in cash. The story was published in several languages, including Ukrainian and English, suggesting that the operation was intended not only for Ukraine’s domestic information space but also for foreign audiences following the war and Western support for Kyiv. AI supplied the supposed evidence The false article was supported by a video purportedly showing the money discovered during the raid. NABU said no such search or procedural action had taken place and identified the footage as fabricated using artificial intelligence. Independent fact-checker Lead Stories found no credible Ukrainian or international reporting confirming either the raid or the alleged seizure, while searches of NABU’s own published material produced no evidence supporting the claim. The operation therefore combined two separate forms of synthetic credibility. The AI-generated footage supplied what looked like visual proof, while the cloned NV website supplied institutional proof: an apparently reputable Ukrainian newsroom supposedly confirming that the event had happened. Neither element needed to withstand close scrutiny for long. Together, they only needed to appear credible enough to be copied, quoted and redistributed before the deception was exposed. From a fake Ukrainian source into the Russian information ecosystem On 24 September, the story began moving through large pro-Russian Telegram channels. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications traced early amplification to Golos Mordora, with roughly 149,000 subscribers, and Militarist, with around 277,000. Within less than an hour, other channels including VOBLA, Rossiya Seychas and Ostashko! Vazhnoye were circulating versions of the same claim. It subsequently appeared on X and on Russian-language websites including e-news.su and pressa24.ru. Babel calculated that posts carrying the fabrication had accumulated approximately 370,000 views by the morning of 25 September. The story also moved beyond the Russian-language ecosystem. English-language versions appeared in online communities including Lemmy and Hexbear, while accounts on X shared direct links to the counterfeit NV article. NV later reported that larger Russian media and propaganda outlets, including RIA Novosti, Life, Vesti, Ukraina.ru and Mail.ru, had reproduced or discussed the claim. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and a Kremlin representative involved in contacts with the United States, also shared it on 25 September. This amplification is significant, but it should not be confused with proof of authorship. Publicly available evidence shows how the false story entered and spread through a Russian and pro-Russian information ecosystem. It does not establish which organisation registered the cloned domain, generated the video or directed the operation from the outset. Why copy NV? The operation relied on source laundering. A claim originating directly from a Russian Telegram channel that Ukraine’s defence procurement system had concealed $140 million would immediately carry an obvious political context. A claim apparently uncovered by an established Ukrainian newsroom looks very different. Once the fabricated NV article existed, subsequent accounts could cite what appeared to be an independent Ukrainian source rather than present the allegation as their own. Each repost moved the story another step away from its manufactured origin. The use of an English-language version strengthened that mechanism for audiences outside Ukraine. The underlying narrative was also carefully chosen. Corruption in Ukrainian defence procurement is a genuine subject of public scrutiny and investigative reporting, so the fabricated story did not require audiences to accept an entirely unfamiliar premise. It inserted a false event into a real area of political concern. That mixture of authentic context and fabricated evidence can be more persuasive than a completely invented story because much of the surrounding information feels recognisable. What can – and cannot – be attributed Ukrainian authorities and NV describe the episode as a Russian information operation, and its distribution can be documented extensively across pro-Russian and Russian media channels. The available public evidence, however, does not identify the organisation that created the counterfeit website, nor does it link the operation forensically to a named Russian intelligence service, military unit or state contractor. The most precise description is therefore a Russian-aligned disinformation operation whose fabricated material was systematically amplified through the Russian information ecosystem. That distinction matters. Distribution can be observed directly; command-and-control is harder to establish and should not be inferred without evidence. The newsroom itself becomes the deepfake The most important feature of the operation was not the $140 million figure or even the AI-generated video. It was the counterfeit newsroom surrounding them. The operators copied a real publication, populated it largely with genuine material and inserted a single false story, allowing the fabrication to borrow the accumulated credibility of journalists who had nothing to do with it. This points to a broader evolution in synthetic media. AI can fabricate an image, a voice or a video, but an influence operation can now fabricate something larger: the source that supposedly verified the evidence. In the Fake NV operation, the article, the video and the website reinforced one another, creating not simply a false story but a manufactured chain of credibility. Sources The New Voice of Ukraine — investigation into the cloned website https://english.nv.ua/nation/nv-discovers-fake-copy-of-website-with-planted-story-cites-russian-links-50644601.html The New Voice of Ukraine — Russian amplification of the $140 million fabrication https://english.nv.ua/russia-spreads-fake-140-million-ukraine-corruption-story-during-dmitriev-u-s-talks-50644647.html Lead Stories — independent fact-check https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-story-claims-140-million-found-at-home-of-ukraines-zhumadilov-marked-servant-of-the-people-nv-website-originated-it.html Babel — AI video and distribution analysis https://babel.ua/en/news/130469-a-video-is-sharing-online-about-140-million-found-in-the-possession-of-the-ex-head-of-the-defense-procurement-agency-this-is-an-ai-video-distributed-by-a-clone-of-ukrainian-media Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — initial debunk https://spravdi.org/en/ai-fake-about-140-million-amid-us-talks-how-russians-impose-the-image-of-corrupt-ukraine-on-the-west/ Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — NABU confirmation https://spravdi.org/u-merezhi-poshyryuyut-shi-fejk-pro-nibyto-obshuky-nabu-v-eksgolovy-agencziyi-oboronnyh-zakupivel/ Detector Media — distribution and NABU response https://detector.media/infospace/article/252806/2026-09-25-u-merezhi-pidrobyly-sayt-nv-dlya-poshyrennya-feyku-pro-obshuky-v-eksochilnyka-agentsii-oboronnykh-zakupivel/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode10 #FakeNV #NewVoiceOfUkraine #Ukraine #Russia #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #MediaImpersonation #ClonedMedia #FakeMedia #FakeNews #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #AIVideo #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #CorruptionNarrative #UkraineCorruption #DefenceProcurement #NABU #ArsenZhumadilov #Telegram #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Lingua Trener has a new front page. Break through the speaking barrier in 11 languages, out loud, in real conversations. Pick a scenario, turn on the mic and talk. If you get stuck, it explains in your native language. The photo is Plaza de España in Seville, taken by the founder in 2019. The page also tells the story of why he built the app. 10 minutes free, no credit card: linguatrener.eu/welcome

Mali – a war where some of the people fighting do not exist In Mali's war, an apparently simple question is becoming increasingly difficult to answer: who exactly is speaking to us? A real person? A rebel organisation? A Russian influence operation? A supporter of the military junta? Or somebody who has never existed at all? In September 2026, the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute published Des algorithmes en guerre, a report examining the use of generative artificial intelligence by actors involved in the Malian conflict. Its researchers describe the country as a potential laboratory for AI-assisted information warfare. Separatist networks are deploying synthetic fighters on TikTok. Jihadist propagandists are experimenting with AI-generated imagery. Pro-government accounts are producing large quantities of content celebrating the Malian armed forces. Russia, meanwhile, operates the most developed influence infrastructure of all: pseudo-media outlets, inauthentic accounts, AI-generated text, images and video, and systems designed to artificially amplify their visibility. Artificial intelligence did not create Mali's conflict. The war has been under way since 2012, and its participants have always fought with propaganda as well as weapons. What AI has changed is the economics of that struggle. A new “witness”, commentator, fighter, poster or video can now be produced in minutes. For audiences watching from a phone, distinguishing between genuine documentation, propaganda and material created entirely by an algorithm is becoming progressively harder. Azzghim – the fighter who cannot be killed or interrogated The most striking case documented by the Timbuktu Institute involves accounts associated with supporters of the Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, a Tuareg separatist movement fighting the authorities in Bamako. A figure called “Azzghim” appeared on TikTok. He looks like a Tuareg fighter and regularly features in videos attacking Mali's government and Russia's Africa Corps, commenting on the conflict and promoting the cause of Azawad. There is one problem: Azzghim does not exist. Analysis of the videos identified anomalies characteristic of generative AI, including unnatural body movements, visual inconsistencies, irregular colouring and problems with audio synchronisation. According to the Timbuktu Institute, Azzghim is a synthetic character being used as the digital face of a political narrative. The propaganda advantages are considerable. An organisation no longer needs to expose a real spokesman. A synthetic personality can be designed to look exactly as its creators require, speak the appropriate language and appeal to a particular audience. Different characters could potentially be created for younger viewers, traditional communities or different ethnic and social groups. There is another advantage: a synthetic spokesman cannot be arrested, identified or interrogated. Researchers also identified accounts amplifying the material. At the time of the study, TikTok account @tawri.n.azawad had around 207,000 followers and was almost entirely devoted to publishing or repackaging content involving Azzghim. Another account, @asnan831, used a similar synthetic teenage character. An important distinction is necessary. Researchers describe these profiles as belonging to supporters or individuals associated with the FLA. The available evidence does not establish that every account is part of an operation centrally directed by the Front's leadership. The information effect, however, remains significant: a digital community can be constructed around the Azawad cause in which some of the apparent participants may not be real people at all. The jihadists are learning too The picture is different for Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, the al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition that has become one of the most powerful armed groups in the Sahel. Its confirmed use of generative AI remains considerably less sophisticated. In June 2026, JNIM's Az-Zallaqa media apparatus published AI-generated posters promoting material about previous attacks. The images showed fighters in combat but contained familiar generative artefacts: buildings and vegetation merging unnaturally, blurred details and unnaturally smooth surfaces. More important than JNIM's current capabilities is what AI could add to an already sophisticated propaganda apparatus. The organisation already tailors communications to different audiences. UN reporting has documented its use of media channels for broader propaganda while other outlets increasingly distribute material in local languages, including Bambara. Generative AI could dramatically reduce the cost of this strategy, translating material into Fulfulde, Hausa, Zarma or Tamasheq, generating synthetic dubbing and producing multiple versions of the same message. The Timbuktu Institute also considers the future possibility of AI chatbots being used to personalise recruitment. That should not be presented as a capability JNIM has already demonstrated. At present, it is a risk scenario rather than a confirmed operation. Russia has the most sophisticated machine At the other end of the spectrum lies Russia's influence ecosystem. Here, AI is not an isolated experiment but another component of an infrastructure previously developed by Wagner-linked networks, Russian media operations and influence organisations operating across Africa. After Wagner's withdrawal from Mali in 2025, its military role was taken over by the Russian state-controlled Africa Corps. The information infrastructure evolved alongside it. Of particular importance is African Initiative, which presents itself as a news agency but has been identified by France's VIGINUM, the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and the European External Action Service as an important component of Russia's newer influence architecture in Africa. One of the most interesting elements of this ecosystem is a network researchers call AI-Freak. The operation uses generative AI to produce text, images and videos, places them on fake or apparently independent news websites and distributes them through inauthentic accounts. This is supplemented by so-called Black Hat SEO – techniques intended to artificially increase the visibility of content in search engines. Elements of this infrastructure have previously been identified by Meta and OpenAI. In 2024, OpenAI disrupted Russian accounts using ChatGPT to generate articles and comments in English, French and Russian. Some of the French-language content targeted audiences in West Africa. In a later iteration of the operation, AI models were also used to draft scripts for short videos praising the Russian Africa Corps, translate them into French and generate descriptions optimised for social media. This illustrates an important difference between the Russian approach and Azzghim. The separatist ecosystem uses AI primarily to manufacture convincing digital personalities. The Russian model increasingly resembles an industrial production line: text, image, video, pseudo-news website, distribution account, search optimisation and additional channels amplifying the narrative. The objective is not merely to convince someone of a single claim. It is to occupy as much of the information environment as possible with narratives advantageous to Moscow: Russia as an effective security partner, the West as a neo-colonial aggressor, France as a source of instability and Russian forces as defenders of African sovereignty. Yet VIGINUM also warns against equating technological sophistication with actual impact. Some Russian influence channels still attract relatively small audiences. A sophisticated operation is not automatically a successful one. The junta is building its own digital reality Mali's military authorities operate within the same contested information environment. Since breaking with France and moving closer to Moscow, Bamako has increasingly restricted independent media space while promoting a narrative built around restored sovereignty, military success and the benefits of its Russian partnership. The Timbuktu Institute highlights the TikTok account @6tm_officiel. At the time of the study, it had more than 436,000 followers and published substantial amounts of AI-generated material presenting Mali's armed forces, the FAMa, and the Africa Corps in a favourable light. One video concerning the battle for Kidal accumulated around 4.7 million views. Again, attribution requires care. Researchers describe the account as being operated by an individual based in Bamako; they do not provide evidence that it is officially managed by the Malian government. It is better understood as part of a wider pro-government information ecosystem in which the boundaries between state communications, supporters and co-ordinated propaganda can be difficult to establish. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has previously identified the military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso as important sources of disinformation campaigns in West Africa. Recurring narratives target France, the United Nations, ECOWAS, human-rights organisations and independent media, while presenting criticism of the authorities as part of a foreign conspiracy. Generative AI allows such narratives to be produced faster, more cheaply and in far more variations. Everyone is fighting over a different version of the same war What makes Mali particularly revealing is that multiple actors are using similar technology for very different objectives. FLA-linked networks need digital faces capable of humanising the Azawad cause and attacking Russia's presence. JNIM needs propaganda material and increasingly localised communications. The pro-government ecosystem seeks to portray Mali's armed forces as victorious and reinforce the junta's legitimacy. Russia possesses the broadest infrastructure, in which AI is merely one component of a larger system involving media outlets, websites, local partners, social-media profiles and technical amplification. The result is a war taking place simultaneously in two realities. In the first, soldiers and civilians are killed, towns change hands and the army, separatists and jihadists fight for territory. In the second, every side is trying to determine what the first reality will look like on a smartphone screen. Generative AI does not need to create a perfect deepfake to be effective. It merely needs to increase the number of competing versions of events until an ordinary viewer can no longer easily determine which one deserves to be trusted. That is why Mali matters. It is not showing us the future of information warfare. It is showing us its present. One TikTok video may feature a real soldier. Another may feature a propagandist. A third may feature a fighter who has never existed. And all three can tell completely different stories about the same war. Sources Timbuktu Institute – Des algorithmes en guerre: Comment l'IA générative rebat les cartes du conflit malien https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1731-rapport-des-algorithmes-en-guerre-comment-l-ia-generative-rebat-les-cartes-du-conflit-malien AfricaNews/AFP – “Mali's information war is increasingly being shaped by AI” https://www.africanews.com/2026/09/09/malis-information-war-is-increasingly-being-shaped-by-ai/ OpenAI – research on Russia-origin influence activity and Operation Stop News https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-stop-news-2024/ VIGINUM / FCDO / EEAS – technical report on African Initiative and the AI-Freak network https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250612_TLP-CLEAR_VIGINUM_FCDO_EEAS_Technical_Report_African_Initiative_EN.pdf Africa Center for Strategic Studies – Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/ Timbuktu Institute – analysis of AI use by JNIM https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1735-artificial-intelligence-a-new-propaganda-lever-for-jnim-in-mali?print=1&tmpl=component #Disinformation #Mali #Sahel #Africa #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #AIPropaganda #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #Propaganda #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #Azawad #FLA #JNIM #AfricaCorps #Russia #RussianInfluence #TikTok #DigitalWarfare #MediaManipulation #WRLD

We addressed: 🗺️Ukraine & Transcarpathia; 🗣️Minority languages in the digital age; ❌Tackling hate speech against minorities; 🌡️Climate change and the Sámi; 🚺The specific challenges facing minority women. #MinorityRights #ClimateChange #HateSpeech #UA #SE

"RadioText-RadioSoftware (1983–1989)": The First (Forgotten) Radio Programme of Computer Science Dissemination in Italy SOURCE: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/radiotext-radiosoftware-19831989-first-forgotten-sardella-ph-d--eqief/ Radiosoftware represents Italy's absolute pioneer in broadcasting digital literacy education over the airwaves in the Belpaese. Abstract This paper reconstructs the history of Radiosoftware, the first Italian radio programme which anticipated by over a decade the dissemination of microtelematics, computing, and digital technology, as well as modern methods of digital software distribution. Established in 1983 at Radio Popolare and subsequently developed as a national initiative on Rai Radio 3 from 1984 to 1989, Radiosoftware represents the first Italian radio programme to broadcast educational content and transmit executable software for home computers over the airwaves. Through analysis of its technical evolution, educational content, and cultural impact, this article demonstrates how the initiative constituted a significant precedent in national computer literacy, the democratisation of access to software, and the development of amateur programming communities, establishing itself as the progenitor of a media ecosystem dedicated to technological dissemination that has extended into the contemporary era. Keywords: history of Italian computing, technological dissemination, digital broadcasting, computer literacy, Radio Popolare Introduction: The Dawn of Computing Dissemination in Italy In the landscape of Italian digital media history, a fundamental chapter remains little explored in academic literature: that of computing dissemination through radio broadcasting in the 1980s. In an era characterised by the absence of network connectivity and economic and geographical barriers to accessing computer technologies, radio configured itself as a democratic instrument for the diffusion of nascent digital culture. Radiosoftware emerges in this context as an absolutely pioneering initiative in Italy, anticipating not only analogous Italian experiences but also positioning itself amongst the first European experiments in software transmission over the airwaves. Its genesis at Radio Popolare in 1983 and subsequent evolution as a national programme on Rai Radio 3 bear witness to a trajectory of technical and pedagogical innovation that merits in-depth analysis. Contenuto dell’articolo The Original Phase: Radio Popolare (1983) The birth of Radiosoftware at Radio Popolare in 1983 constitutes the foundational moment of radio-based computing dissemination in Italy. In a period when personal computers still represented niche objects, the programme set out to systematically explore programming languages, hardware architectures, and practical applications of home computing, addressing a heterogeneous audience composed of students, teachers, hobbyists, and professionals. This first incarnation established the conceptual paradigms that would characterise the entire subsequent tradition: linguistic accessibility, pedagogical vocation, attention to the social and cultural dimensions of technology, and promotion of active listener participation. Contenuto dell’articolo The National Evolution: From Radiotext to Radiosoftware (1984–1989) The experience gained at Radio Popolare found systematic development in the national initiative coordinated by Rai Radio 3. The pilot phase, denominated Radiotext, commenced on 11 May 1984 as an experimental segment within the current affairs programme Un certo discorso, presented by Pasquale Santoli. Eight 30-minute episodes, broadcast on Fridays at 16:00 with Sunday repeats, tested the technical feasibility and public interest in the transmission of executable software through audio signals. Curated by Luigi Grimaldi and Giovanni Sighele of the Lega Informatica of Florence, in collaboration with Arci Media, the pilot phase demonstrated the viability of the concept. In autumn 1984, the format consolidated with the definitive denomination Radiosoftware, expanding to one-hour episodes and maintaining its placement within Un certo discorso. Contenuto dell’articolo The third season, inaugurated on 7 February 1986, introduced a thematic structuring articulated in three distinctive segments: "Hard & soft news" (updates and reviews), "Studiare con il computer" (educational applications), and "Radio + informatica" (experimental intersections between broadcasting and computing). This phase evidenced a growing pedagogical sophistication and greater attention to formal educational applications. In late 1986, the programme acquired editorial autonomy, transforming into an independent transmission with nocturnal weekend scheduling. 1987 marked a significant technical innovation with the introduction of the 4800 bit/s hardware interface developed by the RAI Research Centre in Turin, which enabled direct connection to the RS-232 serial port, overcoming the limitations of the audio-cassette method. The concluding phase, from February to June 1989, adopted a brief daily format (10 minutes, Monday to Friday at 19:45), concentrating on MS-DOS-compatible software. Despite the announcement of a cycle for 1990, no national transmission is documented beyond June 1989. Contenuto dell’articolo The Audio-Cassette Method (1984–1987) The initial methodology replicated the cassette loading mechanisms typical of 1980s home computers. Programmes were encoded as sequences of audio impulses—electronic noises incomprehensible to the human ear—which listeners recorded onto blank audiocassettes by connecting a tape recorder to the radio's audio output. The recorded cassette was subsequently played through the computer's cassette interface, which decoded the signals, loading the software into memory. This approach, based on modulation techniques similar to frequency-shift keying (FSK), guaranteed compatibility with heterogeneous platforms such as the ZX Spectrum 48K, Commodore 64, Olivetti M10, subsequently extended to the Apple II, MSX, BBC Micro, Olivetti M24 and M28. Each episode transmitted sequentially platform-specific versions for each system. Whilst accessible and revolutionary for mass distribution in pre-Internet Italy, this method presented significant limitations: low transmission speed, susceptibility to errors induced by radio interference or ambient noise, and the necessity for precise volume and timing adjustments. Contenuto dell’articolo The RAI-Radiosoftware Hardware Interface (1987) In 1987, the RAI Research Centre in Turin developed an advanced interface documented in CCIR reports as the RAI-Radiosoftware system. The principal innovation consisted of direct transmission at 4800 bits/s utilising biphase modulation organised in packets, enabling connection to the computer's RS-232 serial port without cassette intermediation. The interface was designed for operating system independence, with management software adaptable for MS-DOS, CP/M, and potential future extensions to Macintosh. For Olivetti M24 and M28 computers, a version with an internal card was available. The Research Centre additionally developed management software, test cassettes, and manuals, considering initial commercialisation at approximately 90,000 lire. This technical evolution represented a significant advancement in terms of speed, reliability, and usability, whilst maintaining the audio-cassette method in parallel to guarantee universal access. Contenuto dell’articolo Types of Software Transmitted The catalogue of software distributed through Radiosoftware reflected a broad range of applications: practical utilities (thematic databases on fashion, music, itineraries, and personalised diets), educational tools (didactic programmes for secondary schools, upper secondary schools, and conservatoires), recreational software (games such as the Olympic pentathlon for the Commodore 64), graphic demonstrations, and creative tools (bases for musical composition and digital comics). Particularly significant was the introduction, from the third season onwards, of educational software developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Education, designed specifically for scholastic use across various disciplines, not limited to computing. Contenuto dell’articolo Community Participation: The ORSA Section The Osservatorio Radiofonico del Software Autoprodotto (ORSA) [Radio Observatory of Self-Produced Software], reintroduced in the third season from February 1986, constituted a space dedicated to the transmission of programmes created by listeners. This feature transformed Radiosoftware into a bidirectional platform, anticipating collaborative logics that would characterise, decades later, open-source communities and participatory digital cultures. The "listeners' post" section within "Hard & soft news" additionally facilitated continuous dialogue with the public, integrating feedback, questions, and suggestions into the programming. Questionnaires distributed at the end of cycles and surveys conducted by specialist magazines such as Sperimentare con l'elettronica e il computer provided further mechanisms for evaluation and editorial orientation. Contenuto dell’articolo Institutional Collaborations and School Experiments In 1987, Radiosoftware collaborated with the ITIS Enrico Fermi in Rome to produce a series of transmissions dedicated to the development and application of educational software in scholastic contexts. The initiative involved experimental reception centres in 60 Italian schools, where students and teachers utilised the specialised interfaces developed by the RAI Research Centre to capture and load directly the transmitted software. These experiments positioned Radiosoftware as an operational instrument of pedagogical innovation, extending its impact beyond the hobbyist user base towards formal integration within the national education system. Contenuto dell’articolo Comparison with European Experiences Although Radiosoftware represents the first Italian national initiative, it was not the first European experiment in radio transmission of software. In the Netherlands, the programme Hobbyscoop on the public broadcaster NOS began transmitting computer programmes via radio around 1979–1980, subsequently developing the Basicode standard (from 1982). This standardised format utilised a restricted subset of BASIC commands and platform-specific translation routines, guaranteeing portability across heterogeneous architectures through FSK modulation at 1200 bps. Contenuto dell’articolo In the United Kingdom, The Chip Shop on BBC Radio 4, presented by Barry Norman and launched in 1984, included a "takeaway" service that transmitted Basicode programmes during nocturnal hours on VHF. Contenuto dell’articolo Technical and Cultural Differentiation Unlike approaches based on Basicode, which privileged portability at the interpreted language level, Radiosoftware transmitted platform-specific executable files, often in machine code, encoded as audio tones analogous to cassette loading signals. This choice reflected different priorities: maximising performance and the specific capabilities of each architecture rather than guaranteeing universal compatibility through a standardised language. The subsequent introduction of the 4800 bit/s interface with RS-232 connection represented a further differentiation, bypassing cassette recording entirely. These technical specificities bear witness to an autonomous development pathway, oriented towards the characteristics of the Italian computing market and ecosystem. Contenuto dell’articolo Transition towards Telesoftware Between 1988 and 1989, Radiosoftware was progressively accompanied and superseded by telesoftware transmitted through Televideo, RAI's teletext system. Technically defined by the RAI Research Centre in collaboration with Olivetti, the system became operational in 1989 following scholastic experiments coordinated with the Ministry of Public Education and Seleco in 1988. Telesoftware represented a natural evolution that shifted distribution from radio to television, offering advantages in terms of bandwidth capacity and already widespread reception infrastructure. This transition reflected broader trends in media convergence and the evolution of digital broadcasting technologies. Contenuto dell’articolo Obsolescence and the Rise of the Internet The emergence of the Internet in the 1990s rendered obsolete both radio-based and teletext-based methods of software distribution. Bidirectional digital networks offered incomparable speed, scalability, and interactivity, radically transforming the paradigms of software access and distribution. However, the conceptual legacy of Radiosoftware persists: the idea of mass distribution of executable digital content through broadcasting channels anticipated logics that re-emerge in modern over-the-air distributions of firmware and software updates for mobile devices and IoT. Contenuto dell’articolo The Ecosystem of Italian Radio-Based Computing Dissemination COMPLETE TIMELINE From the birth of computing dissemination on radio to the contemporary digital ecosystem 🟦 1983 — THE ORIGIN Radiosoftware – Radio Popolare (1983) The first Italian programme entirely dedicated to computing, programming languages, and personal computers. The absolute progenitor of the Italian tradition of radio-based technological dissemination. 🟦 THE 1980s — THE FIRST HEIRS 1984–1989 — Bit, Byte & Musica – Radio Popolare Technology, electronics, early networks, hacker culture. Continues the pioneering spirit of Radiosoftware, exploring the countercultural and communal dimensions of nascent computing. 1987–1990 — Decoder / Cyberpunk – Radio Popolare First systematic discussions of BBS, cryptography, alternative telematics, anticipating themes that would become central in the Internet era. 🟩 THE 1990s — THE INTERNET ERA 1993 — Golem – Radio3 Critical reflection on media and digital technologies, situating technological transformation within a broader cultural and philosophical framework. 1994 — Eta Beta – Radio1 Innovation, information society, digital transformation. Technological dissemination for a general audience in the phase of initial digital literacy. 1995 — Internetworkcity – Radio Deejay Presented by Claudio Cecchetto and Marco Camisani Calzolari, represents the first pop-commercial programme dedicated to the Internet, introducing email, websites, chat, and cyber culture to the mass public with accessible language and a massified educational approach. 1996–1999 — Mediamente (radio version) – RAI Dissemination on the Internet, networks, digital culture, with particular attention to the social and cognitive implications of emerging technologies. 1997–2000 — Cybernet / Tecnologie e Libertà – Radio Sherwood Free software, digital rights, civic networks. Continuation of the critical and communal tradition inaugurated by Radio Popolare, with focus on the political and libertarian dimensions of technology. This timeline evidences how Radiosoftware does not represent an isolated phenomenon, but rather the point of origin of a continuous tradition that has traversed over four decades. From the programming languages and over-the-air software transmission of the 1980s, through explorations of BBS and alternative telematics, to mass literacy on the Internet in the 1990s and critical reflections on free software and digital rights, a connecting thread emerges that testifies to the role of radio as a privileged space for the cultural mediation of emerging technologies. Contenuto dell’articolo Contemporary Recognition and Archival Preservation In recent years, Radiosoftware has acquired renewed attention as a pioneering initiative in the history of Italian computing. In 2024, contributions by scholars such as Andrea Fortuna have described the programme as a fascinating chapter in the diffusion of personal computing in Italy, underscoring its innovative approach to the distribution of executable software in the pre-Internet era. RAI has preserved selections from the initial phase of the programme through digital platforms such as RaiPlay Sound, where a dedicated playlist in the "Via Asiago 10" series includes several pilot episodes from 1984, originally broadcast on Rai Radio 3. Preservation efforts by enthusiasts have further contributed to maintaining accessible portions of the programme's legacy, with partial audio recordings and listener interviews available on dedicated websites. Radiosoftware constitutes a significant case study from multiple disciplinary perspectives. From the standpoint of media history, it represents an innovation in the utilisation of radio broadcasting, extending its functionalities beyond the transmission of audio content towards the distribution of executable code. In computing history, it testifies to strategies of democratisation of software access in contexts characterised by scarcity of resources and infrastructure. From a pedagogical standpoint, it anticipates models of distributed and community learning that re-emerge in modern online educational platforms. The participatory dimension embodied by the ORSA section prefigures collaborative dynamics that would characterise open-source cultures. Its position as progenitor of a continuous media ecosystem dedicated to technological dissemination—from Radio Popolare through national public broadcasters to the experiences of the 1990s—underscores the role of radio broadcasting as essential cultural infrastructure in the processes of national digital literacy. In an era when over-the-air distribution of software updates has become ordinary practice for billions of connected devices, Radiosoftware emerges not as an antiquarian curiosity, but as a conceptual antecedent that illuminates often-neglected technological genealogies. Its rediscovery and archival preservation constitute essential operations for a complete understanding of the roots of Italian digital culture.

On the International Day of Indigenous Women and Girls, we celebrate their vital role in keeping Indigenous languages alive. As lead agency for the @ILDecade, @UNESCO honors their leadership. Watch Indigenous activist Hélène Boivin's inspiring interview: https://t.co/BBSI9XIknT https://t.co/RvJwdvNlU9 #IndigenousWomen #LanguagePreservation #UNESCO #Nospecificcountriesarementionedinthetweet.

🚨 DATAREPUBLICAN.COM STRIKES AGAIN: TRUMPBLOGS, FORMERLY KNOWN AS NOBLOGS 🚨 🏴 THE ANARCHIST INTERNATIONAL ON NOBLOGS, MAPPED — EVERY BLOG, EVERY CELL, EVERY CITY. 🌍 The militant far-left has spent years hiding in plain sight on Noblogs.org — the anonymous blog network that quietly powers antifa, anarchist, squat, and "solidarity" cells around the world. So on my own time, for free, I scraped the whole thing. Because I kick commie *** for fun and need no government funding or sanction for it. Introducing an interactive map of 7000+ blogs across many countries and languages — antifascist, anarchist, ecological, prisoner-solidarity, migrant-border, revolutionary. Every one classified, geolocated, and searchable down to the verbatim quote. * 🔥 Verified quotes. Every claim is a receipt — their words, not mine. * 🌐 4000-plus blogs pinned to a live world map — zoom into your own city. * ⚔️ Many blogs classified "operational." * 🕸️ Click any blog, author, or cell and walk the network one tie at a time. No grant funded this. No client asked for it. I do this for free, on my own time, because someone should. 🖥️ Data-heavy! Best viewed on desktop. 📖 A preview of what's coming: DataRepublican v2.0 — full site redesign — launches soon, ahead of my and @JoshuaLisec book UNELECTED (Passage Press, Oct 13). And yes — if I can map the anarchist international in my spare time, I can map anything. https://x.com/DataRepublican/status/2094285318170018166

8/17/2026: FORMAL COMPLAINT — VERBAL AGGRESSION & INTIMIDATION IN FINLAND COURT — On behalf of PM Simon Ekpa supporters in Finland Date: 17 August 2026 Location: Itä-Suomen hovioikeus, Istuntosali 2, Finland (Appeal from Lahti Magistrate Court — Päijät-Häme District Court) Purpose of Attendance: A delegation of Biafran supporters, attended court peacefully on 17.08.2026 in solidarity as PM Simon Ekpa's appeal continues. Incident Reported: Two individuals engaged in verbal aggression and intimidation directed at members of the delegation who had come to support PM. The individuals identified by witnesses as: Individual 1: Mary Ike Lasuba aka Adadioranma (France-based) Individual 2: Madam NkyNky @deborahsal82 (Evidences and Exhibits attached) The alleged conduct included insulting , demeaning languages, verbal aggression, crossing boundaries, intimidating remarks toward innocent Biafran supporters inside/near the courthouse area. Impact: The supporters felt harassed, unsafe and discouraged. Such conduct, if confirmed, undermines safety, unity and peaceful advocacy required during an active appeal, especially if confirmed that one of the women involved has verbally attacked our PM Simon Ekpa in the past (exhibits attached). Requested Action by USB Administration for; - Impartial fact-finding — obtain witness statements, camera exhibits from those present in Istuntosali 2 and the court house - Whom these 2 women represents and Caution to them to refrain from aggressive conduct during PMs court process moving forward. Assurance from Finland government of safety and respect for all supporters who travel for court solidarity. Resolution and commitment to non-violence and rule of law. Dr Ngozi Orabueze DPM USB/Head of BRGIE/DEFACTO @alexstubb @yleuutiset @Huuhkajat @MobilePunch @channelstv @SaharaReporters #HumanRights #Justice #PeacefulProtest

Developing countries bring enormous assets to the age of AI. Talent. Ideas. Young, dynamic populations. Every country should be able to shape this technology to its own needs with its own skills, its own data and in its own languages. Technology must be built with, and for, #AI #Innovation #Diversity #Therearenospecificcountriesmentionedinthetweet.Therefore #theresponseis: