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The author said that, apart from Israel and the UAE, Saudi Arabia and its Western backers were especially deserving of punishment. They accused them of carrying out airstrikes on hospitals, schools, markets and funerals and starving children, claiming their actions rivalled those in Gaza and South Lebanon. #SaudiArabia #HumanRights #Justice #IL #AE #SA #PS #LB

The author called for measures to cut Russia’s export revenues, including ending imports of Russian diesel and oil, sanctioning shipments, banning tankers, closing loopholes and penalising companies they said helped fund Vladimir Putin’s war. They also urged restricting Russia’s access to Western markets and finance. https://t.co/XzddxylQtq #Sanctions #Russia #StopPutin #RU

The author called for cutting Russia off from Western markets and finance, including by banning Russian diesel and oil imports, sanctioning shipments, barring tankers and punishing companies they said helped fund Putin’s war effort. They also urged closing loopholes. https://t.co/STBHh2OCb4 #Sanctions #StopWar #SupportUkraine #RU

The author questioned why EU leaders were not putting Europe first, arguing that global fuel markets were inflexible. They said the United States had lifted sanctions on Russian diesel, while the EU would rather face a fuel crisis than act. The author also asked what Ursula von der Leyen had promised in 2022. #AmericaFirst #EU #FuelCrisis #US #EU

The author said that at yesterday’s Eurogroup meeting in Luxembourg, they focused on responding to current pressures while preserving Europe’s economic resilience. They added that citizens and businesses needed protection from rising energy costs without sending the wrong signals to financial markets. #Eurogroup #EconomicResilience #EnergyCosts #LU #EU

The author wrote that Europe faced a dual challenge, citing elevated energy prices and rising inflation that they said were creating difficulties for citizens and businesses, while financial markets were also reacting. They said the response should focus on protecting and preserving. https://t.co/PSdcg5auad #Energie #Inflation #Finanzen #EU

The author wrote that reducing fragmentation was vital for the EU, which they said still had 27 markets in energy, connectivity and finance. They questioned how Europe could compete with China and the US without being able to scale, and described One Europe One Market as a crucial step for Europe’s future. The post referenced CSFPrishtina2026, the Delors Institute and IE University. https://t.co/7IQWw2MKwa #OneEurope #EUintegration #MarketUnity #EU #CN #US

The author said survey data showed prices rising and argued that the “OIL GLUT 2.0” narrative was pointless because inflation data was already beginning to reflect the impact of the Hormuz crisis. They added that bond markets were responding to the data, rather than to low-quality satellite images.

The author called for Spain’s Sánchez to follow Lula’s departure, arguing that Spain should move away from socialism and Putinism and return to an Atlantic-aligned course. They advocated a stronger Europe and NATO, victory for Ukraine, free markets, economic growth and prosperity, and opposed Moscow’s influence. https://t.co/YfNJsFEVuL #España #Libertad #Europa #BR #ES #EU #UA

The author proposed a peaceful post-Nigeria settlement consisting of 12 free, federal and democratic republics, with no ethnic cleansing or expulsions, one citizenship, open markets and regional cooperation. They also said Biafra should be free and democratic. https://t.co/jDRNHGc7tY #Biafra #Democracy #Peace #NG #BJ (translated)

Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD