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Martin Sellner wrote that Siegmund had taken a brave step and crossed an important threshold. He described the decision as a great opportunity that is also associated with many risks, and he said it was the right one and offers important lessons. Sellner recommended watching and sharing the linked video. https://t.co/rLdHdMlRFl #Risiko #Entscheidung #Lektion (translated)

What bothers Rubik and Sapnap mainly is the misinformation spread by the administration. 1. It was not a lag machine. 2. The server did not crash because of them nor was it intentional; it was the result of a bad command by the administration to clear the water. The entire server and its viewers received the message that Rubik and Sapnap made a machine or even used an exploit to lag and take down the server, which is a very convenient lie to avoid admitting a mistake. Everyone involved looks bad, both the administration and the streamers. #desinformación #streaming #gaming (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Ruské síly, včetně jedné třetiny elitního Rubikonu, tlačí na město Dobropillja s cílem dostat se dovnitř ještě předtím, než opadá listí, zatímco ukrajinští obránci čelí silné ruské převaze a dosud se jim podařilo zasáhnout letiště v Rostově na Donu. #VálkaNaUkrajině #Dobropillja #RuskáArmáda

Agresja na Ukrainę była przekroczeniem Rubikonu. O ile wcześniej traktowaliśmy Rosję jako potencjalnego przeciwnika,z którym można i należy rozmawiać,by podtrzymywać szanse na redukowanie ryzyka wojennego,to w 2014 r. Rosja stała się naszym realnym wrogiem z przewagą ryzyka wojny #Ukraina #Rosja #Wojna #UA #RU

⚫ RUBIKON JE PRESTOPLJEN. Izjava poslanca Martina Premka je zame primer nedopustnega in sovražnega političnega diskurza. 🕯️ Posmehovati se @JJansaSDS zaradi usode njegovega očeta, ki se je v času povojnih pobojev po spletu okoliščin rešil iz brezna, pomeni poseči v eno najtežjih in najbolj bolečih poglavij naše zgodovine. S takšnim načinom govora je bila po mojem mnenju prestopljena meja humanizma, človečnosti in dostojanstva, ki bi moralo biti temelj vsake razprave v slovenskem parlamentu. ⚠️ Če ideološko sovraštvo pripelje tako daleč, da postanejo celo povojna morišča in trpljenje svojcev sredstvo za poniževanje političnega nasprotnika, potem se moramo zelo resno vprašati, kam smo kot družba prišli. Sam takšen pojav razumem kot eno od oblik tega, čemur pravim #levifašizem . 🇸🇮 Državni zbor mora biti prostor zgodovinskega spomina, odgovornosti in narodne zrelosti. Prostor, kjer se o tragedijah po drugi svetovni vojni govori s spoštovanjem in kjer se iz zgodovine učimo — ne pa prostor, kjer se iz najglobljih ran slovenskega naroda dela politični posmeh. 🔴 Tukaj je meja dokončno prestopljena. Zame po takšni izjavi ni več prostora za relativiziranje, izmikanje ali politične izgovore. Martin Premk mora prevzeti politično odgovornost. Z odstopom‼️‼️ Po mojem prepričanju po takšnem ravnanju ne more več verodostojno opravljati poslanske funkcije. Zato pozivam, vse kolegice in kolege, da takšnemu ekstremnemu sovražnemu diskurzu #MARTINPREMK pokažemo vrata #državnizbor ‼️ #levifašizem #državnizbor #politika

Robert Lewandowski w ramach nowej kampanii promocyjnej Poland. More than you expected zachęca do odwiedzenia Polski, współpracując z innymi ambasadorami, takimi jak Jesse Eisenberg i Anja Rubik, aby pokazać kraj jako nowoczesny, bezpieczny i pełen różnorodnych atrakcji. #Polska #Turystyka #RobertLewandowski

Robert Lewandowski oraz inne gwiazdy, w tym Jesse Eisenberg i Anja Rubik, promują Polskę w nowej kampanii Polskiej Organizacji Turystycznej pod hasłem „Poland. More than you expected”, mającej na celu przyciągnięcie turystów z Niemiec, Wielkiej Brytanii, Hiszpanii, Włoch i USA. #Polska #Turystyka #Promocja

Ytterligare 4 skuggflottefartyg ut med drönare från luften och 1 med marin drönare⬇️på Svarta havet. Totalt har 176 ryska fartyg slagits ut på Azvoska sjön och på Svarta havet från luften hittills under juli. ryssland ska nu ha tagit 200 drönaroperatörgrupper i sitt bästa och mest beryktade drönarförband "Rubikon" från fronten och ska istället nu sätta dem på att försöka skydda skuggflottan. Även hela den 51:a luftvärnsdivisionen från svartahavfslottan ska nu försöka skydda och återupprätta den ryska fartygstrafiken med luftvärnsrobotsystem, ksp mm. Vi får väl allt se hur det går.... 75 % av färjorna som trafikerar kertjsundet är nu för övrigt också utslagna meddelar Madjar. Innan attackerna satte igång så var trafiken på de 4 färjorna till 80 % militär. På energfronten ser det fortsatt ännu mörkare för de ryska ockupanterna: 13 transformatorer/energiknutpunkter har slagits ut på Krim (8) och på ryskockuperat fastlandet (5). #Ukraina #drönare #konflikt

Podle "Maďara" stahují orkové z fronty 200 stanovišť systemu Rubikon a umístí je na ochranu zbytků flotily. Jedno stanoviště-jedna loď. Také na ochranu stahují 51. protileteckou divizi a protiletadlový pluk, který je zbytkem Černomořské flotily...jestli to opravdu udělají, pak to #vojenskástrategie #Černomořskáflotila #obrana

Șeful forțelor de drone ucrainene, Robert „Magyar” Brovdi, a afirmat că operațiunea „MoLoChKa” a obligat Rusia să retragă unități de elită „Rubikon” de pe front pentru a proteja flota din Marea Neagră și Marea Azov, rezultând în atacuri asupra a 172 de nave rusești, ceea ce ar putea afecta semnificativ transportul maritim al Rusiei și, implicit, piețele europene de cereale. #DroneUA #OperațiuneaMoLoChKa #MareaNeagră