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In his article, Jordi Juan reflects on the importance of the covers of La Vanguardia, highlighting the images of victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and criticizing the dehumanization in response to acts of violence, as well as the controversial decisions of political figures such as Donald Trump and the Israeli government. #LaVanguardia #GuerraGaza #Opinión (translated)

Now he is already a huge player. He can be the leader of the new generation of Spanish basketball, but we should not do anything special or force things for him to be. He must continue his evolution naturally because he has the conditions,” assures Jaume Ponsarnau, the coach of Surne Bilbao, who made him debut at the elite level at the age of 16 when he was in charge of Casademont Zaragoza. #AdayMara #BaloncestoEspañol #Unicornio (translated)

Jorge García Orozco pointed out that the Morena deputy in Sinaloa, Carlos Escobar, was hugging Graciela Domínguez, whom he identified as the governor, while wearing a Franck Muller Vanguard watch that he estimated at 400 thousand pesos. He also referred to the fortune of those he disparagingly described as men in the service of Rocha Moya in Sinaloa. https://t.co/jzV6Ascxls #Sinaloa #Morena #Política (translated)

Nigeria – how pro-Russian influence networks sell military rule as the answer When Nigerians took to the streets in August 2024 to protest soaring living costs and frustration with government, some demonstrations acquired an unexpected symbol: the Russian flag. In Kano, Kaduna and other northern cities, protesters were filmed carrying Russian colours and calling for Moscow’s intervention. Some demanded a military takeover. What initially looked like an unusual expression of anger has since become part of a much larger picture. A September 2026 assessment by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies describes Nigeria as a major target of overlapping foreign information operations, with Russia the most active external actor in its information space. The report does not identify a single centrally controlled campaign. Instead, it maps an ecosystem in which genuine dissatisfaction over insecurity, corruption and living standards is repeatedly redirected towards a broader proposition: democratic government has failed, while the military-led regimes of the Sahel offer a more effective alternative. Turning a real protest into a pro-Russian message The clearest example emerged during the 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests. Nigerian investigative reporting found that a Kano-based TikTok influencer with more than 100,000 followers had been paid through a Telegram channel associated with African Initiative, a Moscow-based media operation linked by researchers to Russian influence activity in Africa. The influencer said the channel supplied photographs, videos and talking points for redistribution on TikTok and Instagram. Among the messages provided were phrases such as “Putin please come and save Nigeria” and “The army is the answer for Nigeria”. Influencers were encouraged to use Hausa-language hashtags including #Zangazanga – “protest” – alongside references to Putin and Russia. Investigators identified 38 accounts circulating similar pro-Russian and pro-military narratives during the demonstrations. Russian flags subsequently appeared among protesters in several northern cities. This does not mean the protests themselves were created by Russia. They were driven by genuine economic and political grievances, and Nigerian protesters gave different reasons for carrying Russian flags. The important feature of the influence activity was precisely that it did not need to manufacture the original anger. It could attach a geopolitical message to an existing domestic crisis. From frustration to the idea of military government The narrative fits a wider pattern seen across West Africa. Russia has developed close relations with the military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while pro-Russian media ecosystems routinely portray those states as examples of sovereignty, stability and resistance to Western influence. Nigeria, by contrast, has remained under constitutional civilian government since 1999. Africa Center researchers say information networks targeting Nigerians increasingly contrast these two models. Recurring messages depict elections as wasteful or predetermined, civilian institutions as incapable of protecting citizens and military governments as more decisive on security and development. Some content portrays the Sahelian juntas as delivering better roads, lower prices and stronger security even where available evidence points to continuing or worsening instability. Language is central to the strategy. Hausa is spoken across northern Nigeria and neighbouring Niger, allowing political narratives to travel across borders that are far less important online than they are on maps. HumAngle documented efforts involving Nigerien state-linked actors to cultivate Hausa-speaking journalists and distribute material favourable to Niger’s junta and hostile to France and Western influence. The Russian and Sahelian-junta information ecosystems are not identical, but their narratives frequently reinforce one another. Fake journalists inside real Nigerian media The campaign environment extends beyond social media. A 2026 investigation by Graphika and Code for Africa identified 44 ghost reporters and fake experts whose identities were used to place Russia-aligned narratives in African media. Thirty-eight were assessed with high confidence to be fabricated. Their articles or quotations appeared across 138 websites and were amplified by at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages. Nigeria was one of the most heavily targeted countries. According to the Africa Center’s analysis of the research, Daily Post Nigeria carried 39 articles involving 14 identified ghost authors. Once published by a genuine Nigerian outlet, such material could then be cited by other websites, social-media accounts or even Russian official channels as though it had originated independently in Africa. This is information laundering rather than simple propaganda: the most valuable asset being borrowed is the credibility of the local newsroom. Generative AI added another layer. OpenAI and Meta separately disrupted a Russia-origin network that produced Africa-focused political content and operated Facebook Pages posing as local media organisations. One fabricated commentator, “Dr Manuel Godsin”, was presented as a European-trained geopolitical expert although investigators found no evidence supporting his academic biography. ChatGPT had been used to generate articles under the persona’s name, while Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the broader network. Different networks, similar strategic direction It would be misleading to merge all these activities into a single Russian command structure. The African Initiative-linked influencer campaign, the ghost-reporter network and the AI-enabled operation disrupted by OpenAI and Meta were uncovered separately and used different infrastructure. Public evidence does not demonstrate that every actor reported to the same organisation. What connects them is a recurring set of themes and methods: portraying Western partnerships as exploitative, presenting Russia as an alternative security partner, amplifying failures of civilian government, and giving military-led rule greater legitimacy. Investigative reporting on leaked Russian documents has meanwhile described a much wider influence apparatus operating across Africa, involving political consultants, paid journalists, influencers and locally tailored campaigns intended to reduce Western influence and expand Moscow’s position. The underlying technique is less about inventing dissatisfaction than redirecting it. Nigeria faces real security threats, economic pressure and public frustration. Influence operators do not need to persuade Nigerians that those problems exist. They need only influence the explanation for why they exist – and which political model appears to offer the answer. That is what makes the Nigerian case significant. The most effective propaganda does not necessarily introduce a completely false reality. It takes a real crisis and changes where the audience is encouraged to look for the solution. Sources Africa Center for Strategic Studies — The Raging Information Battle in Nigeria https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-raging-information-battle-in-nigeria/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ TheCable — Ghost reporters in African media https://www.thecable.ng/ghost-reporters-how-fabricated-african-voices-carried-pro-russia-narratives/ HumAngle — Nigeria Is Facing an Information War in Its Own Language https://www.humanglemedia.com/nigeria-is-facing-an-information-war-in-its-own-language DAIDAC / CJID — Russian influence during #EndBadGovernance https://daidac.thecjid.org/how-telegram-tiktok-aided-russian-disinformation-that-led-to-incarceration-of-nigerian-minors/ FactCheckHub — How Nigeria’s hunger protest took a radical turn https://factcheckhub.com/from-economic-protests-to-coup-agitation-how-nigerias-hunger-march-took-a-radical-turn/ News24 — Fake Kremlin-linked analyst planted stories in African media https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard — AI ‘expert’ exposed https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Africa Confidential — How Moscow wages social media war https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/15961/how-moscow-wages-social-media-war Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode15 #Nigeria #Russia #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Africa #WestAfrica #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Propaganda #MilitaryRule #MilitaryGovernment #Democracy #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #AfricanInitiative #EndBadGovernance #Hausa #LocalInfluencers #GhostReporters #FakeExperts #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPersonas #SyntheticMedia #AIPropaganda #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #Telegram #TikTok #DigitalInfluence #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #MediaManipulation #Sahel #Geopolitics #OSINT #WRLD

José Pablo López stated that the audience data questioned the attempts to delegitimize Radio Televisión Española. He affirmed that the day before, La 1 had obtained a 13.7% share and that the group of channels of the Corporation had reached 19.9%, close to 20%. https://t.co/3QLtCYFVWj #Televisión #Datos #RTVE (translated)

The survey from 'La Vanguardia' reveals that Aliança Catalana could achieve 30 seats in the Catalan Parliament, tying with the PSC, while Junts and the socialists would suffer a significant setback, and Vox would experience notable growth, leaving a fragmented and complicated political landscape for governance. #AliançaCatalana #PolíticaCatalana #EncuestaElectoral (translated)

We have Vanguard, the second largest asset manager in the world, warning against a potential spiral of deterioration of French sovereign credit. The French 10-year has surpassed 4.86% today, The spread with Germany is approaching levels of 2012, during the euro crisis, It will be fine. #économie #finance #crédit (translated)

Valeri, el Baluarte Atronador Capitán del Batallón de Misiones Especiales #GenshinImpact #Valeri La Real Armería es un enorme complejo de investigación, diseño y producción dentro de Glupov. Como la principal institución de investigación de Snezhnaya, ha desarrollado múltiples tecnologías de vanguardia y muchas de las armas que forman los cimientos del sector militar de la nación nevada. Los secretos y valiosos recursos que oculta en su interior son incontables. Con tal de proteger la Real Armería y a su personal, las tropas de élite del Primer Regimiento de Bombarderos pasaron a formar el Batallón de Misiones Especiales, que sirve como la guardia dedicada de la institución. El comandante Valeri es el líder de dicha unidad. Valeri posee un historial particularmente brillante. Lideró a sus tropas en la erradicación de seis concentraciones de monstruos relacionadas con perturbaciones en las líneas ley, aplastó a tres terribles bandas de volkodlak y eliminó a más del ochenta por ciento de los fieros monstruos quiméricos al oeste de Snezhnogrado... Además, organiza los deberes del batallón con precisión y sin falta, día tras día y año tras año... y todo esto sin contar siquiera con un ayudante personal. Con un experto tanto en combate como en gestión al mando de su guardia, los especialistas de la Real Armería pueden volcarse por completo en la investigación y la producción, sabiéndose en buenas manos. Ciertamente, desde que el Batallón de Misiones Especiales llegó al cargo, el comandante Valeri y sus tropas han neutralizado a más de noventa amenazas de todo tipo, incluyendo un grupo de bandidos que planeaban robar los secretos de la Real Armería y unos criminales que pretendían raptar a los investigadores. En los últimos años, sin embargo, los observadores militares han notado algo sorprendente: el comandante Valeri se ha convertido en un visitante frecuente del Teatro Korolevski y el Restaurante Podvorye, entre otros establecimientos de entretenimiento... El comandante Valeri se niega a hacer ningún comentario sobre cualquier especulación, pues continúa dejando que su impecable gestión del tiempo y sus perfectas dotes de organización en el trabajo hablen por sí mismas. Por supuesto, las personas no son máquinas. Uno no puede esperar que funcionen como un reloj, siguiendo un rígido horario en cada momento del día. Pero un plan sólido es una buena garantía. Cuando lo inesperado altera el programa, este otorga el espacio para adaptarse y la confianza necesaria para ello. Siempre hay tareas que requieren planes de contingencia y fechas límites que no pueden ser ignoradas. Y siempre debe haber alguien que soporte la presión, mantenga el ojo puesto en el plan y prevenga retrasos y accidentes. #GenshinImpact #Valeri #Snezhnaya

🚨 Reunião da Situação nesta manhã acabou sem definição de quem concorrerá à presidência. Apurei que cinco nomes foram colocados como dispostos a concorrer: - Harry Massis (grupo Vanguarda) - Vinicius Medeiros (grupo Legião) - José Edgard Galvão (grupo SOMOS) - Fernando “Chapecó” (grupo Sempre) - Themistocles Almeida (grupo Participação) Também não há definição sobre vice-presidente e presidente do Conselho. A Oposição, por sua vez, oficializou hoje a chapa com Marcelo Portugal Gouvêa na disputa pela presidência. #Política #Eleições #Candidaturas

Es el mejor discurso de un Presidente argentino ante la ONU de toda la historia. Defendiendo la soberanía argentina sobre las Islas Malvinas, reforzando nuestra alianza con occidente, criticando la burocracia de la ONU y poniéndose a la vanguardia de la IA https://t.co/aOpm9tYFQz #Malvinas #Argentina #ONU

Russia’s fake African newsrooms – propaganda designed to look local A Facebook user in Nairobi, Accra, Johannesburg or Luanda encounters what appears to be a local news page. It publishes stories about African politics, Western influence and relations with Russia. The language is tailored to an African audience and the page presents itself not as a foreign broadcaster, but as part of the local information landscape. Behind some of these outlets, however, Meta found operators based in Russia. In its 2026 threat research, the company disclosed a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour network targeting audiences in Angola, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the operation. Around 30,000 users followed at least one of the Pages, while the operators spent approximately $7,000 on Facebook and Instagram advertising, mostly in euros and US dollars. The numbers are relatively modest. The method is considerably more important. Rather than openly distributing Russian state messaging, the network posed as local African news sources and grassroots organisations, promoting narratives about Western colonialism and political interference while presenting Russia as a credible economic and political alternative. It was an old geopolitical message delivered through a much more effective identity: not Moscow speaking to Africa, but Africans apparently speaking to one another. A news outlet that was actually an influence operation Meta's investigation found that the network attempted to conceal its Russian origin while creating media brands that appeared indigenous to the countries they targeted. Its content amplified historical grievances against former colonial powers, criticised Western involvement in Africa and promoted closer relations with Russia. One example helps illustrate how the infrastructure was assembled. A Facebook Page targeting Kenya was called Kenya Watchtower. According to OpenAI's subsequent investigation, Facebook transparency records showed that the Page had previously been named “Farmtown5”. It appears to have been acquired or repurposed rather than built from scratch as a Kenyan news organisation. Some Pages also exposed administrator locations in Russia and Ukraine. Other elements of the network had previously targeted audiences in Zambia and Namibia. This use of apparently local identities is particularly important in the African information environment. A story published by RT or another identifiable Russian outlet arrives with an obvious geopolitical provenance. The same narrative presented by something resembling an independent Kenyan, Ghanaian or South African newsroom carries a different kind of credibility. The source appears closer to the reader, and the geopolitical interest behind the message becomes less visible. Then investigators found Dr Manuel Godsin The Facebook operation was only one part of a broader information ecosystem. OpenAI investigated related activity after receiving information from Meta and subsequently banned a ChatGPT account it assessed as likely originating in Russia. OpenAI called the campaign Operation No Bell. The account was being used to generate long-form articles and social-media posts about African geopolitics. Prompts were primarily written in English, but OpenAI also observed Russian-language instructions that the user described as coming from a manager. The operator sometimes explicitly asked the model to make the material appear less AI-generated – including requests to avoid stylistic features associated with machine-generated text and to write more like a human journalist. Many articles appeared under the name “Dr Manuel Godsin”, presented as an academic with a PhD from the University of Bergen and an affiliation with an organisation called the International Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. OpenAI could find no credible evidence that Godsin existed. Searches of Norway's National Research Information Repository and the University of Bergen library produced no record of him. Investigators subsequently discovered that a photograph used to represent Godsin had appeared years earlier on a Russian professional networking site and apparently belonged to a law student in St Petersburg. The fabricated academic identity was nevertheless remarkably productive. OpenAI identified 53 online articles carrying the Godsin byline. The fiction had moved beyond fake social-media pages and into the real media ecosystem. When propaganda enters genuine newsrooms This is the most consequential aspect of the operation. The articles were not confined to websites controlled by the influence network. Some were published by genuine African news organisations, including established South African outlets. The content mixed local political issues with broader geopolitical narratives. Some pieces criticised the United States and Britain or defended Russia's role in Africa. One accused the British NGO Crisis Action of fomenting protests in South Africa. Another praised Russia's presence in the Central African Republic. Other material addressed Kenya, Angola and relations between African governments and Washington. The mechanism represents a significant evolution from the classic troll-farm model. Instead of building an audience entirely on its own platforms, an influence operator can manufacture an apparently credible expert, generate articles in his name and persuade genuine news organisations to publish them. Once this happens, the propaganda acquires something a fake Facebook Page cannot provide: the institutional credibility of a real newsroom. OpenAI assessed No Bell's social-media impact as limited. One Facebook Page had around 3,000 followers before Meta removed it, while several others had very small audiences. But the operation was more successful in placing material in established media. In OpenAI's impact framework, it approached the level at which an influence operation breaks into mainstream media. For information operators, a single article published by a recognised outlet can potentially be more valuable than thousands of impressions generated by an obviously artificial account. A much larger network of ghost journalists Subsequent research suggests that Manuel Godsin was not an isolated experiment. In August 2026, Graphika, working with Code for Africa and with support from Meta, published a much broader investigation into Russian ghostwriting operations across African media. Researchers identified 44 ghost writers and fake experts, 38 of them assessed as high-confidence fabricated personas, operating between 2021 and 2026. Their material appeared or was quoted across 138 websites and was subsequently republished through at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages, including authentic users, coordinated inauthentic networks and official Russian communication channels. The narratives were strikingly consistent. They included criticism of France, Ukraine and the United States; attacks on organisations such as ECOWAS and the International Criminal Court; positive portrayals of Russian involvement in Africa; praise for Russian paramilitary forces; and support for sovereignty-oriented political projects such as the Alliance of Sahel States. The operation therefore extends beyond creating fake news websites. It attempts to insert Russian-aligned narratives into the legitimate African media ecosystem using identities that appear African, independent or academically authoritative. This also explains why measuring reach through the original Facebook network alone is misleading. A fabricated article may begin with an influence operator, appear in a genuine African publication, be republished elsewhere and eventually circulate without any visible connection to Russia. At that point, the provenance of the narrative has effectively been laundered. An old Russian strategy with increasingly local faces Russia's use of local intermediaries in Africa is not new. Meta documented Russian networks using African nationals as early as 2019. In 2020 it dismantled another operation involving people in Ghana and Nigeria working on behalf of individuals in Russia, with links to previous activity associated with the Internet Research Agency. More recent Meta investigations suggest that this model has continued to evolve. Networks have increasingly relied on local freelancers, social-media managers and authentic media outlets rather than exclusively operating armies of obviously fake Russian-controlled accounts. This decentralisation offers several advantages. Local operators understand language, political sensitivities and cultural references. Authentic accounts are harder to identify than newly created synthetic personas. Local media brands can also deliver narratives without immediately triggering the scepticism associated with Russian state outlets. There is no evidence that every African journalist, freelancer or publication carrying such material knowingly participates in Russian influence activity. Meta explicitly notes in its investigations that some local contractors may not know who ultimately commissioned their work. That distinction is essential. The operation's effectiveness partly depends on precisely this ambiguity between deliberate participation, commercial content placement and unwitting amplification. The objective is to make Russian narratives look African The significance of this network is therefore not its 30,000 Facebook followers or its $7,000 advertising budget. Those figures are small compared with the audiences of major African media organisations. What matters is the distribution model. Traditional foreign propaganda asks an audience to trust a foreign source. These operations attempt to remove the foreign source from the equation altogether. A Russian geopolitical narrative can be generated with AI, attributed to an expert who does not exist, published by a media organisation that does, amplified through a Facebook Page presenting itself as local, and then rediscovered elsewhere as apparently independent African analysis. By the time the reader encounters it, Moscow may have disappeared completely from the chain of attribution. The resulting information operation is therefore less about making Russian propaganda more persuasive than about making it look as though it is no longer Russian propaganda at all. In an increasingly fragmented African media environment, that may be the more important evolution to watch. SOURCES: Meta Threat Research https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h1-2026-russia-based-cib-network-1/ OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina News24 https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2019 https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/removing-more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2020 https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta Threat Research — Russian Use of Authentic Operators in Sub-Saharan Africa https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h2-2025-russia-based-cib-network-2/ KEYWORDS: #DISINFORMED #Episode7 #Russia #Africa #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeNews #FakeMedia #FakeNewsrooms #MediaImpersonation #GrassrootsManipulation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SyntheticMedia #FakeInfluencers #SocialMediaManipulation #Facebook #Meta #OperationNoBell #AfricanMedia #MediaManipulation #Propaganda #DigitalInfluence #Angola #Ghana #Kenya #SouthAfrica #OSINT #WRLD

¡Muy ilusionados con este gran avance! #Andalucía se sitúa a la vanguardia de la economía circular con la nueva planta de Atlantic Copper, que recuperará 60.000 toneladas de metales al año procedentes de aparatos en desuso. Son 550 M€ de inversión y generará empleo y riqueza. https://t.co/A2lgpizVH1 #EconomíaCircular #Andalucía #Sostenibilidad #ES #PR #US

AFRYKA — RAPORT PORANNY 12 września 2026 Najważniejsze wydarzenia z ostatnich 24 godzin 1. DR KONGO — EBOLA ROZSZERZA SIĘ NA SIÓDMĄ PROWINCJĘ Znaczenie: 10/10 — krytyczne Epidemia Eboli w DR Konga przekroczyła 7 tys. przypadków i 3,398 zgonów. Wirus dotarł do Sud-Ubangi na zachodzie kraju, daleko od pierwotnego epicentrum, co zwiększa ryzyko dalszego rozprzestrzeniania się w regionie. WHO wskazuje na niedobór personelu, finansowania i partnerów jako główne bariery w opanowaniu epidemii. Źródła: Reuters, AP — 11.09.2026 https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/ebola-infections-top-7000-congo-virus-spreads-new-province-2026-09-11/ https://apnews.com/article/58a2b25c752eaa8344ff16564a8e3547 2. SUDAN — RADA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA ONZ PRZEDŁUŻA EMBARGO NA BROŃ DLA DARFURU Znaczenie: 9/10 — bardzo wysokie Rada Bezpieczeństwa ONZ jednomyślnie przedłużyła o miesiąc embargo na broń dla Darfuru. USA naciskają na rozszerzenie zakazu na cały Sudan, ale Rosja zapowiada sprzeciw. Jednocześnie WFP ostrzega o dalszych cięciach pomocy humanitarnej wobec ogromnego niedofinansowania operacji w kraju. Źródło: AP — 11.09.2026 https://apnews.com/article/fde2c6880c80343bebffb83c243fd3f4 3. NIGERIA–RPA — NIGERYJSKI PARLAMENT ZAWIESZA OFICJALNE KONTAKTY Z RPA Znaczenie: 9/10 — bardzo wysokie Nigeryjski parlament zawiesił oficjalne wizyty i część współpracy parlamentarnej z Republiką Południowej Afryki w reakcji na przemoc wobec migrantów, w tym Nigeryjczyków. Kwestia ksenofobii staje się coraz poważniejszym problemem w relacjach dwóch największych politycznie i gospodarczo państw Afryki Subsaharyjskiej. Źródła: Reuters, AP — 11.09.2026 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-parliament-boycotts-south-africa-events-over-anti-migrant-attacks-2026-09-11/ https://apnews.com/article/523e32cb4f0574e2e00b8345460b1c02 4. GAMBIA — WŁADZE OGRANICZAJĄ PROTESTY PO ZAMIESZKACH ZWIĄZANYCH Z BRAKAMI PRĄDU Znaczenie: 8/10 — wysokie Policja zakazała protestów bez oficjalnych zezwoleń po serii demonstracji przeciwko długotrwałym przerwom w dostawach energii. Kryzys energetyczny szybko nabiera wymiaru politycznego przed grudniowymi wyborami prezydenckimi i zwiększa presję na administrację Adamy Barrowa. Źródło: Reuters — 11.09.2026 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gambia-bans-protests-without-permits-after-unrest-over-power-cuts-2026-09-11/ 5. USA–AFRYKA — 99,6 MLN USD DLA AFRICELL W RAMACH RYWALIZACJI Z HUAWEI Znaczenie: 8/10 — wysokie Amerykański Export-Import Bank udzielił Africell pożyczki w wysokości 99,6 mln USD na rozwój sieci telekomunikacyjnych w Afryce, szczególnie w Angoli. Finansowanie jest elementem szerszej strategii USA mającej ograniczyć dominację Huawei w afrykańskiej infrastrukturze 4G i 5G. Źródło: AP — 11.09.2026 https://apnews.com/article/a755a634563876d52c9738dce4e5d7f4 6. AGOA — USA PRZEDŁUŻAJĄ PROGRAM DO KOŃCA 2028 ROKU Znaczenie: 8/10 — wysokie Przedłużenie African Growth and Opportunity Act do 31 grudnia 2028 r. utrzymuje preferencyjny dostęp do rynku USA dla kilkudziesięciu państw Afryki Subsaharyjskiej. Dla eksporterów oznacza to większą przewidywalność inwestycji, produkcji i handlu z rynkiem amerykańskim. Źródło: Vanguard / AllAfrica — 11.09.2026 https://allafrica.com/stories/202609110270.html 7. KENIA — UJAWNIONO OPERACJĘ WPŁYWU POLITYCZNEGO Z UŻYCIEM AI Znaczenie: 8/10 — wysokie Według raportu opisywanego przez Capital FM, operator kampanii wpływu wykorzystywał generatywną AI do masowego tworzenia treści politycznych przed wyborami w Kenii w 2027 r. Celem miało być m.in. wzmacnianie określonych narracji i tworzenie pozoru spontanicznego poparcia społecznego. To ważny sygnał dotyczący wykorzystania AI w afrykańskich kampaniach wyborczych. Źródło: Capital FM / AllAfrica — 11.09.2026 https://allafrica.com/stories/202609110160.html 8. ETIOPIA — FANO TWIERDZI, ŻE WZIĘŁO DO NIEWOLI PONAD 150 ŻOŁNIERZY Znaczenie: 8/10 — wysokie Milicja Fano poinformowała o schwytaniu ponad 150 żołnierzy armii federalnej w regionie Amhara po ciężkich walkach. Informacje nie zostały niezależnie potwierdzone, ale wskazują na utrzymującą się wysoką intensywność konfliktu między Fano i rządem federalnym. Źródło: Shabelle / AllAfrica — 11.09.2026 https://allafrica.com/stories/202609110509.html 9. BRICS — NACISK NA REFORMĘ MFW I BANKU ŚWIATOWEGO Znaczenie: 7/10 — istotne Ministrowie finansów i prezesi banków centralnych BRICS wezwali do zwiększenia wpływu gospodarek rozwijających się na MFW i Bank Światowy oraz do dalszego rozwoju systemów płatności transgranicznych. Dla afrykańskich członków BRICS — w tym RPA, Etiopii i Egiptu — oznacza to kontynuację polityki zwiększania roli Globalnego Południa w światowych instytucjach finansowych. Źródło: Reuters — 11.09.2026 https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/brics-finance-chiefs-urge-reform-global-development-financial-institutions-2026-09-11/ 10. HANDEL I ENERGIA — REKORDOWE STAWKI TRANSPORTU ROPY UDERZAJĄ TAKŻE W TRASĘ AFRYKA ZACHODNIA–AZJA Znaczenie: 7/10 — istotne Eskalacja konfliktu na Bliskim Wschodzie doprowadziła do rekordowego wzrostu stawek frachtu dużych tankowców. Reuters wskazuje, że rekordowe poziomy objęły także trasę z Afryki Zachodniej do Azji, co może podnosić koszty eksportu, importu paliw i presję inflacyjną w części państw afrykańskich. Źródło: Reuters — 11.09.2026 https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-tanker-rates-hit-record-highs-following-iran-us-shipping-attacks-2026-09-11/ #Afryka #Africa #DRC #healthcare #ebola #security #bezpieczenstwo #wojna# #wiadomosci #news #Kongo #DRC #Kenia #kenya #Southafrica #Africell #Sudan #Nigeria #Gambia #USA #Etiopia #Brics #ropanaftowa #agoa

Hoy, el sector espacial español vive un momento récord. Y @PLD_Space es un buen ejemplo. Ha pasado de ser una startup a contar con más de 500 profesionales y representa lo mejor del sello 'Made in Spain'. Se abre una nueva y emocionante etapa que pondrá a Elche, Alicante y a España donde merecemos estar: a la vanguardia de la industria espacial. #IndustriaEspacial #MadeInSpain #Innovación

China está a la vanguardia en la fabricación de robots humanoides, alcanzando hitos como el récord de velocidad del robot Superman, pero enfrenta desafíos significativos en el desarrollo del software necesario para que estos robots realicen tareas complejas, mientras el gobierno subsidia en gran medida los costos de formación y desarrollo. #RobotsHumanoides #TecnologíaChina #InnovaciónRobótica