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At the end of September, in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Colby specified the function of the instrument: Washington engages high-performing allies in narrow formats, such as the selective Bergen Group, to accelerate coalition building and progress towards NATO 3.0. #NATO #GrupulBergen #PoliticaExternă (translated)

The Bergen Group, an initiative of the Pentagon, will take place in October 2026 in Warsaw, but the absence of Romania and other essential European states raises questions about the selection criteria and their involvement in the future of NATO. #NATO #GrupulBergen #PoliticaExternă (translated)

Norway is constructing the "Rogfast," a 26.7-kilometer-long and up to 390 meters deep underwater road tunnel under the North Sea, which significantly reduces travel time between Stavanger and Bergen and connects the island of Kvitsøy to the mainland. #Rogfast #Tunnelbau #Norwegen (translated)

The ministry believes that the statement regarding the fact that NATO's future will be discussed in the Bergen format this week is exaggerated, considering that significant decisions about NATO's strategy are made in the North Atlantic Council, and the Baltic states continue to strengthen their defense and the U.S. military presence in the region. #NATO #BaltijasValstis #Aizsardzība (translated)

The author wrote that unity and collective defence depended on allies being prepared to honour their commitments in words and actions. They said the Pentagon’s discussions in the Bergen format were not, in themselves, cause for alarm, but that allies needed confidence in NATO’s long-term cohesion.

The author wrote that unity was essential and said collective defence depended on allies being prepared to honour their commitments in words and actions. They added that Pentagon discussions in the Bergen format were not, in themselves, cause for alarm, but said allies needed confidence in NATO’s long-term cohesion.

According to Tristan Bergen, a storm chaser on site, it is not one but two simultaneous tornadoes that hit the Aigues Mortes area in Gard. More than 300mm has already fallen in the north of Hérault. After the summer drought, the soil absorbs little. The reaction of waterways is very quick! The Mediterranean, overheated by summer heatwaves, is playing the role we feared. An additional 300mm is expected to fall in Hérault. The situation is deteriorating rapidly! #Météo #Tornade #Inondation (translated)

Der deutsche Verfassungsschutz warnt Universitäten vor Technologietransfers nach China, da diese Kooperationen das Risiko eines Wissens- und Technologieverlustes bergen und Chinas dominierende Position in verschiedenen Bereichen stärken könnten. #Technologietransfer #Verfassungsschutz #China

In den Bergen wurde Alarmstufe Rot ausgerufen, da die Gletscherspaltenstürze im Jahr 2024 dreimal so hoch waren wie im Durchschnitt der letzten zehn Jahre, was auf die drastischen klimatischen Veränderungen und die damit einhergehenden Gefahren für Bergsteiger hinweist. #Klimakrise #Bergsicherheit #Gletscher

De schat van de mieren: Waar de paden samenkomen - De schat van de mieren: Waar de paden samenkomen www.amazon.nl/dp/B0H34T87R3 Visuele wiskunde duidelijk uitgelegd — Dutch Edition / Édition néerlandaise by Mr. Numberwise De schat van de mieren: Waar de paden samenkomen is een visueel wiskundeverhaal dat vergelijkingen, grafieken en coördinaten verandert in een avontuur dat kinderen echt kunnen zien en begrijpen. Wanneer Mia en Alex twee mysterieuze mierenpaden ontdekken die elkaar op het strand kruisen, ontmoeten ze Mr. Numberwise — een rustige gids die hun laat zien dat wiskunde niet alleen uit getallen op een pagina bestaat, maar ook uit verhalen, paden, patronen en ontdekkingen. Door mieren, schatkaarten, trappen, kleurrijke paden en spannende “Aha!”-momenten maken kinderen kennis met: • lineaire vergelijkingen • helling • coördinaten • grafieken tekenen • snijpunten en ontmoetingspunten Dit boek gebruikt originele visuele modellen om algebra gemakkelijker te begrijpen: • helling wordt een trap • een vergelijking wordt het recept van een pad • +b wordt de startverdieping • coördinaten worden het adres van een punt • een snijpunt wordt de plek waar twee verschillende padverhalen samenkomen Voor kinderen die zich nerveus, geblokkeerd of overweldigd voelen door wiskunde, biedt dit boek zachte hulp bij wiskundeangst door middel van vriendelijke beelden, eenvoudige stappen en vertrouwde ideeën. In plaats van algebra abstract of eng te laten voelen, verbindt het nieuwe begrippen met dingen die kinderen al begrijpen: een trap, een pad, een mier, een verhaal. Dit boek combineert: ✔ verhaal ✔ visuele uitleg ✔ opgeloste oefeningen ✔ stap-voor-stap leren ✔ tekeningen en grafieken ✔ oefenbladen ✔ uitleg in de stijl van “Math Made Clear” ✔ onvergetelijke “Aha!”-momenten In plaats van formules uit het hoofd te leren, beginnen kinderen te zien hoe wiskunde beweegt. Perfect voor nieuwsgierige leerlingen, visuele denkers, thuisonderwijsgezinnen, klaslokalen en kinderen die algebra voor het eerst ontdekken. Hoofdzakelijk ontworpen voor kinderen van 10–14 jaar, maar dit boek kan ook oudere leerlingen helpen die algebra moeilijk vinden en een duidelijkere, meer visuele uitleg nodig hebben. En eerlijk gezegd… misschien begrijpen veel volwassenen met dit boek eindelijk ook de helling beter. Een visueel wiskundeverhaal met opgeloste oefeningen — ontworpen om algebra eindelijk duidelijk te maken. #visueleWiskundeVoorKinderen #visualMathForFid #hulpBijWiskundeangst #mathAnxietyHelpForKids #zomerseAvonturenverhalenVoor_9_12_jaar #lineaireVergelijkingen #linearEquations #hellingBegrijpen #understandSlope #grafiekenBegrijpen #understandGraphs #hellingCoördinaten #slopeCoordinates #Nederlands #Kinderen #DutchEdition #Kids #Scheveningen #Zandvoort #BloemendaalAanZee #EgmondAanZee #BergenAanZee #Domburg #Renesse #Noordwijk #Afsluitdijk #Brouwersdam #Oosterscheldekering #Maeslantkering #Haringvlietdam #VeerseGatdam #Prinsengracht #Herengracht #Keizersgracht #Singel #Brouwersgracht #Oudegracht #0255_. 20261006: 917(357)8 #Blij #BlijOnderwijs #BlijeKinderen #BlijeWiskunde

Russia’s fake African newsrooms – propaganda designed to look local A Facebook user in Nairobi, Accra, Johannesburg or Luanda encounters what appears to be a local news page. It publishes stories about African politics, Western influence and relations with Russia. The language is tailored to an African audience and the page presents itself not as a foreign broadcaster, but as part of the local information landscape. Behind some of these outlets, however, Meta found operators based in Russia. In its 2026 threat research, the company disclosed a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour network targeting audiences in Angola, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the operation. Around 30,000 users followed at least one of the Pages, while the operators spent approximately $7,000 on Facebook and Instagram advertising, mostly in euros and US dollars. The numbers are relatively modest. The method is considerably more important. Rather than openly distributing Russian state messaging, the network posed as local African news sources and grassroots organisations, promoting narratives about Western colonialism and political interference while presenting Russia as a credible economic and political alternative. It was an old geopolitical message delivered through a much more effective identity: not Moscow speaking to Africa, but Africans apparently speaking to one another. A news outlet that was actually an influence operation Meta's investigation found that the network attempted to conceal its Russian origin while creating media brands that appeared indigenous to the countries they targeted. Its content amplified historical grievances against former colonial powers, criticised Western involvement in Africa and promoted closer relations with Russia. One example helps illustrate how the infrastructure was assembled. A Facebook Page targeting Kenya was called Kenya Watchtower. According to OpenAI's subsequent investigation, Facebook transparency records showed that the Page had previously been named “Farmtown5”. It appears to have been acquired or repurposed rather than built from scratch as a Kenyan news organisation. Some Pages also exposed administrator locations in Russia and Ukraine. Other elements of the network had previously targeted audiences in Zambia and Namibia. This use of apparently local identities is particularly important in the African information environment. A story published by RT or another identifiable Russian outlet arrives with an obvious geopolitical provenance. The same narrative presented by something resembling an independent Kenyan, Ghanaian or South African newsroom carries a different kind of credibility. The source appears closer to the reader, and the geopolitical interest behind the message becomes less visible. Then investigators found Dr Manuel Godsin The Facebook operation was only one part of a broader information ecosystem. OpenAI investigated related activity after receiving information from Meta and subsequently banned a ChatGPT account it assessed as likely originating in Russia. OpenAI called the campaign Operation No Bell. The account was being used to generate long-form articles and social-media posts about African geopolitics. Prompts were primarily written in English, but OpenAI also observed Russian-language instructions that the user described as coming from a manager. The operator sometimes explicitly asked the model to make the material appear less AI-generated – including requests to avoid stylistic features associated with machine-generated text and to write more like a human journalist. Many articles appeared under the name “Dr Manuel Godsin”, presented as an academic with a PhD from the University of Bergen and an affiliation with an organisation called the International Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. OpenAI could find no credible evidence that Godsin existed. Searches of Norway's National Research Information Repository and the University of Bergen library produced no record of him. Investigators subsequently discovered that a photograph used to represent Godsin had appeared years earlier on a Russian professional networking site and apparently belonged to a law student in St Petersburg. The fabricated academic identity was nevertheless remarkably productive. OpenAI identified 53 online articles carrying the Godsin byline. The fiction had moved beyond fake social-media pages and into the real media ecosystem. When propaganda enters genuine newsrooms This is the most consequential aspect of the operation. The articles were not confined to websites controlled by the influence network. Some were published by genuine African news organisations, including established South African outlets. The content mixed local political issues with broader geopolitical narratives. Some pieces criticised the United States and Britain or defended Russia's role in Africa. One accused the British NGO Crisis Action of fomenting protests in South Africa. Another praised Russia's presence in the Central African Republic. Other material addressed Kenya, Angola and relations between African governments and Washington. The mechanism represents a significant evolution from the classic troll-farm model. Instead of building an audience entirely on its own platforms, an influence operator can manufacture an apparently credible expert, generate articles in his name and persuade genuine news organisations to publish them. Once this happens, the propaganda acquires something a fake Facebook Page cannot provide: the institutional credibility of a real newsroom. OpenAI assessed No Bell's social-media impact as limited. One Facebook Page had around 3,000 followers before Meta removed it, while several others had very small audiences. But the operation was more successful in placing material in established media. In OpenAI's impact framework, it approached the level at which an influence operation breaks into mainstream media. For information operators, a single article published by a recognised outlet can potentially be more valuable than thousands of impressions generated by an obviously artificial account. A much larger network of ghost journalists Subsequent research suggests that Manuel Godsin was not an isolated experiment. In August 2026, Graphika, working with Code for Africa and with support from Meta, published a much broader investigation into Russian ghostwriting operations across African media. Researchers identified 44 ghost writers and fake experts, 38 of them assessed as high-confidence fabricated personas, operating between 2021 and 2026. Their material appeared or was quoted across 138 websites and was subsequently republished through at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages, including authentic users, coordinated inauthentic networks and official Russian communication channels. The narratives were strikingly consistent. They included criticism of France, Ukraine and the United States; attacks on organisations such as ECOWAS and the International Criminal Court; positive portrayals of Russian involvement in Africa; praise for Russian paramilitary forces; and support for sovereignty-oriented political projects such as the Alliance of Sahel States. The operation therefore extends beyond creating fake news websites. It attempts to insert Russian-aligned narratives into the legitimate African media ecosystem using identities that appear African, independent or academically authoritative. This also explains why measuring reach through the original Facebook network alone is misleading. A fabricated article may begin with an influence operator, appear in a genuine African publication, be republished elsewhere and eventually circulate without any visible connection to Russia. At that point, the provenance of the narrative has effectively been laundered. An old Russian strategy with increasingly local faces Russia's use of local intermediaries in Africa is not new. Meta documented Russian networks using African nationals as early as 2019. In 2020 it dismantled another operation involving people in Ghana and Nigeria working on behalf of individuals in Russia, with links to previous activity associated with the Internet Research Agency. More recent Meta investigations suggest that this model has continued to evolve. Networks have increasingly relied on local freelancers, social-media managers and authentic media outlets rather than exclusively operating armies of obviously fake Russian-controlled accounts. This decentralisation offers several advantages. Local operators understand language, political sensitivities and cultural references. Authentic accounts are harder to identify than newly created synthetic personas. Local media brands can also deliver narratives without immediately triggering the scepticism associated with Russian state outlets. There is no evidence that every African journalist, freelancer or publication carrying such material knowingly participates in Russian influence activity. Meta explicitly notes in its investigations that some local contractors may not know who ultimately commissioned their work. That distinction is essential. The operation's effectiveness partly depends on precisely this ambiguity between deliberate participation, commercial content placement and unwitting amplification. The objective is to make Russian narratives look African The significance of this network is therefore not its 30,000 Facebook followers or its $7,000 advertising budget. Those figures are small compared with the audiences of major African media organisations. What matters is the distribution model. Traditional foreign propaganda asks an audience to trust a foreign source. These operations attempt to remove the foreign source from the equation altogether. A Russian geopolitical narrative can be generated with AI, attributed to an expert who does not exist, published by a media organisation that does, amplified through a Facebook Page presenting itself as local, and then rediscovered elsewhere as apparently independent African analysis. By the time the reader encounters it, Moscow may have disappeared completely from the chain of attribution. The resulting information operation is therefore less about making Russian propaganda more persuasive than about making it look as though it is no longer Russian propaganda at all. In an increasingly fragmented African media environment, that may be the more important evolution to watch. SOURCES: Meta Threat Research https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h1-2026-russia-based-cib-network-1/ OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina News24 https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2019 https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/removing-more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2020 https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta Threat Research — Russian Use of Authentic Operators in Sub-Saharan Africa https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h2-2025-russia-based-cib-network-2/ KEYWORDS: #DISINFORMED #Episode7 #Russia #Africa #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeNews #FakeMedia #FakeNewsrooms #MediaImpersonation #GrassrootsManipulation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SyntheticMedia #FakeInfluencers #SocialMediaManipulation #Facebook #Meta #OperationNoBell #AfricanMedia #MediaManipulation #Propaganda #DigitalInfluence #Angola #Ghana #Kenya #SouthAfrica #OSINT #WRLD

Josef Čapek, zatčen 9. září 1939, zahájil svou hrůznou pouť nacistickými koncentračními tábory v Dachau. 😔 Již 26. září 1939 byl přemístěn do Buchenwaldu, kde strávil těžké dva a půl roku. 🕯️ Následovalo další stěhování, 26. června 1942 byl transportován do Sachsenhausenu. Poslední a osudová kapitola jeho věznění začala 25. února 1945, kdy byl převezen do Bergen-Belsenu. 🕯️ V důsledku tyfové epidemie, která v táboře propukla, zde Josef Čapek zemřel krátce předtím, než byl tábor osvobozen spojeneckými vojsky. Zajímavost: Josef Čapek byl podle svědectví svého bratra Karla skutečným tvůrcem slova „robot“, které se následně rozšířilo do mnoha jazyků a stalo se jedním z nejčastěji používaných pojmů v moderní technologii. Karel Čapek tento termín převzal a poprvé ho použil ve své divadelní hře R.U.R., kde označoval uměle vytvořenou lidskou bytost. #historie #holocaust #JosefCapek

Neun Tage nach der verheerenden Sturzflut in Nepal konnten Rettungskräfte zwei verschüttete Mitarbeiter eines Wasserkraftwerks lebend bergen, während die Zahl der Vermissten bei über 5.000 und die der bestätigten Todesopfer bei fast 1.300 liegt. #Nepal #Flutkatastrophe #Rettungsaktion

In Sachsen-Anhalt kursieren vor den Landtagswahlen gefälschte Videos, die Politikern kriminelle Vorwürfe anheften und Teil einer gezielten Desinformationskampagne sind, während Betroffene wie Olaf Meister (Grüne) betonen, dass solche Fakes ernsthafte Gefahren bergen können, obwohl bisher kein Video viral gegangen ist. #Falschnachrichten #Desinformation #Landtagswahl