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Disinformation for hire – the network of 70 fake newsrooms sold as a service The websites looked local. Naija Pulse appeared to cover Nigeria, Echo Berlin Germany, The British Daily Britain, Fifty States the United States and Commonwealth Post Australia. Each had its own branding, articles, supposed journalists and matching social-media presence. Taken individually, they resembled small independent news outlets. According to Anthropic, however, they were parts of a single commercial influence network spanning six continents. Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report identifies the operation as GTG-54002, a commercial “influence-as-a-service” network that used Claude to generate and rewrite political content at industrial scale. Investigators linked roughly 70 fabricated news websites to around 70 matching X accounts and more than 250 additional inauthentic commenting accounts designed to create the appearance of genuine public engagement. The network produced at least 8,913 articles in about 20 languages before Anthropic disrupted the activity. The significance of the case is not simply the number of fake sites. It is the business model. The network did not consistently promote one government, party or ideology. Anthropic found that its political position changed according to the apparent interests of different customers. The company therefore described it as a commercial influence operation: political manipulation offered in much the same way as other outsourced digital services. A fake media ecosystem built at scale Anthropic says the infrastructure was created rapidly. Domains were registered from France during a roughly ten-week period in mid-2025 and deployed through shared technical infrastructure, allowing investigators to connect publications that outwardly appeared unrelated. Most of the supporting social-media accounts were also created within a narrow timeframe in June and July 2025. The sites were designed to look like functioning local newsrooms rather than anonymous propaganda pages. Articles carried fabricated bylines belonging to journalists who, according to Anthropic, did not exist. Each outlet had a corresponding account on X, while a second layer of fake profiles commented on and amplified the articles. Many of those accounts used AI-generated profile photographs. The result was a three-tier structure: the newsroom published the story, the branded social account distributed it, and apparently ordinary users supplied the appearance of public reaction. Some of those sites remained publicly visible after the operation was exposed. The British Daily, for example, described itself as providing “conservative insights” on British sovereignty and migration, while Commonwealth Post presented itself as an Australian liberal publication focused on democracy, migration and regional security. Those contrasting editorial identities illustrate the central feature identified by Anthropic: the network was capable of taking different political positions in different markets. Claude as a publishing engine Claude was not simply asked to draft occasional articles. The operators built a structured production pipeline around it. Prompts required fixed JSON outputs, formatted HTML, precise character limits and internal links, allowing articles to move directly into an automated publishing workflow. The system could generate entirely new material or take reporting produced by legitimate journalists and rewrite it to fit a desired political perspective. Anthropic identified three recurring techniques. The same source article could be rewritten in opposite ideological directions for different audiences; a political interpretation could be added to a story that originally contained none; and material could be moved from one country to another after its original context had been removed. The articles were also structured to improve the apparent authority of the sites in search engines, helping the network imitate ordinary digital publishing practices rather than simply broadcasting propaganda. This is where generative AI changes the economics of an influence operation. A conventional network of dozens of supposedly local publications would normally require writers, translators, editors and social-media staff. Here, much of that production could be standardised and automated while human operators concentrated on political direction, customer requirements and distribution. The DRC–Rwanda conflict as a test case The clearest concentration of activity involved the Democratic Republic of Congo. Anthropic identified 318 articles concerning the DRC across the fake-news network. The material generally supported positions aligned with the Congolese government, particularly on regional mineral agreements and tensions with Rwanda. Early in the network’s growth, many of the fake social-media personas following and amplifying its accounts also presented themselves as Congolese. Investigators observed one especially revealing episode on 11 September 2025, when multiple sites published almost identical articles about the DRC–Rwanda conflict within approximately three minutes of one another. The wording and political tone were adjusted for different regional audiences, while associated X accounts distributed the links in a coordinated pattern. Anthropic said the activity contained signals suggesting that one or more customers had interests connected to the DRC–Rwanda conflict. It did not, however, identify those customers and explicitly stated that it found no evidence that any government had directed the operation. That distinction is essential. The content may have benefited a political actor without demonstrating that the actor commissioned or controlled it. Influence without ideology Commercialisation is what distinguishes GTG-54002 from many state-linked information operations. A government propaganda network usually has an identifiable strategic direction. A commercial influence provider does not need one. Its infrastructure can support one position in one country and the opposite position somewhere else, provided different customers are willing to pay. That makes attribution more difficult. Analysts cannot necessarily infer the operator from the ideology of the content because ideology may simply be part of the service package. The enduring asset is the infrastructure: domains, publishing systems, fake journalists, social-media accounts and automated amplification. Anthropic says the operation was disrupted before it achieved significant genuine reach. It classified GTG-54002 as Category Two on the Brookings Breakout Scale: material circulated across the network’s own sites and associated social accounts but showed no evidence of substantial penetration into authentic communities. Most of the 8,913 articles generated little observable engagement from real users. That limited impact is important. The case should not be presented as a successful global manipulation campaign. It is better understood as evidence that the infrastructure required to run such campaigns has become cheaper, faster and increasingly commoditised. The deeper shift is that a fake media ecosystem no longer has to be built around a single political cause. It can be built once, automated and then repurposed for the next customer. Disinformation, in this model, is no longer only a political instrument as it turend into the service. Sources: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Business Standard — AI scaling fake newsrooms, surveillance and online scams https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/anthropic-report-ai-fake-newsrooms-dating-surveillance-scams-126091100730_1.html Mimikama — KI baut 70 erfundene Nachrichtenportale https://www.mimikama.org/ki-netzwerk-erfundene-nachrichtenportale-echo-berlin/ Poliscoop Media — Anthropic exposes DRC propaganda network https://www.poliscoopmedia.com/articles/anthropic-exposes-drc-propaganda-network-20260911 The British Daily — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://www.british-daily.com/contact Commonwealth Post — example of a fabricated outlet identified in the network https://commonwealth-post.com/category/science MalPulse — infrastructure references for network domains https://www.malpulse.com/infra-pivots/usom-pivots/list/?page=1105 Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode13 #DisinformationAsAService #InfluenceAsAService #FakeNewsrooms #FakeMedia #SyntheticMedia #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #FIMI #CommercialInfluence #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #SourceLaundering #MediaImpersonation #FakeJournalists #SyntheticPersonas #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #DigitalInfluence #AutomatedPropaganda #ContentAutomation #AIPropaganda #LKMCompany #NaijaPulse #AxumVoices #JamboJournal #EchoBerlin #TheBritishDaily #FiftyStates #CommonwealthPost #DRC #Rwanda #OSINT #WRLD

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

🚨 OFFICIAL! The FIA and the Automobile Club de l'Ouest have reached an agreement to secure the future of the WEC championship until 2037! Both parties announce changes, including greater control by the FIA over the rules and branding of the championship. They also confirm the holding of the 24 Hours of Le Mans and other events such as Lone Star Le Mans or the 6 Hours of Imola in 2027! 🍿 #WEC #WEC #WEC #24HeuresduMans #FIA (translated)

Acho que tá meio explicado o silêncio da CazéPT sobre o fim das BETs. No dia seguinte à proibição, a emissora digital já estava com o selo da Caixa Loterias como branding. Não é sobre defender as BETs, mas é sobre a omissão diante de um povo tão sofrido que é o povo Brasileiro e que agora será explorado pelo crime organizado. #Brasil #Cidadania #Justiça

Fake NV – how a cloned newsroom turned an AI video into a $140 million corruption scandal For two days in September, a website that looked almost indistinguishable from one of Ukraine’s best-known news organisations carried an extraordinary corruption story. It claimed that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau had raided former defence procurement chief Arsen Zhumadilov and discovered more than $140 million in cash packed inside refrigerator boxes. One box supposedly carried the words “For the Servant of the People” – an apparent reference to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s political party. The raid never happened. The photographs and video presented as evidence were fabricated, and the news organisation reporting the story was not the New Voice of Ukraine but a cloned version of it. The episode is a compact example of an increasingly effective disinformation technique. Rather than inventing a new propaganda outlet and trying to build its credibility from scratch, an operator can simply steal the identity of an established newsroom and place fabricated material inside an otherwise convincing copy of its editorial environment. A newsroom copied almost in full The counterfeit site appeared at nvukraine.com, while the authentic New Voice of Ukraine operates at nv.ua and english.nv.ua. Registration records examined by fact-checkers show that the false domain was created on 21 September 2026, two days before the fabricated article appeared. According to NV’s own investigation, the imitation went much further than copying a logo: the operators reproduced the site’s visual design, sections, branding, contact information and genuine editorial material. A snapshot of legitimate NV content from 23 September appears to have been copied onto the counterfeit site, into which the operators inserted a single false article. That article claimed that NABU had searched premises connected to Zhumadilov, who had headed Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency until August, and seized $140 million in cash. The story was published in several languages, including Ukrainian and English, suggesting that the operation was intended not only for Ukraine’s domestic information space but also for foreign audiences following the war and Western support for Kyiv. AI supplied the supposed evidence The false article was supported by a video purportedly showing the money discovered during the raid. NABU said no such search or procedural action had taken place and identified the footage as fabricated using artificial intelligence. Independent fact-checker Lead Stories found no credible Ukrainian or international reporting confirming either the raid or the alleged seizure, while searches of NABU’s own published material produced no evidence supporting the claim. The operation therefore combined two separate forms of synthetic credibility. The AI-generated footage supplied what looked like visual proof, while the cloned NV website supplied institutional proof: an apparently reputable Ukrainian newsroom supposedly confirming that the event had happened. Neither element needed to withstand close scrutiny for long. Together, they only needed to appear credible enough to be copied, quoted and redistributed before the deception was exposed. From a fake Ukrainian source into the Russian information ecosystem On 24 September, the story began moving through large pro-Russian Telegram channels. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications traced early amplification to Golos Mordora, with roughly 149,000 subscribers, and Militarist, with around 277,000. Within less than an hour, other channels including VOBLA, Rossiya Seychas and Ostashko! Vazhnoye were circulating versions of the same claim. It subsequently appeared on X and on Russian-language websites including e-news.su and pressa24.ru. Babel calculated that posts carrying the fabrication had accumulated approximately 370,000 views by the morning of 25 September. The story also moved beyond the Russian-language ecosystem. English-language versions appeared in online communities including Lemmy and Hexbear, while accounts on X shared direct links to the counterfeit NV article. NV later reported that larger Russian media and propaganda outlets, including RIA Novosti, Life, Vesti, Ukraina.ru and Mail.ru, had reproduced or discussed the claim. Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and a Kremlin representative involved in contacts with the United States, also shared it on 25 September. This amplification is significant, but it should not be confused with proof of authorship. Publicly available evidence shows how the false story entered and spread through a Russian and pro-Russian information ecosystem. It does not establish which organisation registered the cloned domain, generated the video or directed the operation from the outset. Why copy NV? The operation relied on source laundering. A claim originating directly from a Russian Telegram channel that Ukraine’s defence procurement system had concealed $140 million would immediately carry an obvious political context. A claim apparently uncovered by an established Ukrainian newsroom looks very different. Once the fabricated NV article existed, subsequent accounts could cite what appeared to be an independent Ukrainian source rather than present the allegation as their own. Each repost moved the story another step away from its manufactured origin. The use of an English-language version strengthened that mechanism for audiences outside Ukraine. The underlying narrative was also carefully chosen. Corruption in Ukrainian defence procurement is a genuine subject of public scrutiny and investigative reporting, so the fabricated story did not require audiences to accept an entirely unfamiliar premise. It inserted a false event into a real area of political concern. That mixture of authentic context and fabricated evidence can be more persuasive than a completely invented story because much of the surrounding information feels recognisable. What can – and cannot – be attributed Ukrainian authorities and NV describe the episode as a Russian information operation, and its distribution can be documented extensively across pro-Russian and Russian media channels. The available public evidence, however, does not identify the organisation that created the counterfeit website, nor does it link the operation forensically to a named Russian intelligence service, military unit or state contractor. The most precise description is therefore a Russian-aligned disinformation operation whose fabricated material was systematically amplified through the Russian information ecosystem. That distinction matters. Distribution can be observed directly; command-and-control is harder to establish and should not be inferred without evidence. The newsroom itself becomes the deepfake The most important feature of the operation was not the $140 million figure or even the AI-generated video. It was the counterfeit newsroom surrounding them. The operators copied a real publication, populated it largely with genuine material and inserted a single false story, allowing the fabrication to borrow the accumulated credibility of journalists who had nothing to do with it. This points to a broader evolution in synthetic media. AI can fabricate an image, a voice or a video, but an influence operation can now fabricate something larger: the source that supposedly verified the evidence. In the Fake NV operation, the article, the video and the website reinforced one another, creating not simply a false story but a manufactured chain of credibility. Sources The New Voice of Ukraine — investigation into the cloned website https://english.nv.ua/nation/nv-discovers-fake-copy-of-website-with-planted-story-cites-russian-links-50644601.html The New Voice of Ukraine — Russian amplification of the $140 million fabrication https://english.nv.ua/russia-spreads-fake-140-million-ukraine-corruption-story-during-dmitriev-u-s-talks-50644647.html Lead Stories — independent fact-check https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-story-claims-140-million-found-at-home-of-ukraines-zhumadilov-marked-servant-of-the-people-nv-website-originated-it.html Babel — AI video and distribution analysis https://babel.ua/en/news/130469-a-video-is-sharing-online-about-140-million-found-in-the-possession-of-the-ex-head-of-the-defense-procurement-agency-this-is-an-ai-video-distributed-by-a-clone-of-ukrainian-media Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — initial debunk https://spravdi.org/en/ai-fake-about-140-million-amid-us-talks-how-russians-impose-the-image-of-corrupt-ukraine-on-the-west/ Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security — NABU confirmation https://spravdi.org/u-merezhi-poshyryuyut-shi-fejk-pro-nibyto-obshuky-nabu-v-eksgolovy-agencziyi-oboronnyh-zakupivel/ Detector Media — distribution and NABU response https://detector.media/infospace/article/252806/2026-09-25-u-merezhi-pidrobyly-sayt-nv-dlya-poshyrennya-feyku-pro-obshuky-v-eksochilnyka-agentsii-oboronnykh-zakupivel/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode10 #FakeNV #NewVoiceOfUkraine #Ukraine #Russia #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #MediaImpersonation #ClonedMedia #FakeMedia #FakeNews #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #AIVideo #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #CorruptionNarrative #UkraineCorruption #DefenceProcurement #NABU #ArsenZhumadilov #Telegram #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Russia’s influence operation arrives ahead of the US midterms With weeks remaining before America's November midterm elections, a familiar type of content has begun appearing online. Videos resembling reports from CNN, the BBC and The New York Times accuse candidates of corruption, antisemitism and misconduct. Hollywood actors appear to denounce Democrats. Other clips claim that warnings about Russian interference are themselves a Democratic disinformation campaign. The reports are fabricated. Graphika, which tracks online influence operations, says it has identified a coordinated campaign targeting candidates in competitive US Senate races. It assesses with high confidence that the material was produced by Operation Overload, also known as Matryoshka – a long-running Russia-aligned influence operation previously active against elections and political debates in Europe and the United States. The activity coincides with a broader warning from American intelligence officials. Classified assessments reported by The New York Times conclude that the Kremlin has authorised another digital influence campaign ahead of the 2026 midterms, aimed primarily at exploiting existing divisions and undermining confidence in American democracy. There is an important distinction. US officials have not reported evidence that Russia is attempting to manipulate voting machines or alter the counting of votes. The operation is about influencing the information environment surrounding the election. Fake scandals for competitive Senate races Graphika traced a concentrated wave of activity between 10 and 14 September. Likely inauthentic or repurposed accounts distributed videos accusing Democratic politicians of corruption, antisemitism and other misconduct. The targets included Senator Jon Ossoff in Georgia, Representative Chris Pappas in New Hampshire and Texas state representative James Talarico, as well as Senate candidates Sherrod Brown in Ohio, Roy Cooper in North Carolina, Mary Peltola in Alaska, Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, Joshua Turek in Iowa and Troy Jackson in Maine. The selection was not random. These were politicians involved in Senate contests where the result could matter to control of the chamber. The campaign did not rely on a single political narrative. Instead, it attached different accusations to different candidates – corruption, social issues, antisemitism or personal misconduct – while maintaining a consistent production and distribution model. That model is characteristic of Matryoshka: create apparently independent pieces of evidence, disguise them as journalism and distribute them through networks of disposable accounts. Hollywood celebrities who never said what the videos claimed One of the campaign's more distinctive techniques involved genuine footage of American actors. Videos featuring celebrities including Sarah Jessica Parker and Julia Roberts were altered with captions and other material to suggest they were promoting the slogan #AllDemocratsAreCriminals. The technique continued in subsequent material. Fact-checkers identified fabricated New York Times-branded videos using footage of Alyssa Milano, Sean Astin, Rachael Harris, Leonardo DiCaprio, Eric Braeden, Annie Potts and Patrick Fabian. Some of the original footage came from Cameo, where actors record personalised video messages. Their authentic images were retained while fabricated audio, captions or surrounding material changed the meaning entirely. Lead Stories compared several of the clips with the originals and found that the supposed political statements did not appear in the genuine recordings. Eric Braeden's representative separately confirmed that the claim he had joined the anti-Democratic campaign was false. The advantage of the technique is straightforward. Generative AI does not need to create a convincing celebrity from nothing. The operator can begin with authentic footage of a recognisable person and manipulate only the elements necessary to manufacture a political statement. Stealing the authority of real newsrooms Celebrity impersonation was only one layer. The operation repeatedly borrowed the visual identity of established media organisations. Graphika identified material impersonating or falsely citing the BBC, CNN and Politico, alongside references to France's VIGINUM foreign-interference agency and journalist Brandy Zadrozny. Other material reproduced New York Times-style branding. Some fabricated reports made an unusual claim: that Democrats themselves were organising disinformation or “false-flag operations” and then blaming Russia. This creates a defensive layer around the influence operation. Instead of merely distributing false political allegations, the campaign also attempts to discredit future reporting about the manipulation itself. If successful, evidence exposing foreign interference can be reframed as part of the conspiracy. Graphika says it assesses with high confidence that Operation Overload produced these videos. The technique is well established. Earlier investigations by CheckFirst and Reset Tech documented hundreds of falsified pieces of content produced by Operation Overload, often impersonating journalists, institutions and major media brands. AI-generated or manipulated material has increasingly become part of that production system. What US intelligence says Russia is trying to achieve The broader strategic picture comes from American intelligence assessments reported on 18 September. According to US officials familiar with classified findings, the Kremlin has authorised a covert digital influence campaign aimed at Americans during the 2026 election season. Its apparent objective is to seed or amplify domestic divisions and weaken confidence in the political process. Some officials described the principal aim as creating disorder rather than helping a single political party. The publicly identified Matryoshka material examined so far, however, has targeted Democratic candidates. Those two findings should not be treated as contradictory. An operation can exploit partisan divisions while serving the broader objective of making the electoral system appear corrupt, chaotic or illegitimate. US officials also reportedly assess the current Russian campaign as less extensive or coordinated than some previous election operations. Moscow is considered less focused on congressional elections than presidential contests and remains heavily occupied by its war against Ukraine. Russia has denied previous US accusations of election interference. An operation with limited reach – so far There is another reason for caution: producing large quantities of disinformation is not the same as successfully influencing voters. Matryoshka has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to manufacture content at industrial speed, but much of its material receives little genuine engagement. Researchers monitoring the network have previously warned against confusing automated distribution and platform view counts with authentic audience penetration. There are exceptions. A fabricated New York Times-style video featuring Jamie Lee Curtis had accumulated nearly 200,000 views on X by the end of 17 September, according to reporting by The New York Times. Other pieces attracted considerably less attention. There is currently no public evidence demonstrating that the campaign has changed voting intentions or will affect election results. What the September activity demonstrates is something narrower but important: a Russia-aligned influence infrastructure previously used against European elections has now turned significant attention towards the American midterms. The basic method has changed little – impersonate trusted media, manufacture scandals and use networks of inauthentic accounts to distribute them. What has changed is the production technology. Authentic celebrity footage, synthetic voices, manipulated video and rapidly generated fake journalism allow the same operation to produce more tailored material for more candidates at lower cost. The objective does not require Americans to believe every fabrication. Creating uncertainty over which videos, news reports and public statements are authentic can itself degrade trust in the information environment surrounding an election. Sources - Graphika — Russia-Aligned Influence Operation Targets US Midterm Candidates, German State Elections https://www.graphika.com/insights/russia-aligned-influence-operation-targets-us-midterm-candidates-german-state-elections - The New York Times — Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections, U.S. Intelligence Finds https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/us/politics/russia-election-disinformation-us-intelligence.html - Kathimerini / The New York Times — Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections https://www.ekathimerini.com/nytimes/1315792/russia-aims-to-inject-chaos-into-elections-us-intelligence-finds/ - CheckFirst — Operation Overload: An AI-fuelled escalation of the Kremlin-linked propaganda effort https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-an-ai-fuelled-escalation-of-the-kremlin-linked-propaganda-effort/ - CheckFirst — Operation Overload targeting the US election https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-a-growing-disinformation-threat-now-targeting-the-u-s-presidential-election/ - Lead Stories — Fake NYT videos: Alyssa Milano, Rachael Harris and Sean Astin https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-new-york-times-videos-of-alyssa-milano-rachael-harris-sean-astin-falsely-claim-they-support-all-democrats-are-criminals.html - Lead Stories — Fake NYT videos: Leonardo DiCaprio, Eric Braeden and other celebrities https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-new-york-times-videos-of-leonardo-dicaprio-eric-braeden-other-celebs-falsely-claim-they-support-all-democrats-are-criminals.html - Brennan Center for Justice — AI Is Changing Foreign Election Influence https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/ai-changing-foreign-election-influence - ODNI — previous US intelligence assessment of foreign election information operations https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICM-Declassified-Foreign-Threats-to-US-Elections-After-Voting-Ends-in-2024.pdf - FBI / ODNI / CISA — previous joint assessment of Russian election influence operations https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-110424 #DISINFORMED #Episode9 #Russia #UnitedStates #USMidterms #Midterms2026 #USElections #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #OperationOverload #Matryoshka #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #FakeNews #PoliticalDisinformation #CelebrityDeepfakes #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #ElectionSecurity #CognitiveWarfare #Graphika #OSINT #Democracy #WRLD

Jak zabít globální love brand během čtyř až pěti let? Nike bude tento měsíc vyřazený z S&P 100, schválně se podívejte na ten propad ceny akcíí v posledních pěti letech. Masakr. Vedly k němu v zásadě tři důvody (a na počátku údajně byla drahá studie McKinsey): - Konec sportovních kategorií (běh, fotbal, baseball,...). Namísto toho byl produkt prostě pánský, dámský, nebo dětský. Tím značka začala přicházet o své know-how. - Přetrhaná distribuční síť. Během covidu začala firma hrát sama na sebe, vypověděla smlouvy s tradičními prodejci. Nová mantra byla DTC (Direct-to-consumer). Během lockdownu to dávalo smysl, jenže pak na uvolněné regály nastoupily nové brandy jako On, Hoka,... - Reklama & marketing. Nike najel na inkluzivitu, body positivity a společenská témata. Značka, co stála na emocích a sportovních ikonách, najednou začala řešit hlavně metriky a sociální trendy. Pro deep dive je skvělý starší článek bývalého brand directora Nike Massima Giunca: https://t.co/tw63lH1gQQ #Nike #branding #marketing

For artists and music industry professionals, managing digital presence shouldn't mean using a dozen different tools. SXR Connect by SXR Music Group is a comprehensive platform designed to streamline your workflow: 🔹 Link Management: One link for every stream, store, and purchase option. 🔹 Campaigns: Lock in listeners before release day with Pre-Save Campaigns and Pixel tracking (Meta, TikTok, Google Analytics). 🔹 Operations: Sign contracts directly inside the platform with E-Signature support. 🔹 Analytics: Gain insights into geo, device, browser, and referrer data for every interaction. 🔹 Branding: Choose from visual presets like Punk, Neon, Glass, or Sunset for your / @username bio page. If you're looking to professionalize your music distribution and marketing, it's time to connect. 🔗 Learn more: subexile.com/connect #MusicIndustry #MusicMarketing #ArtistDevelopment #SXR #Subexile #MusicTech #DigitalDistribution #MusicBusiness

Here’s Where Brands Are Failing to Meet Consumers’ Expectations: Authenticity All signals were found to be broadly important to consumers, from a high of 96% considering accuracy and honesty “very important” or “somewhat important” to a low of 85% perceiving personalization to https://t.co/T0ncTrfBwk #Authenticity #ConsumerExpectations #Branding #Nospecificcountriesarementionedinthetweet.

Wynik Lecha Poznań to jedno, drugim jest umiejętność wykorzystania przedstawianych słabości rywali i gra tak, jak chciałbym to widzieć. Bardzo się z tego cieszę ✌️ Z tego, jak Lech Poznań w 100% wykorzystał wszystkie niedoskonałości systemu 1-4-4-2, wszystkie mankamenty FC Thun i jeszcze był przy tym bardzo skuteczny. Doceniających słowa za wykonaną robotę, które usłyszałem w różnych miejscach, w tym na stadionie. Z pewnością w fazie ligowej w #UEL można będzie dać z siebie jeszcze więcej, bo poprzeczka idzie wyżej. Postaram się sam dla siebie pójść wyżej. Milan, Marsylia, Bayer, Crystal Palace i tak dalej - To już nie jest mój piłkarski świat... Ciężko będzie znaleźć słabe strony w wielu zespołach, mankamenty do wykorzystania, ale z pewnością potraktuję to jako wyzwanie 👍 No to co? Losowanie 28.08 o 13:00, dodatkowe 0.500 wpada do pewnych 2.500 pkt. za ten sezon i 15-16.09 zaczynamy wszyscy nową przygodę w #UEL - Zmiana brandingu z czarno-zielonego na czarno-pomarańczowy - Entrance #UEL zostaje bez zmian (o 18:42 i 20:57) - 8 rywali, w tym wielu nowych - 2 mecze w styczniu Dobrej nocy. Hej Lech! 🤠 #LechPoznań #UEL #football

Ależ mam problem z tym naszym polskim morzem. Mamy przecież przepiękne, wspaniałe plaże. Piasek aksamitny, bielutki, sypki, mało gdzie w Europie jest tak super. Mamy piękną naturę dookoła. Wydmy czy gęsto porośnięte wzgórza i parki narodowe (np. w okolicach Międzyzdrojów) wyglądają bajecznie jak z filmów studia Ghibli. Mamy pieniądze unijne na renowacje. Widać, że promenady, skwerki, chodniki, infrastruktura rowerowa i inne podobne są dofinansowane, a tabliczek unijnych jest niemal tyle, co smażalni ryb. Mamy doskonały porządek. Zdziwiło mnie, ze w Świnoujściu przy morzu jest wręcz… sterylnie czysto. Codziennie służby miejskie sprzątają, zero walających się śmieci czy butelek, zero nieczystości, wygląda to pięknie. A co poza tym? Mamy kompletną cepeliadę. Nikt nie panuje nad tym jak wyglądają oznakowania lokali, jakie są reklamy, jaki jest hałas i chaos, jakie tony chińskiego badziewia się przewala codziennie. Mamy knajpiany valuemaxxing. Tyle, że po stronie właścicieli lokali. Oczywiście, można znaleźć tanie miejsca, ale słowo klucz to „znaleźć”. A tak, to poza cenami drastycznie niewystarczająca liczba niezadowolonych (to nie dziwi) pracowników, stoły klejące, toalety brudne, a towar smażony w najtańszym oleju na najtańszym sprzęcie. Mamy rządy deweloperów. Autentycznie zdębiałem, jak zobaczyłem bloki budowane w Międzyzdrojach DOSŁOWNIE na wydmach. Zaraz przyklejone do parku narodowego. W Świnoujściu absolutny horror architektoniczny, zero ładu i składu, „modernistyczne” straszaki co chwile ranią oczy, a wielkie hotele wyłaniające się zza horyzontu przypominają Ohmu zmierzające ku morzu. Mamy brak tradycji i brandingu. Przez te prawie 40 lat mogliśmy wyrobić tyle tradycji: przede wszystkim kulinarnych i pamiątkowych (bursztyn). Tymczasem nad morzem sprzedaje się przede wszystkim generyczne gówno do jedzenia: czipsy z ziemniaka, dziwne importowane lody, jakieś desery z tiktoka w „lounge cafe” i wspomniany wyżej chiński plastik. — Te wszystkie wady uwypukla dosłownie 12-minutowa podróż autem ze Świnoujścia do Ahlbecku, niemieckiej, przygranicznej miejscowości. Oglądająca zarówno polską, jak i niemiecką stronę po raz pierwszy żona spytała czy wjechaliśmy do Disneylandu (w którym byliśmy miesiąc temu). Idealnie zadbana zieleń. Stare, urocze budownictwo zaopiekowane, jakby powstało wczoraj. Praktycznie brak nowoczesnych horrorków architektonicznych. Nie wciska się świecących lampek i barakowozów w każdą możliwą przestrzeń. W większości jakieś stare knajpy z cenami w żaden sposób nie droższymi niż u nas (różnica w mocy nabywczej…!)… — To nie jest tak, że tam jest idealnie, a u nas wszystko do dupy. Co to to nie. Ale przeokropnie boli, że jest TAK BLISKO. Że tak niewiele brakuje, abyśmy byli dosłownie europejską top-lokalizacją wakacyjną. Nawet „bez pogody”, jak jest 20 stopni, to i tak jest co robić i na zmianę z upalnymi dniami to wypada super. A starczyłoby pokierować się trochę bardziej długofalowym planem, nie na wszystko zezwalać, poszukać partnerów „na poziomie” i ze zrozumieniem prawdziwej siły, dofinansować, wybierać perły. Ot, w Świnoujściu znaleźliśmy piekarnię Zakwas Kontrolowany - z pieczywem lepszym niż sieciowym (nie używam słowa „rzemieślnicza”, bo nie znaczy ono nic), nawet w rozsądnych cenach. Jedno miejsce, schowane na osiedlu. I co? I CODZIENNIE kolejka jeszcze przed otwarciem, czekałem prawie godzinę na chleb, chore. Jakościowe, nieoscamowane rzeczy się bronią, warto byłoby je pompować. Promować. Ściągać. Szukać miejsc starych, jakoś je pooznaczać, zrzeszyć, zachować ten „heritage”. Wydobyć dumę z tych właścicieli niewielkich lokali, którzy od lat działają. Uhonorowani też by się pewnie przyłożyli bardziej. A nie, że idziemy do jednej z knajp zawartych w przewodniku Michelin, to nie dość, że umiejscowiona w nowym, wielkim hotelu, to jeszcze… w sobotnie popołudnie, mimo braku jakichkolwiek oznaczeń, zamknięta, bo ktoś z hajsem urządził sobie w niej kinderbal. W restauracji z przewodnika, w sobotę popołudniu. Tym bardziej, że osoby może w wieku do 40 lat nie zrozumieją, ale to jest potężny, POTĘŻNY plus, że można wsiąść we własne auto lub pociąg i po kilku godzinach jazdy autostradą lub drogą szybkiego ruchu dojechać POD SAMO MORZE (tak, teraz można już pod samo morze z całej Polski). Nie martwimy się, gdzie mamy płyny w walizce. Nie zastanawiamy, czy nie jest 5cm za długa albo 3kg za ciężka. Nie przechodzimy przez bramki bezpieczeństwa ani nie czekamy na wolny slot na lotnisku. Nie zostawiamy depozytu z kredytówki w wypożyczalni aut. Nie szukamy dodatkowego ubezpieczenia. Jest masa drobnych i w gruncie rzeczy upierdliwych czynności, do których przywykliśmy (my, ekhm, młodzi), których tu po prostu nie ma. Wsiadamy, jedziemy, wysiadamy nad morzem i mamy relaks. PIĘKNA sprawa. A potem już spacer po plaży lub nostalgicznie pachnących wydmach z rodzinką lub Edytą Bartosiewicz albo Varius Manx na słuchawach, gdzie naprawdę uderza to inaczej, dużo mocniej. 90sPolskaMaxxing w pełni. I tym wpisem zupełnie nic nie zmienię, bo pewnie buntując się przeciw blokom na plaży „jestem antypostępowy”, ale trudno. Kto się nie boi takiej betonozy, niech obejrzy na Netflixie Pom Poko (Szopy w natarciu) Isao Takahaty i Księżniczkę Mononoke Hayao Miyazakiego. Igranie z naturą to ryzykowna sprawa! No ale cóż, i tak wrócimy. Polskie morze można tylko kochać. #PolskieMorze #Plaże #Turystyka

Witaj, prawdziwa Europo! 🎆 7. raz w historii, 2. rok z rzędu (pierwszy raz w historii). Miał być awans najszybciej w historii (29 lipca), jest 14 sierpnia (po 18 latach od Grasshoppersu Zurych 6:0) 😍 #UECL jest pewna, Lech Poznań celuje wyżej. Bardzo cieszę się z niedawnego SPP🏆, bo tylko trofea w gablocie pokazują wielkość klubu, z kolejnych pucharowych wieczorów jesienią, z następnych, nieznanych jeszcze rywali i innych rzeczy związanych z pucharami 😎 Niestety lata 2012–2014 pamiętam, jakby były dwa tygodnie temu. Pamiętam, w jakich nastrojach opuszczałem stadion po AIK-u, Żalgirisie i Stjarnanie. Pamiętam niszczenie potencjału tego klubu czy rozbijanie współczynnika 23.650, który zjechał do poziomu 6.000, dlatego pewne prawdziwe puchary w połowie sierpnia to mimo wszystko pucharowy progres Lecha Poznań, który łapie stabilizację w tej Europie. 4 lata temu startowaliśmy z poziomu 6.000, dziś na lato 2027 współczynnik Lecha Poznań wynosi 29.750 i na pewno wzrośnie. To też pokazuje, ile udało się zrobić. Z przyjemnością zrobię ten FC Thun, ponieważ to mały klub, a takie kluby i drużyny są najlepsze. Paradoksalnie w tym dwumeczu Lechowi Poznań może być łatwiej (z gry) niż z KI Klaksvik, ale to jeszcze zobaczę. Ciężej będzie za to wygrać wyżej 😂 Dziwny mecz, Lech Poznań popsuł KI Klaksvik wszystkie passy, chyba przełożenie meczu im się nie spodobało 🙃 Presja na wynik zeszła, bo zarówno Liga Europy, jak i Liga Konferencji ma swoje plusy: Liga Europy 2026 z tymi klubami to mała Liga Mistrzów, jednak ciężko tam zbudować współczynnik (za 2 lata odpada aż 14.000), a finansowo będzie można zarobić w niej mniej niż w Lidze Konferencji (z wyniku sportowego). Liga Konferencji 2026 zapowiada się na najtrudniejszą edycję w jej krótkiej historii (dużo niezłych firm). Realnym celem Lecha Poznań byłby mimo wszystko awans do 1/8 finału (gra w marcu), wyśrubowanie współczynnika do magicznych 40.000 pkt. i zarobienie milionów złotych za wynik sportowy. Zobaczymy, co Lechowi Poznań uda się ugrać. Najważniejsza jest pucharowa powtarzalność, pewne już kolejne mecze w środku tygodnia, hymn #UEL, cały branding na stadionie, pucharowa otoczka itp. Idę robić dalej, dobrej nocy. Hej Lech! https://t.co/FcADBZJ5ui #LechPoznań #UECL #LigaEuropy

Η νέα δημοσκόπηση της Κάπα Research δείχνει ότι η ταινία «Οδύσσεια» του Κρίστοφερ Νόλαν έχει κερδίσει επτά στους δέκα Έλληνες θεατές, με το 79% να την θεωρεί σημαντική για την προβολή της Ελλάδας στο εξωτερικό και το 75% να πιστεύει ότι μπορεί να ενισχύσει τον τουρισμό, υποδεικνύοντας τη δυναμική της ως εργαλείο εθνικού branding και διεθνούς πολιτιστικής προβολής. #Οδύσσεια #ΚρίστοφερΝόλαν #Δημοσκόπηση

Aika kekseliäs tapa romauttaa brändin arvo. Kun ensimmäisen kerran kuulin tästä, luulin väärin ajoitetuksi aprillipilaksi, mutta vuoden 2020 jälkeen rakennetut BMW:t toden totta näyttävät ruudulla Spiderman-mainoksen käynnistymisen yhteydessä. Studio on kuulemma ostanut BMW:ltä tällaisen mainoskampanjan. Kiva juttu että selvisi nyt. BMW tipahti nimittäin ajoissa pois vaihtoehtojen joukosta, kun olen juuri vaihtamassa kärryä. #BMW #Branding #Marketing

Brandingenjören Fredrik Eriksson förklarar hur en skogsbrand kan utvecklas från en liten gnista till en livsfarlig situation på bara några minuter, särskilt under torra förhållanden och med ökande vind, vilket han har erfarenhet av från Västmanlandsbranden 2014. #Skogsbrand #Västmanland #Brandsäkerhet

Rano mail od @Google o tom, ze nekdo claimuje $12.500 mym jmenem, odpoledne velmi sofistikovanej call z NY cisla, ze scameri zkousi prolomit muj ucet, ze nahlasili ze mi shorel dum a proto nemam 2FA, ze nekdo claimnul moji starou obcanku jako recovery doc a pak ustni redirect na https://t.co/nn7hm3FXGM , kde jsem mel potvrdit na jedne screene ze jsem nezadal zmeny a na druhe si vygenerovat nove heslo lol. Kdykoli jsem se zasekl, tak velmi prijemny muzsky hlas "a proc si myslis, ze to neni official, vzdyt je to na google domain". Jako nevedet, ze https://t.co/zhSJq3XWe3 je subdomena pro webiky kohokoli (jako claimnout si "view"? solid) a nebejt toho prehnanyho gemini brandingu, tak jsem na to mozna i skocil. Velmi dobre zorchestrovany, prvni pulku jsem byl nadseny, ze se o me nekdo takhle stara. Budte opatrni. #scamming #cybersecurity #onlinesafety