The author argued that the decision should be straightforward, citing their claim that the GRU officer behind the Leipzig attack had entered Europe on an Italian tourist visa valid throughout the Schengen area. #Schengen #EuropeanSecurity #Intelligence #IT #DE
The author said they met King Haakon VIII of Norway in Oslo and held discussions with Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre. They said the talks covered a joint initiative to control AI models, European security and Ukraine. https://t.co/bj1mWv1gEu #Norway #AI #EuropeanSecurity #NO #EU #UA
The author said they had met Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband in London to discuss support for Ukraine and broader European security. They said the talks covered countering Russian sabotage, increasing pressure on Russia to end its aggression and secure lasting peace. https://t.co/4XWhcEZTNV #Ukraine #EuropeanSecurity #Russia #GB #UA #RU
Exchange of views with General Alexus G. Grynkewich, @NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Today’s meeting of @EP_Defence brought together its delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. #NATO #EuropeanSecurity @Europarl_EN https://t.co/imGcUed3pA #NATO #EuropeanSecurity #SACEUR #Nospecificcountriesarementionedinthetweet.
I WILL SPEAK AT WEB SUMMIT 2026 IN LISBON 🇵🇹 My message on stage will be clear: NATO must enlarge faster. I will argue for a stronger European pillar inside NATO and for a new enlargement push bringing Kosovo, Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Moldova and Austria into the https://t.co/qWrVucFRVG #WebSummit2026 #NATOenlargement #EuropeanSecurity #PT #XK #IE #BA #UA #MD #AT
The European Security Council will achieve nothing unless political will changes in the capitals. Institutions are nothing more than hollow bureaucracies without the will to fight - and to win. #EuropeanSecurity #PoliticalWill #Bureaucracy #EU
Both sides are preparing for a war in Europe. It is not inevitable but nor is it impossible. If it happens, Europe will immediately become a hardcore police state and Europeans will be sent to a front with WWI-style casualties. You’re better off not living in Europe. 🇪🇺🇷🇺 #WarInEurope #EuropeanSecurity #WWI #EU #RU
Together with the Norwegian Prime Minister @jonasgahrstore we participated in an event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations. We spoke about Finland’s and Norway’s support for Ukraine and why the way the war ends will have significant implications for European security. https://t.co/dvbkWldDB0 #Ukraine #EuropeanSecurity #NorwayFinland #NO #FN #UA #EU
Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD
❄️ FREEZE MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN — AGAINST RUSSIAN DEPENDENCE This poster presents my position for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: the region should strengthen its democratic, European and Baltic security orientation and reduce political and economic dependence on Russia. For me, that https://t.co/4gLWYgA9zh #MecklenburgVorpommern #EuropeanSecurity #StopRussianDependence
- CIA chief visits Moscow - Drone probes Suwałki Gap - Massive increase in sabotage and arson attacks around Europe - Russia adds 20,000 military hospital beds near the Baltic border - Tusk warns of possible attacks on NATO - Macron convenes security chiefs - Even Le Pen's #MoscowVisit #NATO #EuropeanSecurity #RU #PL #EU #NATO
The French president says he has tasked the government with protecting critical infrastructure and defence industry sites. #HybridWarfare #RussiaThreat #EuropeanSecurity
PROPOSAL FOR DEBATE: THE FRENCH PRESIDENT AS PERMANENT CHAIR OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY COUNCIL? 🇪🇺🇫🇷 One model would give the French President a permanent chair because France possesses an independent nuclear deterrent and already links its deterrence debate increasingly to European https://t.co/qp8ysgSEs7 #EuropeanSecurity #France #NuclearDeterrent #FR #EU
The French president says he has tasked the government with protecting critical infrastructure and defence industry sites. #HybridThreats #EuropeanSecurity #RussiaAttacks
I welcome the proposal for a European Security Council. 🇪🇺🛡️ My position is clear: Europe needs much closer institutional integration with NATO, stronger coordination of European defence, and a security framework that also connects the EU with key partners such as Ukraine and the https://t.co/9B2ClIsC1e #EuropeanSecurity #NATO #DefenceIntegration #EU #UA
Europe needs its own playbook to counter hybrid attacks. An Emergency Security Protocol. When triggered by one Member State, all Member States would coordinate a European response. We will also set out our ideas to make a European Security Council a reality. With partners https://t.co/JteRn0raZm #EuropeanSecurity #HybridThreats #Solidarity #EU
Romania 🇷🇴 expresses full solidarity with our ally Denmark 🇩🇰 over Russia’s reckless and escalatory actions in response to a routine overflight. Denmark security is European security @larsloekke #Romania #Denmark #EuropeanSecurity #RO #DK
Once again, Europe woke up to reckless and dangerous Russian behaviour. A Russian warship fired emergency flares dangerously close to a Danish helicopter. A drone entered Lithuanian airspace before being destroyed by NATO fighter jets. These are not isolated incidents. They #Russia #NATO #EuropeanSecurity #DK #LT #RU
Ireland belongs in NATO. 🇮🇪🇪🇺 I call Ireland’s permanent neutrality immoral neutrality when democratic Europe is under attack and Ukraine is fighting for freedom. Neutrality is not a virtue when aggressors threaten our security and our values. Ireland should stand clearly with https://t.co/SzxUcemEvq #IrelandInNATO #SupportUkraine #EuropeanSecurity #IE #EU #UA
In Kyiv, discussing peace through strength in Ukraine and the future of the Europe we’re building together. With France and the UK’s national security advisers Emmanuel Bonne and Jonathan Powell, my Polish colleague @sikorskiradek and Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Vsevolod https://t.co/qfRWdWmW59 #PeaceThroughStrength #Ukraine #EuropeanSecurity #UA #FR #UK #PL #EU
