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Krzysztof Graj 22h

Operation Dark Clark – Russia built a real organisation around a false identity Most influence operations create fake people, fake websites or fake news stories. Operation Dark Clark appears to have gone considerably further: Russian operators built what looked like a functioning research organisation in Latin America, employed real people to produce genuine research and concealed from those employees who was ultimately directing their work. OpenAI disclosed the operation on 8 October after banning a cluster of accounts originating in Russia. The actors used ChatGPT while targeting countries across Latin America, principally to damage Ukraine’s reputation, manipulate domestic political debates and manage a self-described research organisation called the Social Research Center, or SRC. OpenAI assessed Dark Clark as Category Five on the six-level Breakout Scale, the first operation it has disrupted since beginning its influence-operation reporting to reach that level. A front organisation with real employees The SRC presented itself as a research platform studying subjects including Latin America’s relationship with India and the Indian diaspora. OpenAI found more than 60 articles on its website, most of them apparently original rather than plagiarised. Internal reports produced by the Russian operators discussed hiring, dismissals, salary scales, staffing and unfinished research projects, strongly suggesting that the operators controlled the organisation rather than merely collaborating with it. At the centre of the structure was “Mia Clark”, a fictitious identity reportedly used to manage social-media activity and communicate with staff. According to OpenAI, the available evidence indicates that employees working for SRC in Latin America were probably unaware that the organisation was being directed by Russian actors. They interviewed experts, conducted research and wrote papers in what appears to have been good faith. The deception therefore existed primarily at the organisational level: much of the work was real, but the identity and strategic purpose of the institution commissioning it were not. OpenAI This is one reason Dark Clark differs from the familiar model of a troll farm. A reader encountering an SRC paper might be looking at research genuinely written by a Latin American employee based on genuine interviews. The manipulation lies further upstream, in who built the institution, selected its direction and controlled its infrastructure. From forged emails to real events The operation also appears to have attempted something more ambitious than online persuasion: inducing real people to produce events that could later be turned into propaganda. In May 2026, according to the operators’ internal reports, they created an email address impersonating Lima’s regional education authorities and instructed schools to organise activities about Ukraine for a cultural-diversity event. The instructions included references to Stepan Bandera, whose historical legacy remains particularly contentious in Poland and parts of Eastern Europe. The operators claimed that some schools complied, replied to the false address and sent photographs of the events. OpenAI could not independently verify every claim contained in the operators’ reports. It did, however, find Peruvian reporting matching the story, followed by publications in Poland and an English-language outlet in Hungary. Some coverage included comments from a Polish MEP calling for people displaying what he described as anti-Polish attitudes to be declared persona non grata. OpenAI therefore concluded that the fabricated starting point appears to have entered genuine political debate across national borders. The mechanism is unusually effective because the final photographs need not themselves be fabricated. If people can be tricked into staging a real event on the basis of a forged instruction, the operation creates authentic visual evidence of something that was artificially initiated. The same method in Ecuador and Bolivia Dark Clark’s internal reports describe similar efforts elsewhere. In Ecuador, the operators claimed they used a fake education email to encourage schools to stage ceremonies involving President Daniel Noboa and Erik Prince, the former head of Blackwater. Ecuadorian media subsequently covered a matching controversy, and the country’s education minister issued a detailed denial. Other Ecuador-focused material included fabricated audio attributed to Ukraine’s consul and a false television report alleging that Noboa’s government was recruiting Ecuadorians to fight in Ukraine. Local fact-checker Lupa found that the supposed Teleamazonas report had never been broadcast, that images had been taken from Instagram, that the audio was AI-generated and that a company named in a supposed recruitment contract did not exist in Ecuador’s corporate registry. In Bolivia, an internal report described a fake audio recording supposedly made by an employee of state water company EPSAS during anti-government protests. It claimed that water supplies to La Paz would be cut and a state of emergency declared. The allegation produced a fact-check and an official denial. OpenAI says the operators explicitly described their objective as worsening the political crisis surrounding the demonstrations. Possible links to the post-Wagner influence machine Dark Clark did not emerge in a vacuum. The operators repeatedly asked ChatGPT about Politology and La Compania, names associated in previous investigations with the Russian influence apparatus that developed from structures once connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Forbidden Stories and its partners obtained 1,431 pages of internal documents describing a network known as “The Company”, which they reported had grown to almost 100 operatives and was conducting influence projects across roughly 30 Global South countries. Their investigation found that the organisation moved under the supervision of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, after Prigozhin’s death. Its documented budget for ten months of activity in 2024 was approximately €7.3 million. Two older Argentina campaigns claimed in Dark Clark’s internal reports — a false story about Javier Milei buying Cartier collars for his dogs and the staging of anti-Milei graffiti — had already been independently attributed by investigative journalists to Politology/La Compania. That is significant corroboration, but it is not enough to prove that every Dark Clark activity was run by the same organisational structure. AI was the back office, not the mastermind Perhaps the most important finding concerns artificial intelligence itself. In most documented cases, the Russians were not using ChatGPT to generate the propaganda seen by the public. Their principal use was administrative: drafting reports for an unknown superior, summarising operations, translating material and recording the supposed success of campaigns. Those reports also expose a weakness in the operators’ own measurement. OpenAI found instances in which they tried to claim credit for developments they had probably not caused, suggesting that they were not only attempting to manipulate Latin American audiences but also presenting an inflated picture of their effectiveness to whoever was supervising them. Dark Clark nevertheless broke further into the real world than any influence operation OpenAI had previously disrupted. Under the Brookings framework, Category Five means that an operation has escaped its original network and been amplified by high-profile individuals such as politicians. Dark Clark crossed that threshold because fabricated narratives appear to have provoked governmental denials, mainstream reporting and political comment in several countries. Its most important innovation was therefore not a particularly convincing deepfake. It was the construction of a partly genuine institution around a concealed foreign controller. The research could be real. The employees could be real. The interviews could be real. What was false was who they were ultimately working for. Sources OpenAI — Disrupting AI-enabled “false front” operations https://openai.com/index/disrupting-ai-enabled-false-front-operations/ Forbidden Stories — Propaganda Machine: Russia’s foreign influence strategy across three continents https://forbiddenstories.org/propaganda-machine-secret-documents-reveal-russias-foreign-influence-strategy-across-three-continents/ Forbidden Stories — Ghost Journalists, Cash and Kremlin Scripts: Argentina https://forbiddenstories.org/ghost-journalists-cash-and-kremlin-scripts-how-russian-operatives-tried-to-influence-argentinian-media/ openDemocracy — Russian influence operation in Bolivia https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia-bolivia-south-america-putin-evo-morales-wagner-prigozhin-covert-operations-propaganda-disinformation-foreign-interference/ Lupa Media — Fake Teleamazonas report about recruiting Ecuadorians for Ukraine https://lupa.com.ec/verificaciones/noboa-mercenarios-ucrania-ecuador/ Brookings Institution — The Breakout Scale https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-breakout-scale-measuring-the-impact-of-influence-operations/ Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode17 #OperationDarkClark #DarkClark #Russia #LatinAmerica #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #FalseFront #FrontOrganisation #FakeInstitution #SocialResearchCenter #SRC #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ChatGPT #OpenAI #NarrativeManipulation #SourceLaundering #InstitutionalManipulation #ForgedDocuments #FakeAudio #PoliticalInfluence #CovertInfluence #Peru #Ecuador #Bolivia #Argentina #Ukraine #Politology #LaCompania #TheCompany #SVR #WagnerLegacy #PropagandaMachine #GlobalSouth #BreakoutScale #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

88
D
de Volkskrant 4d

Researcher Marijke Van Vlasselaer warns against the use of AI as a political ghostwriter, as outsourcing language and thinking to algorithms undermines trust between people. #AI #Politiek #Transparantie (translated)

www.volkskrant.nl
Onderzoeker waarschuwt tegen gebruik van AI als politiek ghostwriter: ‘Schrijf gewoon wat je wil vertellen, en niet al die blablabla’
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Krzysztof Graj 5d

Nigeria – how pro-Russian influence networks sell military rule as the answer When Nigerians took to the streets in August 2024 to protest soaring living costs and frustration with government, some demonstrations acquired an unexpected symbol: the Russian flag. In Kano, Kaduna and other northern cities, protesters were filmed carrying Russian colours and calling for Moscow’s intervention. Some demanded a military takeover. What initially looked like an unusual expression of anger has since become part of a much larger picture. A September 2026 assessment by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies describes Nigeria as a major target of overlapping foreign information operations, with Russia the most active external actor in its information space. The report does not identify a single centrally controlled campaign. Instead, it maps an ecosystem in which genuine dissatisfaction over insecurity, corruption and living standards is repeatedly redirected towards a broader proposition: democratic government has failed, while the military-led regimes of the Sahel offer a more effective alternative. Turning a real protest into a pro-Russian message The clearest example emerged during the 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests. Nigerian investigative reporting found that a Kano-based TikTok influencer with more than 100,000 followers had been paid through a Telegram channel associated with African Initiative, a Moscow-based media operation linked by researchers to Russian influence activity in Africa. The influencer said the channel supplied photographs, videos and talking points for redistribution on TikTok and Instagram. Among the messages provided were phrases such as “Putin please come and save Nigeria” and “The army is the answer for Nigeria”. Influencers were encouraged to use Hausa-language hashtags including #Zangazanga – “protest” – alongside references to Putin and Russia. Investigators identified 38 accounts circulating similar pro-Russian and pro-military narratives during the demonstrations. Russian flags subsequently appeared among protesters in several northern cities. This does not mean the protests themselves were created by Russia. They were driven by genuine economic and political grievances, and Nigerian protesters gave different reasons for carrying Russian flags. The important feature of the influence activity was precisely that it did not need to manufacture the original anger. It could attach a geopolitical message to an existing domestic crisis. From frustration to the idea of military government The narrative fits a wider pattern seen across West Africa. Russia has developed close relations with the military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while pro-Russian media ecosystems routinely portray those states as examples of sovereignty, stability and resistance to Western influence. Nigeria, by contrast, has remained under constitutional civilian government since 1999. Africa Center researchers say information networks targeting Nigerians increasingly contrast these two models. Recurring messages depict elections as wasteful or predetermined, civilian institutions as incapable of protecting citizens and military governments as more decisive on security and development. Some content portrays the Sahelian juntas as delivering better roads, lower prices and stronger security even where available evidence points to continuing or worsening instability. Language is central to the strategy. Hausa is spoken across northern Nigeria and neighbouring Niger, allowing political narratives to travel across borders that are far less important online than they are on maps. HumAngle documented efforts involving Nigerien state-linked actors to cultivate Hausa-speaking journalists and distribute material favourable to Niger’s junta and hostile to France and Western influence. The Russian and Sahelian-junta information ecosystems are not identical, but their narratives frequently reinforce one another. Fake journalists inside real Nigerian media The campaign environment extends beyond social media. A 2026 investigation by Graphika and Code for Africa identified 44 ghost reporters and fake experts whose identities were used to place Russia-aligned narratives in African media. Thirty-eight were assessed with high confidence to be fabricated. Their articles or quotations appeared across 138 websites and were amplified by at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages. Nigeria was one of the most heavily targeted countries. According to the Africa Center’s analysis of the research, Daily Post Nigeria carried 39 articles involving 14 identified ghost authors. Once published by a genuine Nigerian outlet, such material could then be cited by other websites, social-media accounts or even Russian official channels as though it had originated independently in Africa. This is information laundering rather than simple propaganda: the most valuable asset being borrowed is the credibility of the local newsroom. Generative AI added another layer. OpenAI and Meta separately disrupted a Russia-origin network that produced Africa-focused political content and operated Facebook Pages posing as local media organisations. One fabricated commentator, “Dr Manuel Godsin”, was presented as a European-trained geopolitical expert although investigators found no evidence supporting his academic biography. ChatGPT had been used to generate articles under the persona’s name, while Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the broader network. Different networks, similar strategic direction It would be misleading to merge all these activities into a single Russian command structure. The African Initiative-linked influencer campaign, the ghost-reporter network and the AI-enabled operation disrupted by OpenAI and Meta were uncovered separately and used different infrastructure. Public evidence does not demonstrate that every actor reported to the same organisation. What connects them is a recurring set of themes and methods: portraying Western partnerships as exploitative, presenting Russia as an alternative security partner, amplifying failures of civilian government, and giving military-led rule greater legitimacy. Investigative reporting on leaked Russian documents has meanwhile described a much wider influence apparatus operating across Africa, involving political consultants, paid journalists, influencers and locally tailored campaigns intended to reduce Western influence and expand Moscow’s position. The underlying technique is less about inventing dissatisfaction than redirecting it. Nigeria faces real security threats, economic pressure and public frustration. Influence operators do not need to persuade Nigerians that those problems exist. They need only influence the explanation for why they exist – and which political model appears to offer the answer. That is what makes the Nigerian case significant. The most effective propaganda does not necessarily introduce a completely false reality. It takes a real crisis and changes where the audience is encouraged to look for the solution. Sources Africa Center for Strategic Studies — The Raging Information Battle in Nigeria https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-raging-information-battle-in-nigeria/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ TheCable — Ghost reporters in African media https://www.thecable.ng/ghost-reporters-how-fabricated-african-voices-carried-pro-russia-narratives/ HumAngle — Nigeria Is Facing an Information War in Its Own Language https://www.humanglemedia.com/nigeria-is-facing-an-information-war-in-its-own-language DAIDAC / CJID — Russian influence during #EndBadGovernance https://daidac.thecjid.org/how-telegram-tiktok-aided-russian-disinformation-that-led-to-incarceration-of-nigerian-minors/ FactCheckHub — How Nigeria’s hunger protest took a radical turn https://factcheckhub.com/from-economic-protests-to-coup-agitation-how-nigerias-hunger-march-took-a-radical-turn/ News24 — Fake Kremlin-linked analyst planted stories in African media https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard — AI ‘expert’ exposed https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Africa Confidential — How Moscow wages social media war https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/15961/how-moscow-wages-social-media-war Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode15 #Nigeria #Russia #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Africa #WestAfrica #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Propaganda #MilitaryRule #MilitaryGovernment #Democracy #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #AfricanInitiative #EndBadGovernance #Hausa #LocalInfluencers #GhostReporters #FakeExperts #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPersonas #SyntheticMedia #AIPropaganda #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #Telegram #TikTok #DigitalInfluence #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #MediaManipulation #Sahel #Geopolitics #OSINT #WRLD

africacenter.org
The Raging Information Battle in Nigeria
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Vitor | Notícias do PlayStation 2w

OFFICIAL: AI UPSCALING IS COMING TO THE BASE PS5! • Sony announced the QSSR — Quick Spectral Super Resolution • Technology comes from Project Amethyst, a partnership between PlayStation and AMD • Goal: to bring some of the benefits of the PS5 Pro's PSSR to the regular PS5 • QSSR uses a lighter and optimized neural network specifically for the PS5 • Promises sharper image and more stability than traditional methods • Marvel’s Wolverine and Ghost of Yōtei are the first compatible games • Both receive support via an update today • QSSR will be made available to other PlayStation developers in the future • PSSR remains the most advanced and exclusive solution of the PS5 Pro In practice, the base PS5 now also features AI-assisted image reconstruction. #PS5 #IA #Jogos (translated)

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Noticias PlayStation 2w

Sony announced Quick Spectral Super Resolution (QSSR), a new AI upscaling technology for standard PS5, developed alongside AMD within Project Amethyst. ▫️ QSSR is a lighter version of PSSR, the exclusive technology for PS5 Pro. ▫️ It utilizes an optimized neural network to improve sharpness, detail, and image stability without requiring the power of PS5 Pro. ▫️ PSSR will continue to offer the best quality on PS5 Pro, while QSSR aims to bring part of that experience to PS5. ▫️ Marvel’s Wolverine and Ghost of Yōtei are the first games compatible through new patches. ▫️ Sony will offer QSSR to all PlayStation developers so it can be implemented in more games in the future. #PlayStation #Sony #Videojuegos (translated)

12806
Procyonico 2w

Ghostface will receive skins from the Day of the Dead collection this year We will also have new Stranger Things skins coming to the game. https://t.co/siHniiY8tD #Ghostface #DiasDosMortos #StrangerThings (translated)

12349
FRANK 2w

The interview with PSPP reached 10.5k views in just 3 hours, only on YouTube. Honestly, I don't understand why the other parties (CAQ, PLQ, QS) have "ghosted" us, although they went to much less visible platforms. Good for them. https://t.co/bVOCAsOBjY #politique #PSPP #YouTube (translated)

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Actu Foot 2w

🚨 Virginie SAINSILY 🇫🇷 inspirée ce soir sur Désiré DOUÉ 🇫🇷 👇 : 🗣️ « Tu nous entraînes dans une relation toxique où au départ, on tombe tous amoureux. Et puis, tu nous ghostes. Ce soir, tu débarques sur ton 31 avec ton bouquet de fleurs et le resto. ON VEUT ÇA TOUS LES SOIRS DÉSIRÉ ! » 🤩 🎥 @lequipedusoir https://t.co/wJcL5uPKS2 #RelationToxique #DésiréDoué #VirginieSainsily

18138
Noticias PlayStation 2w

Sucker Punch anuncia que una de las recompensas por jugar Ghost of Yotei: Most Wanted será un traje inspirado en los Chasqueadores de The Last of Us 🔥🔥 https://t.co/Hc9k6spY0C #GhostOfYotei #TheLastOfUs #SuckerPunch

20669
ana 2w

ich checke wenn männer sagen frauen im online dating sind schlimm, weil als ich mal hinge für beide geschlechter benutzt hab, waren es fast immer die frauen die geghostet haben und absolut keine konversation am laufen halten konnten #Dating #OnlineDating #Ghosting

15542
Gerd Leonhard 2w

“No single lab will choose to slow down while its competitors don’t—not because its executives don’t believe the risk is real, but because individual caution hands the market to whoever is most reckless.” How to Regulate the Ghosts https://t.co/ScuP9egKtg via Instapaper #Regulation #Competition #RiskManagement #Nospecificcountriesarementionedinthetweetyouprovided.Therefore #theresponseforcountrycodeswouldbe:

@GhostReveries_ Eu acho que é pq ele não usa a mulher como chacota, são só personagem engraçados que por acaso são mulheres https://t.co/oHwTN991dv #Personagens #Humor #Mulheres

19844
Krzysztof Graj 3w

UAE / Sudan – when an influence operation tried to enter the United Nations A network of roughly 300 apparently independent social-media influencers. A human-rights organisation borrowing the identity of a real NGO. Personal dossiers on European politicians and journalists. And testimony prepared for delivery at the United Nations without revealing the state interest behind it. These were elements of an influence operation uncovered by Anthropic and disclosed in September 2026. The company says it linked the activity with high confidence to UAE government officials. Tracked as GTG-84002, the operation targeted several overlapping issues: the Muslim Brotherhood, perceptions of the war in Sudan and international mechanisms examining the United Arab Emirates' role in the conflict. What distinguishes the case is not simply its use of artificial intelligence. It is the attempt to make state-aligned messaging appear to originate from independent influencers, human-rights organisations and potentially witnesses addressing an international institution. An influence network built around 300 fake voices Anthropic identified a single actor using Claude to support a sustained influence campaign. At its centre was an AI persona called “Deadshot”, running on the operator's own platform. A master doctrine file repeatedly instructed the system to support what it described as a coordinated international effort to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood. The operator simultaneously managed several components of the campaign, including approximately 300 inauthentic influencer accounts across social-media platforms. Internal material examined by Anthropic described the apparent independence of this network as its greatest strategic advantage. That phrase captures the central method. The objective was not simply to broadcast a political position but to conceal where that position originated. One visible example appeared on 4 June 2026, when accounts participated in a coordinated campaign using #SudanIslamists and near-identical graphics connecting Sudanese Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood with regional instability. Anthropic says the amplification network was centrally funded and coordinated. Its investigation also found that the operator financing the social-media network was connected to the wider influence operation. A human-rights organisation that was not what it appeared to be Social media was only one layer. The operator also created a front NGO that copied the identity of a genuine Swiss organisation and used that borrowed legitimacy to publish human-rights material produced for the campaign. Anthropic's description elsewhere also refers to the identity of a real Sudanese human-rights organisation being used in connection with the preparation of testimony. The public report does not fully clarify whether these references describe the same front or separate elements of the operation, so they should not be treated as definitively identical. The underlying technique, however, is clear: political material was designed to appear as if it originated from independent civil society rather than from actors linked to a government. This is particularly significant in the human-rights environment, where the perceived independence of an organisation or witness can determine how seriously evidence is received by journalists, diplomats and international institutions. The attempt to reach the UN The most consequential part of the operation concerned the 62nd session of the UN Human Rights Council. According to Anthropic, the operator used Claude to ghost-write complete testimony intended to be delivered by two individuals during the session. The texts were prepared under explicit constraints ensuring that neither statement would mention the UAE. This did not amount to a conventional government submission. The intention, according to Anthropic's reconstruction, was for material serving the interests of a party connected to the Sudan conflict to reach an international forum through apparently independent voices. But an important limitation remains: Anthropic could not confirm that the testimony was ultimately delivered. The company similarly could not establish whether other dossiers produced by the operation reached their intended recipients or influenced policy. It therefore assessed the campaign as Category Three on the Brookings Breakout Scale – activity distributed across several platforms, but without evidence of broad public impact sufficient for a higher classification. The distinction matters. The evidence demonstrates a sophisticated attempt to influence international debate; it does not demonstrate that the attempt succeeded. Politicians, journalists and UN investigators became targets The operation was not limited to generating public content. Anthropic found that the operator researched and compiled detailed profiles of 18 members of the European Parliament and prominent journalists. Some material was prepared for direct delivery to senior UAE officials. The network also assembled what Anthropic describes as “counter-accountability dossiers” on UN Special Rapporteurs who had criticised the UAE's conduct in relation to Sudan. This places the campaign in a broader context. Since Sudan's civil war began in April 2023, the role of external powers has become an increasingly important part of international scrutiny. Sudan has accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, allegations Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied. In 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE before the International Court of Justice, accusing it of complicity in genocide against the Masalit through alleged support for the RSF. The UAE rejected the allegations. The ICJ subsequently removed the case from its list after finding that it lacked jurisdiction because of the UAE's reservation to the relevant provision of the Genocide Convention. The ruling therefore did not determine whether Sudan's substantive allegations were true or false. That contested international environment helps explain why narratives about Sudan, human rights and accountability were valuable targets for an influence operation. AI as an operating system for influence The role played by Claude is also important to understand accurately. Anthropic did not find that artificial intelligence independently conceived or directed the campaign. Human operators established the objectives, political doctrine and targets. AI instead helped operationalise them. Across hundreds of sessions, Claude was used to transform predetermined political objectives into social-media narratives, human-rights reports, testimony, intelligence-style briefs and detailed profiles of individuals. The same system could support narrative production, target research and preparation of material for different audiences. That represents a more significant development than simply using generative AI to produce propaganda faster. Traditional influence operations require different teams to research targets, write content, manage personas, adapt messages and prepare briefing material. Generative AI can compress several of those functions into a single operational workflow. The result is not necessarily more convincing propaganda. It is potentially cheaper, faster and more scalable influence infrastructure. From fake influencers to institutional influence Anthropic says it linked the operation to UAE government officials with high confidence. Its assessment was based partly on internal material naming senior Emirati officials as intended recipients of the work, alongside other evidence available to its investigators. That remains an attribution by Anthropic rather than a judicial finding or publicly released forensic attribution by a government agency. The distinction should be retained. The larger significance of GTG-84002 lies in the architecture of the campaign. A network of fake influencers could create the appearance of public opinion. A cloned human-rights organisation could provide institutional credibility. AI-generated reports could give political narratives the appearance of research. Profiles of journalists and politicians could support more precise targeting. And ghost-written testimony could potentially carry the same message into an international institution without revealing the political interest behind it. This is a different model from the familiar troll farm. The objective is no longer simply to make propaganda look popular. It is to make state-aligned messaging look independent – and, if possible, to move it from social media into the institutions where international policy and accountability are debated. SOURCES: Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 International Court of Justice — Sudan v. United Arab Emirates https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197 International Court of Justice — press releases and case documents https://www.icj-cij.org/case/197/press-releases United Nations Geneva — Sudan v UAE proceedings at the ICJ https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/04/105241/world-court-begins-hearing-sudans-complicity-genocide-case-against UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs — UAE response to Sudan's allegations https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/4/10/10-4-2025-UAE-UAE UN Digital Library — Sudan's letter concerning alleged UAE support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091008?ln=en UN Digital Library — UAE response concerning allegations of support for the RSF https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4046224?ln=en Ultra Sudan — reporting on Anthropic's UAE-linked influence-operation findings https://ultrasudan.usawtiq.com/أنثروبيك-أحبطنا-عملية-تأثير-إماراتية-استخدمت-الذكاء-الاصطناعي-لاستهداف-السودان/عامر-صالح/أخبار KEYWORDS #DISINFORMED #Episode8 #UAE #Sudan #UnitedArabEmirates #UnitedNations #UNHumanRightsCouncil #HumanRights #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeInfluencers #FakeNGO #NGOImpersonation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #AIGeneratedContent #SyntheticMedia #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #Propaganda #NarrativeManipulation #InstitutionalInfluence #SudanConflict #SudanWar #MuslimBrotherhood #InternationalRelations #Geopolitics #Anthropic #ClaudeAI #OSINT #WRLD

www.anthropic.com
Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 / Anthropic
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Il Fatto Quotidiano 3w

Circa trecento persone hanno manifestato a Torino per ricordare Nicolò, un bambino di 7 anni investito mentre andava a scuola in bicicletta, ed hanno richiesto maggior sicurezza stradale, depositando una ghost bike sul luogo dell'incidente. #Torino #GhostBike #IncidenteStradale

www.ilfattoquotidiano.it
Una “ghost bike” sul luogo dell’investimento del bimbo di 7 anni mentre andava a scuola in bici a Torino
1732
Krzysztof Graj 3w

Russia’s fake African newsrooms – propaganda designed to look local A Facebook user in Nairobi, Accra, Johannesburg or Luanda encounters what appears to be a local news page. It publishes stories about African politics, Western influence and relations with Russia. The language is tailored to an African audience and the page presents itself not as a foreign broadcaster, but as part of the local information landscape. Behind some of these outlets, however, Meta found operators based in Russia. In its 2026 threat research, the company disclosed a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour network targeting audiences in Angola, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the operation. Around 30,000 users followed at least one of the Pages, while the operators spent approximately $7,000 on Facebook and Instagram advertising, mostly in euros and US dollars. The numbers are relatively modest. The method is considerably more important. Rather than openly distributing Russian state messaging, the network posed as local African news sources and grassroots organisations, promoting narratives about Western colonialism and political interference while presenting Russia as a credible economic and political alternative. It was an old geopolitical message delivered through a much more effective identity: not Moscow speaking to Africa, but Africans apparently speaking to one another. A news outlet that was actually an influence operation Meta's investigation found that the network attempted to conceal its Russian origin while creating media brands that appeared indigenous to the countries they targeted. Its content amplified historical grievances against former colonial powers, criticised Western involvement in Africa and promoted closer relations with Russia. One example helps illustrate how the infrastructure was assembled. A Facebook Page targeting Kenya was called Kenya Watchtower. According to OpenAI's subsequent investigation, Facebook transparency records showed that the Page had previously been named “Farmtown5”. It appears to have been acquired or repurposed rather than built from scratch as a Kenyan news organisation. Some Pages also exposed administrator locations in Russia and Ukraine. Other elements of the network had previously targeted audiences in Zambia and Namibia. This use of apparently local identities is particularly important in the African information environment. A story published by RT or another identifiable Russian outlet arrives with an obvious geopolitical provenance. The same narrative presented by something resembling an independent Kenyan, Ghanaian or South African newsroom carries a different kind of credibility. The source appears closer to the reader, and the geopolitical interest behind the message becomes less visible. Then investigators found Dr Manuel Godsin The Facebook operation was only one part of a broader information ecosystem. OpenAI investigated related activity after receiving information from Meta and subsequently banned a ChatGPT account it assessed as likely originating in Russia. OpenAI called the campaign Operation No Bell. The account was being used to generate long-form articles and social-media posts about African geopolitics. Prompts were primarily written in English, but OpenAI also observed Russian-language instructions that the user described as coming from a manager. The operator sometimes explicitly asked the model to make the material appear less AI-generated – including requests to avoid stylistic features associated with machine-generated text and to write more like a human journalist. Many articles appeared under the name “Dr Manuel Godsin”, presented as an academic with a PhD from the University of Bergen and an affiliation with an organisation called the International Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. OpenAI could find no credible evidence that Godsin existed. Searches of Norway's National Research Information Repository and the University of Bergen library produced no record of him. Investigators subsequently discovered that a photograph used to represent Godsin had appeared years earlier on a Russian professional networking site and apparently belonged to a law student in St Petersburg. The fabricated academic identity was nevertheless remarkably productive. OpenAI identified 53 online articles carrying the Godsin byline. The fiction had moved beyond fake social-media pages and into the real media ecosystem. When propaganda enters genuine newsrooms This is the most consequential aspect of the operation. The articles were not confined to websites controlled by the influence network. Some were published by genuine African news organisations, including established South African outlets. The content mixed local political issues with broader geopolitical narratives. Some pieces criticised the United States and Britain or defended Russia's role in Africa. One accused the British NGO Crisis Action of fomenting protests in South Africa. Another praised Russia's presence in the Central African Republic. Other material addressed Kenya, Angola and relations between African governments and Washington. The mechanism represents a significant evolution from the classic troll-farm model. Instead of building an audience entirely on its own platforms, an influence operator can manufacture an apparently credible expert, generate articles in his name and persuade genuine news organisations to publish them. Once this happens, the propaganda acquires something a fake Facebook Page cannot provide: the institutional credibility of a real newsroom. OpenAI assessed No Bell's social-media impact as limited. One Facebook Page had around 3,000 followers before Meta removed it, while several others had very small audiences. But the operation was more successful in placing material in established media. In OpenAI's impact framework, it approached the level at which an influence operation breaks into mainstream media. For information operators, a single article published by a recognised outlet can potentially be more valuable than thousands of impressions generated by an obviously artificial account. A much larger network of ghost journalists Subsequent research suggests that Manuel Godsin was not an isolated experiment. In August 2026, Graphika, working with Code for Africa and with support from Meta, published a much broader investigation into Russian ghostwriting operations across African media. Researchers identified 44 ghost writers and fake experts, 38 of them assessed as high-confidence fabricated personas, operating between 2021 and 2026. Their material appeared or was quoted across 138 websites and was subsequently republished through at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages, including authentic users, coordinated inauthentic networks and official Russian communication channels. The narratives were strikingly consistent. They included criticism of France, Ukraine and the United States; attacks on organisations such as ECOWAS and the International Criminal Court; positive portrayals of Russian involvement in Africa; praise for Russian paramilitary forces; and support for sovereignty-oriented political projects such as the Alliance of Sahel States. The operation therefore extends beyond creating fake news websites. It attempts to insert Russian-aligned narratives into the legitimate African media ecosystem using identities that appear African, independent or academically authoritative. This also explains why measuring reach through the original Facebook network alone is misleading. A fabricated article may begin with an influence operator, appear in a genuine African publication, be republished elsewhere and eventually circulate without any visible connection to Russia. At that point, the provenance of the narrative has effectively been laundered. An old Russian strategy with increasingly local faces Russia's use of local intermediaries in Africa is not new. Meta documented Russian networks using African nationals as early as 2019. In 2020 it dismantled another operation involving people in Ghana and Nigeria working on behalf of individuals in Russia, with links to previous activity associated with the Internet Research Agency. More recent Meta investigations suggest that this model has continued to evolve. Networks have increasingly relied on local freelancers, social-media managers and authentic media outlets rather than exclusively operating armies of obviously fake Russian-controlled accounts. This decentralisation offers several advantages. Local operators understand language, political sensitivities and cultural references. Authentic accounts are harder to identify than newly created synthetic personas. Local media brands can also deliver narratives without immediately triggering the scepticism associated with Russian state outlets. There is no evidence that every African journalist, freelancer or publication carrying such material knowingly participates in Russian influence activity. Meta explicitly notes in its investigations that some local contractors may not know who ultimately commissioned their work. That distinction is essential. The operation's effectiveness partly depends on precisely this ambiguity between deliberate participation, commercial content placement and unwitting amplification. The objective is to make Russian narratives look African The significance of this network is therefore not its 30,000 Facebook followers or its $7,000 advertising budget. Those figures are small compared with the audiences of major African media organisations. What matters is the distribution model. Traditional foreign propaganda asks an audience to trust a foreign source. These operations attempt to remove the foreign source from the equation altogether. A Russian geopolitical narrative can be generated with AI, attributed to an expert who does not exist, published by a media organisation that does, amplified through a Facebook Page presenting itself as local, and then rediscovered elsewhere as apparently independent African analysis. By the time the reader encounters it, Moscow may have disappeared completely from the chain of attribution. The resulting information operation is therefore less about making Russian propaganda more persuasive than about making it look as though it is no longer Russian propaganda at all. In an increasingly fragmented African media environment, that may be the more important evolution to watch. SOURCES: Meta Threat Research https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h1-2026-russia-based-cib-network-1/ OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina News24 https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2019 https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/removing-more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta — Russian Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour, 2020 https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/ Meta Threat Research — Russian Use of Authentic Operators in Sub-Saharan Africa https://threatresearch-team.github.io/indicators/meta-h2-2025-russia-based-cib-network-2/ KEYWORDS: #DISINFORMED #Episode7 #Russia #Africa #RussianDisinformation #RussianInfluence #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #CoordinatedInauthenticBehaviour #CIB #FakeNews #FakeMedia #FakeNewsrooms #MediaImpersonation #GrassrootsManipulation #Astroturfing #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #SyntheticMedia #FakeInfluencers #SocialMediaManipulation #Facebook #Meta #OperationNoBell #AfricanMedia #MediaManipulation #Propaganda #DigitalInfluence #Angola #Ghana #Kenya #SouthAfrica #OSINT #WRLD

threatresearch-team.github.io
Russia-Based Influence Operation Network Targeting Sub-Saharan Africa
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Krzysztof Graj 3w

The Ghosts of Zaolzie – how a cyberattack tried to manufacture a conflict between Poland and Czechia At around 5pm on 16 August 2026, an alarming article appeared on the website of Radio PiK, a genuine Polish regional broadcaster. Its headline claimed that Poland was preparing to seize Czech territory and that the Czech Foreign Ministry had received a document outlining Warsaw's demands. Radio PiK had published no such story. An attacker had compromised an employee's credentials, gained access to the station's content management system and replaced a legitimate article with fabricated material. The newsroom quickly removed it and informed the authorities. But the intrusion was only one element of a much larger operation. Investigators subsequently uncovered forged diplomatic documents, accounts impersonating Polish and Czech officials, a cloned Czech news site, AI-generated material, a fictitious local activist and advertising for a demonstration that apparently did not exist. Together, these elements attempted to manufacture the appearance of a new territorial conflict between Poland and Czechia over Zaolzie. A false crisis built around a real territorial issue The operation worked because it did not start entirely with fiction. Poland and Czechia do have an unresolved technical issue concerning approximately 368.44 hectares of territory, originating in post-war changes to the Polish-Czechoslovak border. It is commonly described as the Czech “territorial debt” to Poland. But this is not a Polish claim to Zaolzie and there is no evidence that Warsaw is seeking to annex Czech territory. The operation fused this real issue with a much more powerful historical memory. Zaolzie – the part of Cieszyn Silesia west of the Olza River – was disputed by Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First World War. In 1938, during the crisis created by the Munich Agreement, Poland seized the territory from Czechoslovakia. The manipulation therefore followed a simple logic: a real territorial debt became an alleged Polish territorial demand, which was then transformed into a supposed attempt to reclaim Zaolzie. Fake accounts impersonating Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister Artur Harazim and Czech ambassador Břetislav Dančák helped reinforce the story. Fabricated diplomatic documents circulated alongside them. One early version referred incorrectly to 638.44 hectares; the fake Harazim account then “corrected” the number to the genuine figure of 368.44 hectares. It was an effective form of reverse fact-checking: correcting one false detail could make the larger fabrication appear authentic. Fake media – and one real newsroom The operators also created a website designed to resemble Czech public broadcaster iRozhlas. It published material supporting the same narrative, including claims that Czech residents near the border were becoming concerned about Polish intentions. The result was a manufactured information loop. Forged documents could support fake media reports; impersonated officials could comment on those reports; social-media accounts could then cite both as confirmation. But the Radio PiK hack added something much more valuable: the credibility of a real media organisation. Instead of merely cloning a newsroom, the attackers briefly inserted their fabrication into an authentic one. A familiar domain, logo and established broadcaster could therefore appear to confirm a story manufactured elsewhere. The cyberattack was not simply an accompanying technical incident. It was part of the information operation itself – a way of manufacturing credibility for false information. From a synthetic activist to a real demonstration The operation then attempted to move from the digital world into the physical one. A Facebook account under the name “Adam Sikora” promoted a demonstration in the Czech border city of Třinec under slogans including “Cieszyn Silesia is Czech” and “Here we live, here we stay”. Paid Facebook advertising was reportedly used to promote the event. Yet Třinec authorities said no demonstration had been properly notified. Promotional material used the logo of the Czech KOVO trade union, which denied any involvement. Investigators also identified indications that Sikora's profile photograph and other imagery were AI-generated. The persona even advertised a supposed house for sale in the border region, reinforcing the impression that frightened residents wanted to leave because of Polish territorial ambitions. The property could not be verified and its images also showed signs of artificial generation. This reveals the architecture of the operation: forged document → fake official → cloned media → compromised real media → synthetic local activist → advertised protest → appearance of social tension. The final stage is particularly significant. Had real people attended the demonstration, photographs of an authentic crowd could potentially have been presented as evidence that Czech citizens genuinely feared Polish territorial ambitions. A fabricated online conflict could therefore have begun generating real-world evidence of its own existence. Why Zaolzie? Historical grievances are valuable material for influence operations because the underlying facts are real. Poland and Czechoslovakia genuinely disputed Cieszyn Silesia. Poland genuinely occupied Zaolzie in 1938. A Polish minority genuinely lives in Czechia. And the 368.44-hectare territorial issue genuinely exists. The operator did not need to invent that history. It only needed to suggest that the history was repeating itself. PISM assessed that the operation sought to revive the image of Poland as a revisionist state willing to challenge European borders. Such a narrative could serve a broader purpose: damaging Polish-Czech relations, weakening confidence between NATO and EU allies and portraying Central Europe as a region where historical territorial conflicts remain unresolved. Russia is the leading attribution – but not a proven one The attribution requires more caution than the mechanics of the operation. PISM assessed Russia as the most likely perpetrator, while NASK identified similarities between the campaign and previously observed Russian influence methods. Russian-linked information infrastructure had also shown earlier interest in the Polish-Czech territorial issue. The techniques are familiar: cloned media, forged documents, impersonated officials, synthetic identities, historical grievances and the combination of cyber intrusion with information manipulation. But these indicators are not the same as definitive attribution. As of mid-September 2026, no publicly disclosed forensic evidence had conclusively connected the Radio PiK compromise, fake domains, accounts and financing to a specific Russian intelligence service, government organisation or contractor. Russia can therefore reasonably be described as the leading analytical attribution, but claims that the operation was definitively conducted by the GRU or another named Russian structure go beyond the publicly available evidence. The operation failed. The model remains important The campaign did not create a Polish-Czech diplomatic crisis. Both governments rejected the narrative, the fictitious protest was exposed, journalists reconstructed much of the operation and Radio PiK detected the intrusion quickly. Its observable impact appears to have been limited. But Zaolzie illustrates a broader evolution in information warfare. Modern operations do not have to rely on a single viral fake. They can construct an entire artificial information environment in which different elements appear to confirm one another. A forged document creates the claim. A fake diplomat authenticates it. A cloned newsroom reports it. A hacked real newsroom lends it credibility. An AI-generated citizen reacts to it. Advertising creates the appearance of a grassroots movement. And if real people eventually respond, fiction begins producing genuine events. The objective is no longer simply to persuade people that something happened. It is to create the conditions in which something real starts happening because enough people believed that it did. Sources: Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) https://pism.pl/publikacje/dezinformacja-o-relacjach-polsko-czeskich Euronews Polska — Radio PiK cyberattack https://pl.euronews.com/2026/08/20/polska-planuje-zajecie-terytorium-czech-wlamali-sie-na-strone-radia-i-opublikowali-falszyw Demagog https://demagog.org.pl/na-biezaco/skoordynowana-operacja-uderza-w-polsko-czeskie-relacje-czy-stoi-za-nia-rosja/ Robert Lansing Institute https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/08/27/zaolzie-as-an-instrument-of-influence-an-attempt-to-revive-a-polish-czech-territorial-conflict/ Institute for European Security Studies (IESS) https://www.iess.org.ua/analytics/ghosts-of-zaolzie iDNES.cz https://www.idnes.cz/ostrava/zpravy/tesinsko-kampan-lzi-demonstrace-trinec-primatorka-palkovska.A260826_963356_ostrava-zpravy_jog Radio Zachód / PAP https://zachod.pl/1539751/niedzielny-atak-hakerski-na-radio-pik-redaktor-naczelny-podjelismy-niezwloczne-dzialania/ Euronews — territorial debt / NASK assessment https://de.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/21/polen-plant-besetzung-tschechischen-gebiets-fake-news TVP World https://tvpworld.com/95036191/-warsaw-warns-against-division-amid-czech-border-disinformation Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode5 #GhostsOfZaolzie #Zaolzie #Poland #Czechia #CieszynSilesia #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Cyberattack #CyberSecurity #HybridWarfare #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #ForgedDocuments #DigitalImpersonation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #Astroturfing #RussianInfluence #Propaganda #OSINT #NATO #CentralEurope #MediaManipulation #WRLD

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lastampa.it 3w

A San Giovanni La Punta, la polizia ha scoperto un laboratorio di armi nel garage di un 27enne, trovato in possesso di una stampante 3D, progetti per “ghost guns”, sostanze stupefacenti e contanti, portando all'arresto per spaccio e detenzione illegale di arma da sparo. #GhostGuns #Stampa3D #Droga

www.lastampa.it
Realizzava armi con una stampante 3D: la scoperta delle “ghost guns” nel garage con droga e contanti
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Il Fatto Quotidiano 3w

Un laboratorio per la produzione di armi fantasma realizzate con stampanti 3D è stato scoperto a San Giovanni La Punta, portando all'arresto di un 27enne che gestiva l'attività clandestina. #GhostGuns #Catania #ArmiFantasma

www.ilfattoquotidiano.it
Scoperto un laboratorio per realizzate “armi fantasma” realizzate con stampanti 3D: il video
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Sandfeen 4w

🚨 BREAKING: The Trump DOJ has charged 12 IMMIGRANTS from Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iraq for running $10 MILLION-worth of FAKE daycare fraud schemes in California 9 of them came into the country as "ASYLUM SEEKERS" or TPS NEWSOM IS COMPLICIT by working to COVER ALL OF THIS UP, and should face charges HIMSELF. Per @AAGMcDonald: "These 12 ghost daycares billed the taxpayer more than $10 million. Money that should have gone to feeding, protecting, and supporting our children." One man, Mohamad Alawad, received over $1.2 MILLION for purportedly providing daycare services. Yet, Alawad WASN'T EVEN IN AMERICA for 120 days he was billing taxpayers for his "home daycare" services. THE CHARGES ARE AS FOLLOWS: WIRE FRAUD – Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1343 • Maximum penalty: Twenty years in prison and $500,000 fine MONEY LAUNDERING – Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1957 • Maximum penalty: Twenty years in prison and $500,000 fine And of course, they'll be forced to pay restitution to taxpayers. Throw the BOOK at them! https://x.com/nicksortor/status/2099943188173594800

x.com
Nick Sortor (@nicksortor) on X
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Cartoons On The Moon 4w

El doblaje latino de 'Ghost In The Shell' fue censurado y eliminaron toda mención a Israel. Había sido el único doblaje del mundo que mencionó al país para ser fiel al manga. https://t.co/vykbZtCdx6 #GhostInTheShell #DoblajeLatino #Censura

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