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I have seen the writing on the wall.. #CTP #Romania #CristianTudorPopescu https://republica.ro/se-pare-ca-am-murit

The author said residents were continuing to stand firm on Garvaghy Road and credited public pressure with stopping the Orange Order. They urged the British state to withdraw permission for what they described as a triumphalist sectarian march. https://t.co/sFnPAxOpBL #GarvaghyRoad #PeoplePower #Sectarianism #GB #IE

The author wrote that a large crowd had gathered at Garvaghy Road to oppose sectarianism. They said the British state should recognise that the Orange Order would not be allowed through, and claimed public pressure had stopped it and would continue to do so. https://t.co/oiGDngJQM5 #Sectarianism #CivilRights #PeoplePower #GB

IRAN: MEK/NCRI – when AI impersonated a real activist in live conversations For years, synthetic media has largely meant fabricated images, cloned voices and manipulated video. A case uncovered by Anthropic in September 2026 suggests a more consequential development: artificial intelligence being used not merely to imitate how a person looks or sounds, but to behave as that person in an ongoing conversation. Anthropic says it dismantled a distributed influence operation targeting Iranians inside the country and abroad that it linked to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or PMOI/MEK, and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The operators used a shared AI-agent platform to support impersonation, audience profiling, coordinated social-media activity, synthetic personas and the laundering of organisational content through apparently independent accounts. At least four people involved in the operation worked for official NCRI media outlets, according to Anthropic. The company also found references to committee approval processes and MEK leadership, but said it could not independently determine the precise level of central control. Cloning a person from 8,400 Telegram posts The most striking part of the operation involved a real activist whose Telegram identity was copied. According to Anthropic, the operators instructed Claude in Persian that it was now that person, then provided approximately 8,400 of the activist’s Telegram posts so the system could learn and reproduce his writing style. The AI-assisted account was subsequently used to conduct live political conversations with the activist’s existing contacts. Anthropic says that, to its knowledge, the people receiving those messages did not know they were interacting with an account being operated with AI assistance. This is materially different from a conventional chatbot or a static deepfake. The system was not simply producing a forged statement attributed to someone else. It was using a large archive of that person’s authentic language as behavioural training material, then applying the resulting imitation interactively. In practical terms, the deception moved from synthetic content to synthetic identity. Anthropic did not publish the identity of the impersonated activist, nor details of his contacts, and the public report does not establish what specific information the conversations produced. What it does establish is that the impersonation was operational rather than experimental: the cloned account was used in real exchanges with real people. From social-media monitoring to psychographic dossiers The impersonation sat inside a much broader targeting system. Anthropic says the network scraped more than 500 social-media channels and categorised individuals by location, age, profession, political orientation and arrest history. It then analysed approximately 51,944 archived messages from conversations to construct detailed psychographic dossiers on dozens of people inside Iran. The system was therefore not limited to broadcasting propaganda. It was also designed to understand specific audiences and individuals. Profiles could be used to decide what kind of message was most likely to resonate with a particular person, which political identity they appeared closest to and how they should be approached. Anthropic describes this as a structured targeting funnel rather than ad hoc social-media activity. That distinction is important in the Iranian context. Political activists, dissidents and opposition contacts inside Iran can face arrest and severe punishment. The report does not show that the dossiers directly led to arrests or other harm, but collecting and organising information such as arrest history and political affiliation adds a surveillance dimension to what would otherwise be described as an influence operation. A shared AI system for an influence network Anthropic found that the actors used a shared Claude-based platform named “Viktor”, with separate workspaces and persistent memory. Those memory files contained approved sources, prohibited words, account-management instructions and methods intended to reduce the risk of detection. One operator loaded MEK founding doctrine into the system as what the report called “strategic base data”, allowing others to reuse it across their work. This persistent-memory structure meant the AI did not have to be briefed from scratch for every task. Once doctrine, stylistic rules and operational constraints had been stored, the system could repeatedly produce material consistent with the network’s objectives. Anthropic says the same general playbook appeared across different workspaces despite the operators not sharing obvious account infrastructure. The network also used automated pipelines to coordinate Instagram posting schedules and tailor messages to different audiences. Some accounts initially avoided mentioning the Mojahedin at all, allowing material aligned with MEK/NCRI narratives to appear as neutral or independent political commentary. Content was distributed through the organisation’s own media ecosystem as well as accounts presented as ordinary news or activist profiles. Anthropic assessed the campaign as Category Two on its Breakout Scale: active on multiple platforms with distribution through NCRI-linked media properties and amplifier accounts, but without evidence of broad authentic penetration. Synthetic citizens and disguised organisational media The same infrastructure generated AI avatars presented as ordinary Iranians, complete with Persian audio, to promote Maryam Rajavi’s political programme. Anthropic says the synthetic nature of these personas was intentionally concealed. Operators also rewrote and redistributed content originating from MEK-affiliated media while stripping identifying features or presenting it through apparently independent accounts. The network’s political messaging targeted the Iranian government but also rival opposition currents, including monarchists and supporters of the Pahlavi camp. Anthropic documented fabricated video material attacking a member of the Pahlavi family and the use of the slogan “Neither Shah Nor Sheikh”, consistent with the NCRI’s broader competition with other opposition movements. That rivalry provides relevant context. Reuters describes the MEK as one of Iran’s principal organised opposition movements in exile and the dominant force behind the NCRI, led by Maryam Rajavi. Its relationship with other opposition currents is often contentious, while the extent of its support inside Iran remains uncertain. What can be attributed – and what cannot Anthropic’s attribution is unusually specific but still needs to be stated carefully. The company says its investigation linked the operation to MEK/NCRI and established that at least four participants worked for official NCRI media organisations. It also found a common operational playbook, committee review structures and repeated references to MEK leadership. On that basis, Anthropic said central tasking was likely. It nevertheless stopped short of saying it had proven that NCRI’s senior leadership directly ordered or managed every component of the operation. That caveat matters. The strongest public evidence supports describing GTG-84006 as a MEK/NCRI-aligned influence operation involving personnel from official NCRI media, rather than asserting that every action was directly commanded by the organisation’s top leadership. The broader significance of the case lies elsewhere. Earlier generations of synthetic media attempted to fabricate evidence: a photograph, a voice recording or a video. Here, AI was used to maintain an identity over time, remember doctrine, analyse targets and speak directly to real people while appearing to be someone they already trusted. The deepfake was no longer merely an artefact. It had become a participant in the conversation. Sources Anthropic — Countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 AI Misuse Case Library — GTG-84006 activist impersonation case https://www.misuseofai.com/en/cases/gtg-84006-activist-impersonation/ Reuters — Who makes up Iran’s fragmented opposition? https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/who-makes-up-irans-fragmented-opposition-2025-06-18/ Reuters — Iran’s divided opposition senses its moment https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-divided-opposition-senses-its-moment-activists-remain-wary-protests-2025-06-19/ Reuters — NCRI and Maryam Rajavi https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/dissident-leader-abroad-urges-iranians-bring-down-khamenei-2025-06-24/ Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode12 #Iran #MEK #PMOI #NCRI #IranianOpposition #Disinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #AIDeception #AIImpersonation #IdentityImpersonation #SyntheticIdentity #InteractiveDeepfake #DigitalImpersonation #PersonaCloning #BehaviouralCloning #Telegram #PsychographicProfiling #TargetProfiling #AudienceTargeting #SocialMediaManipulation #Astroturfing #SyntheticPersonas #NarrativeLaundering #CoordinatedInfluence #PoliticalInfluence #DigitalInfluence #OppositionPolitics #IranPolitics #OSINT #WRLD

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2026/09/whats-the-future-for-pure-math-research-in-the-age-of-ai/?fbclid=IwY2xjawUoV7tleHRuA2FlbQIxMABwZG9mBWJyaWQRMHd2OEpCbDZaUzhoSmtSelpzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeWwV9er8Q6xxRWiTH56fX_0P5bepFVNk8qqu0FzNouBkXyAQXQiR84j_2VA4_aem_Qz3_c7amSXf6HPPrP4hq5g

Thea Gilmore (born 25 November 1979), is an English singer-songwriter. She has released more than twenty albums since her 1998 debut Burning Dorothy. She has had three Top 40 entries on the UK Albums Chart and one on the UK Singles Chart. She became interested in music as a result of her father's record collection, which included work by Bob Dylan, Joni Mitchell, and The Beatles. Later, she listened to Elvis Costello, Tom Waits, and The Replacements, among others. Having always written poetry and stories, she began seriously writing songs at the age of 15. https://hvdommelen.nl/g/GilmoreT.html

How do I know that the British changed the cipher because Governor Morlington complained about the earlier cipher being too simple? Because I found his complaint. Here is Morlington's letter, dated September 4, 1798, where he complains about the old cipher (while writing in it). https://t.co/z6yc75x7wt #History #Cipher #Archives #GB

Math Detectives: Alien Angles: The Radian Code Mystery by Mr. Numberwise www.amazon.com/dp/B0GHT5N6SC www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0GHT5N6SC Writing What if aliens didn’t use degrees… but radians? When a strange signal appears in the school cafeteria, Jim, Mia, and the mysterious talking ant discover something unbelievable: The message is written in a secret math language. Not degrees… but radians. To solve the mystery, they must: • Decode π, π/2, and 2π • Translate alien rotation commands • Use circles to crack hidden messages • Think like real mathematicians But someone is watching them… And this time, the puzzle is harder. Perfect for ages 10–14, this book turns math into an adventure: Story-based learning Step-by-step explanations Visual thinking 20 fun worksheets included Can YOU crack the alien code? Made Easy Series math mystery book for kids StorytellerUK2026 radians for kids easy explained learning angles pi radians children math detective story book summer adventure stories for kids 9-12 middle school math practice angles geometry stem learning kids problem solving #Amazon #MathMysteryBookForKids #StorytellerUK2026 #RadiansForKidsEasyExplained #LearningAnglesPiRadiansChildren #MathDetectiveStoryBook #SummerAdventureStoriesForKids_9_12 #MiddleSchoolMathPracticeAnglesGeometry #StemLearningKidsProblemSolving #Kids #GreenwichMeridian #Equator #PrimeMeridian #InternationalDateLine #NorthPole #SouthPole #CompassRose #WorldMap #LatitudeAndLongitude #GreatCircleRoute #ArcticCircle #AntarcticCircle #TropicOfCancer #TropicOfCapricorn #FerdinandMagellan #Magellan #JuanSebastiánElcano #JamesCook #MarcoPolo #IbnBattuta #Battuta #ZhengHe #VascoDaGama #DaGama #AmerigoVespucci #Vespucci #RoaldAmundsen #Amundsen #ErnestShackleton #Shackleton #DavidLivingstone #Livingstone #Sacagawea #0248 (=256) 20261006: 916(306)8 #HappyEdu #HappyKids #HappyMath

Math Detectives: Alien Angles The Radian Code Mystery https://www.amazon.com/Math-Detectives-Angles-Radian-Mystery-ebook/dp/B0GHT5N6SC?ref_=saga_dp_bnx_dsk_dp Series Title Math Made Clear for Kids (Ages 10–14) Writing What if aliens didn’t use degrees… but radians? When a strange signal appears in the school cafeteria, Jim, Mia, and the mysterious talking ant discover something unbelievable: The message is written in a secret math language. Not degrees… but radians. To solve the mystery, they must: • Decode π, π/2, and 2π • Translate alien rotation commands • Use circles to crack hidden messages • Think like real mathematicians But someone is watching them… And this time, the puzzle is harder. Perfect for ages 10–14, this book turns math into an adventure: Story-based learning Step-by-step explanations Visual thinking 20 fun worksheets included Can YOU crack the alien code? Made Easy Series #MathMysteryBookForKids #StorytellerUK2026 #RadiansForKidsEasyExplained #LearningAnglesPiRadiansChildren #AnglesPiRadians #Radians #Pi #MathSetectiveStoryBook #SummerAdventureStoriesForKids10_14 #MiddleSchool #MathPractice #Geometry #Angles #AnglesGeometry #StemLearningKidsProblemSolving #StemLearningKids #ProblemSolving #KindleBooks #Children_s_eBooks #Education_Reference #Reference #Kids #20260924_0117 #0248 & #0256 20261006: 1032(271)9 #Happy #HappyEdu #HappyKids #HappyMath

Peep Veedla, who has been battling stomach cancer for a year and a half, shares his positive outlook on life, expressing contentment with his current health, the support of friends, and a desire to focus on his passion for nature and writing, despite not making long-term plans. #PeepVeedla #maovähk #loodus

I appeal to the media writing today about the “elections in Russia.” These “elections” are a propaganda farce meant to legitimize Putin’s criminal, authoritarian regime and his mafia, and also to authorize the occupation of Ukraine. This has nothing in common with elections as https://t.co/ET00W5ixvV #RussiaElections #PutinRegime #Propaganda #RU #UA

Joe Adhemar (London UK), a multi instrumentalist Songwriter capable of re-imagining your songs into whatever direction you want to go. Joe Adhemar started writing and recording songs from 2003 onwards. A familiar story of a Gen-X guy who bailed out of the music industry in their twenties to concentrate on their career. Despite life taking an alternative path, he stockpiled 100’s of compositions from his home-studio. Occasionally uploading them to Soundcloud. A true hobbyist with no ambition other than to enjoy the process of creation. He also branched out into a second artist profile, as Invisible Squirrel. To allow him to separate his passion for Breakbeat, Funk and Trip hop from the more traditional singer-songwriter releases he had. https://hvdommelen.nl/a/Adhemar.html

@ianbremmer The Danes and Greenlanders have completely taken Trump for a ride. What he has secured is something the US has already had for decades, but now they have it in writing that he will drop the foolish idea of ​​taking over Greenland. #Trump #Greenland #Diplomacy #DK #GL #US

We stopped making fun of devs writing bugs, because we understood that it’s very very hard to avoid bugs, even if you try hard. So how come we make fun of a bad sandbox design or system architecture? Isn’t it also just a “preventable oversight” like a software bug? 🙃 #SoftwareDevelopment #Architecture #Debugging #Therearenospecificcountrycodesmentionedinthetweet.

UKRAINE KEEPS WRITING ITS STORY #Ukraine#Lviv#BookForum The 33rd BookForum begins today in Lviv. Despite Russia’s war, Ukrainian books are written, published and read — including powerful firsthand accounts by Ukrainian soldiers. Our story will be written by us. SLAVA UKRAÏNI🇺🇦