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Cristiano Tinazzi argued that disinformation played a central role in hybrid warfare and that its dissemination through a public television program constituted a national problem. He pointed to "In Mezz’ora" on Rai and Gian Micalessin’s reports, stating that in the past the journalist had been in Bashar al-Assad's court to present him as a defender of Christians. Tinazzi also recalled a report on Maidan that, in his opinion, the BBC had termed false: Micalessin had interviewed people presented as Georgian snipers, claiming that the protesters had shot themselves. Tinazzi stated that other freelancers had been excluded from mainstream media for much less, while Micalessin continued to work and move with the Russian occupiers. He linked the situation to the journalist's historical ties with Monica Maggioni, whom he described as his former partner and founder of GM News Produzioni, where Maggioni had been a managing partner. In his view, this created a serious conflict of interest, on which the Rai Supervisory Commission had also taken an interest in 2022. Tinazzi said that one should expect rigor and seriousness from a public television program, and not a showcase for Russian propaganda. He cited an interview by Micalessin with Kostyantyn Suvkov, whom he defined as a representative of ultranationalist and militarist Russian propaganda. According to Tinazzi, that content contributed to polluting information and was part of a psychological warfare operation aimed at terrorizing Western public opinion and weakening military support for Kyiv. #Disinformazione #GuerraIbrida #MediaResponsabili (translated)

The author criticised the US president, saying that after speaking with Putin he had repeated several Kremlin disinformation claims. They argued that no serious US official with even basic knowledge of Ukraine and Russia would accept the points, which they described as nonsensical. #Politik #Desinformation #Ukraine #US #RU

Operation Dark Clark – Russia built a real organisation around a false identity Most influence operations create fake people, fake websites or fake news stories. Operation Dark Clark appears to have gone considerably further: Russian operators built what looked like a functioning research organisation in Latin America, employed real people to produce genuine research and concealed from those employees who was ultimately directing their work. OpenAI disclosed the operation on 8 October after banning a cluster of accounts originating in Russia. The actors used ChatGPT while targeting countries across Latin America, principally to damage Ukraine’s reputation, manipulate domestic political debates and manage a self-described research organisation called the Social Research Center, or SRC. OpenAI assessed Dark Clark as Category Five on the six-level Breakout Scale, the first operation it has disrupted since beginning its influence-operation reporting to reach that level. A front organisation with real employees The SRC presented itself as a research platform studying subjects including Latin America’s relationship with India and the Indian diaspora. OpenAI found more than 60 articles on its website, most of them apparently original rather than plagiarised. Internal reports produced by the Russian operators discussed hiring, dismissals, salary scales, staffing and unfinished research projects, strongly suggesting that the operators controlled the organisation rather than merely collaborating with it. At the centre of the structure was “Mia Clark”, a fictitious identity reportedly used to manage social-media activity and communicate with staff. According to OpenAI, the available evidence indicates that employees working for SRC in Latin America were probably unaware that the organisation was being directed by Russian actors. They interviewed experts, conducted research and wrote papers in what appears to have been good faith. The deception therefore existed primarily at the organisational level: much of the work was real, but the identity and strategic purpose of the institution commissioning it were not. OpenAI This is one reason Dark Clark differs from the familiar model of a troll farm. A reader encountering an SRC paper might be looking at research genuinely written by a Latin American employee based on genuine interviews. The manipulation lies further upstream, in who built the institution, selected its direction and controlled its infrastructure. From forged emails to real events The operation also appears to have attempted something more ambitious than online persuasion: inducing real people to produce events that could later be turned into propaganda. In May 2026, according to the operators’ internal reports, they created an email address impersonating Lima’s regional education authorities and instructed schools to organise activities about Ukraine for a cultural-diversity event. The instructions included references to Stepan Bandera, whose historical legacy remains particularly contentious in Poland and parts of Eastern Europe. The operators claimed that some schools complied, replied to the false address and sent photographs of the events. OpenAI could not independently verify every claim contained in the operators’ reports. It did, however, find Peruvian reporting matching the story, followed by publications in Poland and an English-language outlet in Hungary. Some coverage included comments from a Polish MEP calling for people displaying what he described as anti-Polish attitudes to be declared persona non grata. OpenAI therefore concluded that the fabricated starting point appears to have entered genuine political debate across national borders. The mechanism is unusually effective because the final photographs need not themselves be fabricated. If people can be tricked into staging a real event on the basis of a forged instruction, the operation creates authentic visual evidence of something that was artificially initiated. The same method in Ecuador and Bolivia Dark Clark’s internal reports describe similar efforts elsewhere. In Ecuador, the operators claimed they used a fake education email to encourage schools to stage ceremonies involving President Daniel Noboa and Erik Prince, the former head of Blackwater. Ecuadorian media subsequently covered a matching controversy, and the country’s education minister issued a detailed denial. Other Ecuador-focused material included fabricated audio attributed to Ukraine’s consul and a false television report alleging that Noboa’s government was recruiting Ecuadorians to fight in Ukraine. Local fact-checker Lupa found that the supposed Teleamazonas report had never been broadcast, that images had been taken from Instagram, that the audio was AI-generated and that a company named in a supposed recruitment contract did not exist in Ecuador’s corporate registry. In Bolivia, an internal report described a fake audio recording supposedly made by an employee of state water company EPSAS during anti-government protests. It claimed that water supplies to La Paz would be cut and a state of emergency declared. The allegation produced a fact-check and an official denial. OpenAI says the operators explicitly described their objective as worsening the political crisis surrounding the demonstrations. Possible links to the post-Wagner influence machine Dark Clark did not emerge in a vacuum. The operators repeatedly asked ChatGPT about Politology and La Compania, names associated in previous investigations with the Russian influence apparatus that developed from structures once connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Forbidden Stories and its partners obtained 1,431 pages of internal documents describing a network known as “The Company”, which they reported had grown to almost 100 operatives and was conducting influence projects across roughly 30 Global South countries. Their investigation found that the organisation moved under the supervision of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, after Prigozhin’s death. Its documented budget for ten months of activity in 2024 was approximately €7.3 million. Two older Argentina campaigns claimed in Dark Clark’s internal reports — a false story about Javier Milei buying Cartier collars for his dogs and the staging of anti-Milei graffiti — had already been independently attributed by investigative journalists to Politology/La Compania. That is significant corroboration, but it is not enough to prove that every Dark Clark activity was run by the same organisational structure. AI was the back office, not the mastermind Perhaps the most important finding concerns artificial intelligence itself. In most documented cases, the Russians were not using ChatGPT to generate the propaganda seen by the public. Their principal use was administrative: drafting reports for an unknown superior, summarising operations, translating material and recording the supposed success of campaigns. Those reports also expose a weakness in the operators’ own measurement. OpenAI found instances in which they tried to claim credit for developments they had probably not caused, suggesting that they were not only attempting to manipulate Latin American audiences but also presenting an inflated picture of their effectiveness to whoever was supervising them. Dark Clark nevertheless broke further into the real world than any influence operation OpenAI had previously disrupted. Under the Brookings framework, Category Five means that an operation has escaped its original network and been amplified by high-profile individuals such as politicians. Dark Clark crossed that threshold because fabricated narratives appear to have provoked governmental denials, mainstream reporting and political comment in several countries. Its most important innovation was therefore not a particularly convincing deepfake. It was the construction of a partly genuine institution around a concealed foreign controller. The research could be real. The employees could be real. The interviews could be real. What was false was who they were ultimately working for. Sources OpenAI — Disrupting AI-enabled “false front” operations https://openai.com/index/disrupting-ai-enabled-false-front-operations/ Forbidden Stories — Propaganda Machine: Russia’s foreign influence strategy across three continents https://forbiddenstories.org/propaganda-machine-secret-documents-reveal-russias-foreign-influence-strategy-across-three-continents/ Forbidden Stories — Ghost Journalists, Cash and Kremlin Scripts: Argentina https://forbiddenstories.org/ghost-journalists-cash-and-kremlin-scripts-how-russian-operatives-tried-to-influence-argentinian-media/ openDemocracy — Russian influence operation in Bolivia https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia-bolivia-south-america-putin-evo-morales-wagner-prigozhin-covert-operations-propaganda-disinformation-foreign-interference/ Lupa Media — Fake Teleamazonas report about recruiting Ecuadorians for Ukraine https://lupa.com.ec/verificaciones/noboa-mercenarios-ucrania-ecuador/ Brookings Institution — The Breakout Scale https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-breakout-scale-measuring-the-impact-of-influence-operations/ Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode17 #OperationDarkClark #DarkClark #Russia #LatinAmerica #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #FalseFront #FrontOrganisation #FakeInstitution #SocialResearchCenter #SRC #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ChatGPT #OpenAI #NarrativeManipulation #SourceLaundering #InstitutionalManipulation #ForgedDocuments #FakeAudio #PoliticalInfluence #CovertInfluence #Peru #Ecuador #Bolivia #Argentina #Ukraine #Politology #LaCompania #TheCompany #SVR #WagnerLegacy #PropagandaMachine #GlobalSouth #BreakoutScale #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

AFRICA DAILY REPORT — 11 OCTOBER 2026 Key developments of past 24h 1. SUDAN — Drone strike on displaced civilians: reported death toll rises to 41 IMPORTANCE: 10/10 — CRITICAL Emergency Lawyers reported that a drone strike on displaced people in Abu Shandi, Blue Nile state, killed 41, including eight children. The group blamed the RSF, which had not commented. The toll is not independently verified. Source: https://apnews.com/article/sudan-war-rsf-military-6cb2c34499234e9bcd33c3c9b49521da 2. ETHIOPIA–ERITREA — Eritrea appeals to UN Security Council Eritrea asked the Security Council to take deterrent measures against Ethiopia and denied Ethiopia's allegation of an Eritrean incursion. Ethiopian troops and allies entered Adigrat, according to residents and Reuters-verified footage. The alleged incursion has not been independently verified. Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-forces-regain-control-border-city-after-reported-eritrean-incursion-2026-10-10/ 3. KENYA — Authorities expand Ebola awareness campaign IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Kenya's health ministry asked churches and faith organizations to raise awareness about Ebola symptoms and early reporting. The campaign follows a fatal imported case from DR Congo; authorities continue tracing contacts and strengthening screening. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/kenyan-health-ministry-urges-churches-to-raise-awareness-about-ebola/ 4. MALAWI — Fuel shortages disrupt transport and commerce IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Motorists in Lilongwe have queued for days for petrol, disrupting commuting, schooling and business. The latest reporting did not establish when supplies would normalize. Source: https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/10/10/malawi-motorists-queue-for-days-as-fuel-shortage-bites 5. DR CONGO — President presses AU mediators for implementation of peace commitments President Felix Tshisekedi met AU mediators in Kinshasa after consultations in Goma and Kigali, calling for concrete implementation of Washington and Doha peace commitments. No new ceasefire agreement was announced. Source: https://presidence.cd/actualite-detail/actualite/le_chef_de_letat_a_recu_le_panel_des_facilitateurs_de_lunion_africaine 6. SOUTH AFRICA — Police reinforce security after anti-migrant violence IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Police increased their presence in Johannesburg and Durban after anti-migrant demonstrations, vehicle burnings and looting. The unrest was partly fuelled by misinformation about an asylum court ruling. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/heightened-security-at-anti-immigrant-hotspots-in-south-africa/ 7. MAURITANIA — Prime minister reappointed following resignation over electricity failures The prime minister was reappointed after resigning amid findings about fires at Nouakchott substations and prolonged power outages. Investigators cited deficiencies in maintenance, protection and emergency management. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/mauritanian-pm-reappointed-hours-after-resignation-over-power-outages/ 8. DR CONGO — Joseph Kabila criticizes government and security situation Former president Joseph Kabila accused the authorities of governance failures and criticized the handling of the eastern Congo conflict. These were his political allegations, not independently established findings. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/former-dr-congo-president-says-the-country-is-in-peril/ 9. MOROCCO — King calls for greater emphasis on youth opportunities King Mohammed VI urged greater focus on education, employment, skills and inclusion following youth-led demonstrations. He also called for revised cooperation with Spain on migration. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/moroccan-king-says-youth-issues-must-be-at-forefront-of-policy-agenda/ 10. KENYA — Erratic rainfall pressures farmers' finances and mental health IMPORTANCE: 7/10 — HIGH Farmers in Nyeri report losses from unpredictable rainfall and dry spells. Local specialists highlight growing stress and anxiety, while advocating climate-smart agriculture, irrigation and mental-health support. Source: https://www.africanews.com/2026/10/10/unreliable-weather-creating-mental-health-issues-for-kenyan-farmers/ #Africa #AfricaNews #AfricaDailyReport #TopNewsOfAfrica #AfricaToday #DRCongo #Rwanda #FelixTshisekedi #AfricanUnion #AUMediators #PeaceProcess #PeaceNegotiations #PeaceAgreements #EasternCongo #M23 #Goma #Kinshasa #Diplomacy #Morocco #KingMohammedVI #GenZ #YouthOpportunities #YouthEmployment #Education #YouthEmpowerment #YouthProtests #SocialDevelopment #MigrationPolicy #Sudan #SudanWar #BlueNile #DroneStrike #CivilianCasualties #DisplacedPeople #RSF #HumanitarianCrisis #WarCrimes #Ethiopia #Eritrea #Tigray #Adigrat #HornOfAfrica #UNSecurityCouncil #RegionalSecurity #Kenya #Ebola #PublicHealth #DiseasePrevention #HealthAwareness #Malawi #FuelShortages #EnergyCrisis #SouthAfrica #AntiMigrantProtests #Xenophobia #MigrationCrisis #Disinformation #Mauritania #PowerOutages #JosephKabila #ClimateChange #KenyanFarmers #FoodSecurity #AfricanPolitics #Geopolitics #AfricaSecurity #HumanRights #AfricanDevelopment #WRLDorg

Russia’s war propaganda gets a soundtrack – how AI-generated songs reached global streaming platforms Russian war propaganda is no longer confined to television broadcasts, Telegram channels or political videos. A study by the Ukrainian threat-intelligence organisation Terrecon has identified 981 songs combining signs of AI generation with pro-Russian military narratives, distributed through an ecosystem that reaches YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music, Deezer and SoundCloud. The songs range from sentimental ballads to rock and heavy metal. Their recurring themes are familiar from conventional Russian wartime propaganda: the heroisation of Russian soldiers, romanticisation of the war, mobilisation, the “Russian world”, commemoration of fallen troops and attacks on Ukraine and its armed forces. Some contain derogatory or dehumanising references to Ukrainians. What is new is not necessarily the message, but the production and distribution model: generative AI allows propagandistic music to be produced rapidly, cheaply and in quantities that would previously have required musicians, studios and producers. Nearly 1,000 tracks identified Terrecon examined 3,725 tracks collected from YouTube, YouTube Music, SoundCloud and the AI music platform Suno. After manual review, researchers classified 981 as showing both indications of AI generation and pro-Russian war propaganda. In 681 tracks they identified 728 propaganda-related keywords or phrases. The largest category was the glorification of the Russian military, followed by romanticised treatment of Moscow’s so-called “special military operation”, mobilisation appeals, narratives about the “Russian world”, and the cult of fallen soldiers and the state. The reach was not merely theoretical. Listening or viewing statistics were available for 608 of the identified tracks; together they had accumulated 86.8 million plays and views, according to Terrecon. A smaller group of 13 high-performing songs accounted for more than 53 million YouTube views and more than 67 million when YouTube Music was included. Among the better-known examples is “Power of Artillery”, a Russian-language rock song praising artillery weapons that passed two million views on YouTube. Most of the tracks for which publication dates could be established appeared after 2024, broadly coinciding with the rapid expansion of consumer AI music generators such as Suno and Udio. That correlation does not prove that AI alone caused the increase, but it illustrates how drastically the economics of production have changed. A propaganda song for as little as $11 Terrecon also tested how difficult it would be to commission such material. Researchers approached 25 creators producing AI-assisted militaristic music; 15 agreed to take commissions. Prices ranged from approximately $11 to $330, while delivery times ranged from two hours to three days. According to Terrecon, some were prepared to produce highly aggressive anti-Ukrainian material, including content intended for audiences involving children from occupied Ukrainian territories. Some creators used Russian intermediary services that provided access to Western AI tools such as Suno and Udio despite restrictions. The researchers then tested several AI generators themselves. Across 40 prompts submitted to Suno, Udio, Mureka, Google Flow Music and ElevenLabs, 25 resulted in successful generations, while safeguards were circumvented in 15 cases. Terrecon reported that four of the five services tested produced Russian-language material containing wartime narratives, although technical problems prevented comparable testing on some systems. In one Udio experiment, the researchers said the model itself introduced more explicit violent language than had appeared in the original promp These tests do not demonstrate that the commercial platforms knowingly support Russian propaganda. They show something narrower: existing safeguards can be inconsistent when political messaging is packaged as music. From generation to Spotify The distribution experiment may be the most revealing part of Terrecon’s research. The team deliberately uploaded test tracks containing explicit hostile language to YouTube, SoundCloud, Spotify and Deezer. Terrecon says none was blocked during the experiment. On SoundCloud, researchers used an account identifying its location as Moscow, disclosed the use of AI and added markers including references to the Russian military and the war. The platform accepted the upload and subsequently offered paid promotional and distribution tools. This does not prove that streaming recommendation systems systematically promote pro-war music. There is currently insufficient public evidence to make that claim. It does demonstrate that material can enter the same commercial distribution infrastructure as ordinary music and, once there, potentially benefit from playlists, searches, sharing and recommendation mechanisms available to other releases. That distinction is important. Propaganda no longer has to announce itself as political communication. On a streaming platform it can look like another song. Culture as a delivery mechanism Music has always been used in wartime propaganda. What generative AI changes is scale. Instead of investing heavily in a limited number of patriotic performers or officially commissioned productions, creators can generate variations across styles, audiences and emotional registers at very low cost. Terrecon found material ranging from war rock to sentimental songs and content styled for younger audiences. Some creators also experimented with cloned celebrity voices and stylistic imitation of established musicians. The format also offers a different relationship with the audience. A political video asks a viewer to consume an argument. Music can accompany commuting, exercise or entertainment and may be encountered outside explicitly political spaces. This does not automatically make it more persuasive, and Terrecon’s research does not establish measurable effects on political attitudes. It does, however, place wartime narratives inside a cultural environment where users may not initially perceive themselves as consuming political messaging. An ecosystem, not a proven Kremlin command structure The strongest evidence supports describing this as a growing AI-assisted pro-Russian propaganda-music ecosystem, not a single operation controlled from Moscow. Terrecon did not establish that the Russian government created, financed or coordinated all 981 tracks. Reporting on the study likewise notes that the extent of direct state involvement remains unclear. There is broader evidence that the Russian state finances cultural projects and digital content supporting the war, including through state-backed funding bodies. That context matters, but it does not allow individual songs in Terrecon’s dataset to be attributed to the Kremlin without additional evidence. The significance of the case lies elsewhere. AI has reduced the cost of producing ideological content, intermediaries can help creators access generation tools, and global platforms can provide distribution. The result is a pipeline in which wartime propaganda no longer has to resemble propaganda at all. It can simply appear in a playlist. Sources Terrecon / Ukrainska Pravda — Daria Verbytska on the research https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2026/10/05/8056229/ Suspilne Culture — detailed breakdown of Terrecon findings https://suspilne.media/culture/1417933-rosijsku-voennu-propagandu-maskuut-pid-anime-karaoke-ta-rok-doslidzenna-si-pisen-vid-terrecon/ The Insider — AI-generated Russian war propaganda music https://theins.ru/news/297839 Institute of Mass Information — summary of New York Times reporting https://imi.org.ua/en/news/doslidzhennya-rf-masovo-stvoryu%D1%94-propagandistski-pisni-za-dopomogoyu-shi The Bridge Media — AI-generated songs and Russian military propaganda https://thebridgemedia.com.ua/en/ai-generated-songs-russian-military-propaganda/ Center for Strategic Communication — cost and production of AI propaganda music https://spravdi.org/propaganda-za-11-yak-rosiya-shtampuye-shi-pisni-z-miljonamy-prosluhovuvan/ Times of India — AI-generated Russian war songs https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/ai-sings-russias-war-story-inside-the-rise-of-generative-songs-about-ukraine-conflict/articleshow/134650594.cms EU Council / EUR-Lex — Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32026D1351 Human Rights Watch — Russian state funding of digital and patriotic content https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/07/30/disrupted-throttled-and-blocked/state-censorship-control-and-increasing-isolation #DISINFORMED #Episode16 #Russia #Ukraine #RussianPropaganda #WarPropaganda #MusicPropaganda #AIMusic #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticMedia #AIPropaganda #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #CulturalPropaganda #DigitalInfluence #NarrativeManipulation #PropagandaMusic #StreamingPlatforms #Spotify #AppleMusic #YouTube #YouTubeMusic #Deezer #SoundCloud #Suno #Udio #RussianWorld #RusskiyMir #MilitaryPropaganda #WarNarratives #Mobilisation #AlgorithmicDistribution #RecommendationAlgorithms #MusicStreaming #PlatformManipulation #Terrecon #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

AFRICA DAILY REPORT — 9 OCTOBER 2026 Main developments of past 24 hours 1. ETHIOPIA–ERITREA — Reports of Eritrean troops entering Tigray and drone strikes A commander aligned with Ethiopia's government reported Eritrean troops in Adigrat and Idaga Hamus. ACLED reported drone strikes targeting Eritrean forces. The reports raise concerns about a direct Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation; troop movements were not independently verified. SOURCE: https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-eritrea-tigray-mekelle-shire-tplf-drones-6d89a0f53f527fb45d21637c5d9a0179 2. SOUTH AFRICA — Anti-migrant protests turn violent in Durban and Soweto IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Anti-migrant protests led to looting and vehicles being burned. The government attributed unrest partly to false claims about a Constitutional Court asylum ruling. Police deployed additional personnel. SOURCE: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-african-anti-migrant-protests-turn-violent-with-cars-torched-gunshots-2026-10-08/ 3. GUINEA-BISSAU — December elections postponed The prime minister announced that presidential and legislative elections planned for December 6 could not proceed, citing missed candidate-selection and submission deadlines. No new election date was announced. SOURCE: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guinea-bissau-delay-elections-following-last-years-coup-2026-10-08/ 4. KENYA — Suspected second Ebola case tests negative IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Preliminary tests on a suspected Ebola patient in Wajir County were negative. Kenya continues heightened surveillance and contact tracing after its first confirmed imported case. SOURCE: https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/kenya-says-tests-suspected-ebola-case-come-back-negative-2026-10-08/ 5. NIGERIA — Petrol price cap proposed IMPORTANCE: 8/10 — HIGH Nigeria's finance minister proposed capping petrol at about 1,350 naira per litre and considering measures to buffer fuel-price volatility, including possible windfall taxation. The measures are proposals, not implemented policy. SOURCE: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/nigeria-proposes-petrol-price-cap-curb-fuel-cost-volatility-2026-10-08/ 6. NIGERIA — World Bank sees 4.4% average growth through 2028 IMPORTANCE: 8/10 — HIGH The World Bank forecasts Nigeria's economic growth averaging 4.4% through 2028 if reforms continue, with inflation potentially declining toward 12% by 2028. Improvements in public services and job creation remain essential. SOURCE: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/world-bank-sees-nigeria-growth-averaging-44-through-2028-2026-10-08/ 7. AFRICA / UNITED STATES — Human Rights Watch examines third-country deportations Human Rights Watch documented allegations of arbitrary detention, mistreatment and other rights risks involving US deportations of people to African countries other than their countries of origin. These are findings and allegations of the rights organization. SOURCE: https://www.hrw.org/report/2026/10/08/to-scare-people/us-expulsions-of-third-country-nationals-to-countries-in-africa 8. SOMALIA — Conflict and aid reductions deepen famine risk IMPORTANCE: 10/10 — CRITICAL Drought, insecurity and reductions in international assistance are worsening food insecurity. Al-Shabaab restrictions impede access to vulnerable communities. Baidoa hosts large numbers of displaced people. SOURCE: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/10/08/war-cuts-off-entire-somalians-threatened-by-famine-from-humanitarian-aid_6758371_4.html 9. SOUTH SUDAN — Hospitals overwhelmed by renewed fighting IMPORTANCE: 9/10 — VERY HIGH Medical facilities are struggling with gunshot, blast and trauma casualties. An ICRC-supported hospital in Juba has reported severe pressure on surgical capacity and medical supplies. SOURCE: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/08/inside-south-sudan-overwhelmed-trauma-wards 10. PAN-AFRICAN FINANCE — Dangote refinery IPO highlights investment barriers IMPORTANCE: 8/10 — HIGH Nigeria's Dangote refinery $1.6 billion offering exposed regulatory obstacles to cross-border share purchases, despite ambitions for broad African participation. Investors outside Nigeria face fragmented securities rules and limited eligible intermediaries. SOURCE: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/africas-biggest-ipo-exposes-continents-cross-border-investing-barriers-2026-10-09/ #Africa #AfricaNews #AfricaDailyReport #TopNewsOfAfrica #AfricaToday #SouthAfrica #Durban #Soweto #AntiMigrantProtests #Xenophobia #MigrationCrisis #CivilUnrest #HumanRights #Disinformation #Nigeria #NigerianEconomy #WorldBank #EconomicGrowth #GDPGrowth #EconomicReforms #Inflation #AfricanEconomy #Ethiopia #Eritrea #Tigray #Mekelle #HornOfAfrica #DroneStrikes #RegionalSecurity #ArmedConflict #GuineaBissau #Elections #PoliticalInstability #Kenya #Ebola #PublicHealth #NigeriaFuelPrices #EnergySecurity #Somalia #FoodInsecurity #FamineRisk #HumanitarianCrisis #SouthSudan #HealthcareCrisis #USDeportations #DangoteRefinery #AfricanFinance #CrossBorderInvestment #AfricanDevelopment #AfricanPolitics #Geopolitics #AfricaSecurity #AfricanUnion #WRLDorg

An OpenAI report reveals how Russian and Iranian agents used fake journalists and articles to fuel tensions between Ukraine and Poland, interfere in South American politics, and generate tangible effects in various countries, exploiting the platform for their disinformation efforts. #Disinformazione #Ucraina #OpenAI (translated)

American officials urged EU countries and Canada to withdraw support for a conference on disinformation organized by EU DisinfoLab, which led to Canada and Lithuania distancing themselves from the event and the removal of the European External Action Service from its list of supporters. #dezinformace #diplomacie #konference (translated)

As K. Budrys said to LRT radio on Thursday, the United States found itself alongside Russia and China at the "Disinfo 2026" conference, although the role of these states in Lithuania's security is fundamentally different. #Dezinformacija #LietuvosPolitika #TarptautiniaiSantykiai (translated)

Kęstutis Budrys explained why Lithuania withdrew from the conference on disinformation Disinfo 2026, emphasizing that the event's theme contradicts the country's foreign policy principles and national interests, while Žygimantas Pavilionis criticized this decision as submission to US pressure. #Dezinformacija #LietuvosPolitika #TarptautiniaiSantykiai (translated)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania withdrew from the conference "Disinfo 2026" due to content that does not align with the government's positions and requested the organizers not to use the ministry's connections with the event. #URM #dezinformacija #konferencija (translated)

The post claimed that the US had pressured several countries to withdraw their sponsorship of #Disinfo2026, described as a leading European conference on disinformation, and said Canada, Lithuania and the EU’s diplomatic service were the only ones that subsequently agreed to do so. https://t.co/PStc15aMCC #Desinformación #Conferencia #PolíticaExterior #US #CA #LT #EU

The author claimed that Russia spent $5 billion a year on propaganda and subversion to build support for its invasions through tailored narratives, which they said were later spread by people including Marco Travaglio. They used derogatory language to describe those spreading the narratives and added that fact-based research to counter them took time and effort. #Propaganda #Disinformation #FactChecking #RU

The billionaires' tax in California, aimed at funding the healthcare system, is the subject of heavy disinformation campaigns by the billionaires themselves who are trying to prevent its approval, while the mail-in voting on Proposition 40 has already begun and will close on November 3. #Tassazione #California #ElezioniMidterm (translated)

According to the author, the EU's External Action Service and a few others had removed their names from the materials of the EU's main disinformation conference because the event also addressed the information manipulation and disinformation directed at Europe by the Trump administration. https://t.co/kPXZ52TLiR #disinformaatio #EU #Trump #EU #US (translated)

Sofia Ventura asked Luc Fontana why the Corriere had published an article by physicist Carlo Rovelli. She argued that Rovelli had neither the expertise nor the understanding of international politics and that, in this case, he had accumulated manipulations and Russian propaganda frameworks. She claimed that by doing so, the Corriere was contributing to disinformation in favor of Russia. #disinformazione #politica #media (translated)

Nigeria – how pro-Russian influence networks sell military rule as the answer When Nigerians took to the streets in August 2024 to protest soaring living costs and frustration with government, some demonstrations acquired an unexpected symbol: the Russian flag. In Kano, Kaduna and other northern cities, protesters were filmed carrying Russian colours and calling for Moscow’s intervention. Some demanded a military takeover. What initially looked like an unusual expression of anger has since become part of a much larger picture. A September 2026 assessment by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies describes Nigeria as a major target of overlapping foreign information operations, with Russia the most active external actor in its information space. The report does not identify a single centrally controlled campaign. Instead, it maps an ecosystem in which genuine dissatisfaction over insecurity, corruption and living standards is repeatedly redirected towards a broader proposition: democratic government has failed, while the military-led regimes of the Sahel offer a more effective alternative. Turning a real protest into a pro-Russian message The clearest example emerged during the 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests. Nigerian investigative reporting found that a Kano-based TikTok influencer with more than 100,000 followers had been paid through a Telegram channel associated with African Initiative, a Moscow-based media operation linked by researchers to Russian influence activity in Africa. The influencer said the channel supplied photographs, videos and talking points for redistribution on TikTok and Instagram. Among the messages provided were phrases such as “Putin please come and save Nigeria” and “The army is the answer for Nigeria”. Influencers were encouraged to use Hausa-language hashtags including #Zangazanga – “protest” – alongside references to Putin and Russia. Investigators identified 38 accounts circulating similar pro-Russian and pro-military narratives during the demonstrations. Russian flags subsequently appeared among protesters in several northern cities. This does not mean the protests themselves were created by Russia. They were driven by genuine economic and political grievances, and Nigerian protesters gave different reasons for carrying Russian flags. The important feature of the influence activity was precisely that it did not need to manufacture the original anger. It could attach a geopolitical message to an existing domestic crisis. From frustration to the idea of military government The narrative fits a wider pattern seen across West Africa. Russia has developed close relations with the military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while pro-Russian media ecosystems routinely portray those states as examples of sovereignty, stability and resistance to Western influence. Nigeria, by contrast, has remained under constitutional civilian government since 1999. Africa Center researchers say information networks targeting Nigerians increasingly contrast these two models. Recurring messages depict elections as wasteful or predetermined, civilian institutions as incapable of protecting citizens and military governments as more decisive on security and development. Some content portrays the Sahelian juntas as delivering better roads, lower prices and stronger security even where available evidence points to continuing or worsening instability. Language is central to the strategy. Hausa is spoken across northern Nigeria and neighbouring Niger, allowing political narratives to travel across borders that are far less important online than they are on maps. HumAngle documented efforts involving Nigerien state-linked actors to cultivate Hausa-speaking journalists and distribute material favourable to Niger’s junta and hostile to France and Western influence. The Russian and Sahelian-junta information ecosystems are not identical, but their narratives frequently reinforce one another. Fake journalists inside real Nigerian media The campaign environment extends beyond social media. A 2026 investigation by Graphika and Code for Africa identified 44 ghost reporters and fake experts whose identities were used to place Russia-aligned narratives in African media. Thirty-eight were assessed with high confidence to be fabricated. Their articles or quotations appeared across 138 websites and were amplified by at least 113 Facebook accounts and Pages. Nigeria was one of the most heavily targeted countries. According to the Africa Center’s analysis of the research, Daily Post Nigeria carried 39 articles involving 14 identified ghost authors. Once published by a genuine Nigerian outlet, such material could then be cited by other websites, social-media accounts or even Russian official channels as though it had originated independently in Africa. This is information laundering rather than simple propaganda: the most valuable asset being borrowed is the credibility of the local newsroom. Generative AI added another layer. OpenAI and Meta separately disrupted a Russia-origin network that produced Africa-focused political content and operated Facebook Pages posing as local media organisations. One fabricated commentator, “Dr Manuel Godsin”, was presented as a European-trained geopolitical expert although investigators found no evidence supporting his academic biography. ChatGPT had been used to generate articles under the persona’s name, while Meta removed 37 Facebook accounts and 29 Pages connected to the broader network. Different networks, similar strategic direction It would be misleading to merge all these activities into a single Russian command structure. The African Initiative-linked influencer campaign, the ghost-reporter network and the AI-enabled operation disrupted by OpenAI and Meta were uncovered separately and used different infrastructure. Public evidence does not demonstrate that every actor reported to the same organisation. What connects them is a recurring set of themes and methods: portraying Western partnerships as exploitative, presenting Russia as an alternative security partner, amplifying failures of civilian government, and giving military-led rule greater legitimacy. Investigative reporting on leaked Russian documents has meanwhile described a much wider influence apparatus operating across Africa, involving political consultants, paid journalists, influencers and locally tailored campaigns intended to reduce Western influence and expand Moscow’s position. The underlying technique is less about inventing dissatisfaction than redirecting it. Nigeria faces real security threats, economic pressure and public frustration. Influence operators do not need to persuade Nigerians that those problems exist. They need only influence the explanation for why they exist – and which political model appears to offer the answer. That is what makes the Nigerian case significant. The most effective propaganda does not necessarily introduce a completely false reality. It takes a real crisis and changes where the audience is encouraged to look for the solution. Sources Africa Center for Strategic Studies — The Raging Information Battle in Nigeria https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-raging-information-battle-in-nigeria/ Graphika — Umbrae Ex Machina https://www.graphika.com/reports/umbrae-ex-machina OpenAI — Operation “No Bell” https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-no-bell/ TheCable — Ghost reporters in African media https://www.thecable.ng/ghost-reporters-how-fabricated-african-voices-carried-pro-russia-narratives/ HumAngle — Nigeria Is Facing an Information War in Its Own Language https://www.humanglemedia.com/nigeria-is-facing-an-information-war-in-its-own-language DAIDAC / CJID — Russian influence during #EndBadGovernance https://daidac.thecjid.org/how-telegram-tiktok-aided-russian-disinformation-that-led-to-incarceration-of-nigerian-minors/ FactCheckHub — How Nigeria’s hunger protest took a radical turn https://factcheckhub.com/from-economic-protests-to-coup-agitation-how-nigerias-hunger-march-took-a-radical-turn/ News24 — Fake Kremlin-linked analyst planted stories in African media https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media-20260318-0560 Vanguard — AI ‘expert’ exposed https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/03/ai-expert-exposed-fake-kremlin-linked-analyst-planted-stories-in-african-media/ Africa Confidential — How Moscow wages social media war https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/15961/how-moscow-wages-social-media-war Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode15 #Nigeria #Russia #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Africa #WestAfrica #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #Propaganda #MilitaryRule #MilitaryGovernment #Democracy #PoliticalManipulation #NarrativeManipulation #AfricanInitiative #EndBadGovernance #Hausa #LocalInfluencers #GhostReporters #FakeExperts #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPersonas #SyntheticMedia #AIPropaganda #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #Telegram #TikTok #DigitalInfluence #SourceLaundering #NarrativeLaundering #MediaManipulation #Sahel #Geopolitics #OSINT #WRLD

Brazil’s synthetic voters – when AI manufactures public opinion They look like ordinary street interviews. A reporter approaches a passer-by in a Brazilian square and asks a simple question: who will you vote for? A young voter explains why Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva deserves another term. An elderly woman says Brazil needs Flávio Bolsonaro because he represents political renewal and greater security. The locations look plausible, the microphones are visible and the answers sound much like the brief political opinions heard in television vox pops around the world. None of the people are real. Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election on 4 October, fact-checking organisation Aos Fatos identified at least 50 TikTok videos in which artificial intelligence was used to manufacture voters, reporters and apparently spontaneous political interviews. Together, the videos had accumulated around 7.4 million views by mid-August. Some promoted Lula, others Flávio Bolsonaro, while another group used synthetic characters to ridicule or stereotype supporters of one side. Aos Fatos found no apparent evidence linking the accounts producing the videos to either presidential campaign. The opinion poll that never took place The format is important. These were not conventional deepfakes in which a recognisable politician is made to say something he never said. Instead, the creators reproduced the visual language of the vox pop – the short street interview used by broadcasters and social-media creators to illustrate what ordinary people supposedly think. In pro-Lula videos, synthetic voters described themselves as beneficiaries of social programmes or credited the president with improving their lives. In videos supporting Flávio Bolsonaro, artificial interviewees associated him with political renewal, public security and fighting corruption. Other clips were openly hostile: AI-generated characters presented as poor or living in parts of Brazil’s north-east were shown in dirty clothes or run-down surroundings, declaring support for Lula because they supposedly preferred welfare payments to work. The deception is therefore subtler than fabricating a candidate’s statement. It manufactures something that political communication normally treats as evidence of public sentiment. A real vox pop may be unscientific, but the people interviewed at least exist. These videos created the appearance that identifiable social groups – young people, pensioners, welfare recipients or residents of particular regions – were spontaneously expressing political preferences when no such encounters had taken place. An electoral-law specialist interviewed by Aos Fatos described the technique as the fabrication of a “social fact that never occurred”. That captures the central innovation: AI is being used not merely to falsify political speech, but to manufacture the impression of grassroots opinion. Fifty videos, but not one proven network The available evidence does not support describing the 50 posts as a centrally controlled influence operation. Aos Fatos located them through TikTok searches and recommendations produced by the platform itself, then examined the accounts responsible for publication. Most had relatively small individual audiences, although their combined reach was substantial. The first examples identified by the investigation appeared as early as March 2026. Activity increased in June and was concentrated particularly in July and the first half of August as Brazil’s election calendar intensified. Some accounts specialised in AI-generated videos generally, including fabricated podcast-style material. Others were explicitly political or supportive of a candidate, but Aos Fatos found no apparent links between those profiles and the official Lula or Bolsonaro campaigns. That distinction is essential. The evidence demonstrates a common technique and a shared political environment, not a single command structure. Some creators may have been motivated by ideology, others by engagement or monetisation. Publicly available evidence does not establish who commissioned the individual videos or whether any coordination existed between the accounts. This decentralised model also creates a different enforcement problem from a traditional bot network. There may be no headquarters to expose and no infrastructure whose removal disables the entire operation. The format itself can be copied by anyone with access to inexpensive generative-video tools. When the algorithm mixes real and synthetic citizens Aos Fatos documented another important feature of the phenomenon: TikTok’s recommendation system placed AI-generated interviews alongside genuine street interviews. For a user scrolling quickly through the platform, the transition between an authentic citizen and an entirely fabricated one could therefore be almost invisible. In 18 per cent of the 50 videos analysed, there was no indication that the people shown had been generated using AI. After Aos Fatos provided TikTok with the videos, the company said it had removed all of them for violating its rules on edited and AI-generated media. TikTok said its policies require creators to identify synthetic content and prohibit manipulated media capable of misleading users about matters of public importance or impersonating genuine journalistic material. The issue extends beyond one platform. Factchequeado’s review of Brazil’s 2026 election campaign found that synthetic endorsements and other deepfakes had become one of the most visible forms of AI-assisted electoral misinformation, alongside fabricated candidate statements and invented scenes. Brazil already had rules for synthetic politics Brazil entered the campaign with unusually detailed electoral rules governing artificial intelligence. The Superior Electoral Court, the TSE, requires electoral propaganda using synthetic multimedia to disclose clearly that AI was used. More importantly for the fake-voter videos, its rules prohibit synthetic audio or video used to favour or harm a candidacy when it creates or alters the image or voice of a living, deceased or fictitious person. The difficulty is attribution and enforcement. When a synthetic video is published by an official campaign, responsibility can be relatively straightforward to investigate. When it comes from an apparently independent account with no demonstrated relationship to a candidate, lawyers interviewed by Aos Fatos said responsibility is more likely to fall on the individual creator, while imposing electoral sanctions on a campaign would require evidence of a connection. For the final 72 hours before the election and the 24 hours following it, the TSE has imposed additional restrictions on newly published or republished synthetic material involving candidates or public figures, reflecting the particular difficulty of correcting fabricated content immediately before voting. From deepfake politicians to synthetic electorates The Brazilian case illustrates a broader change in political manipulation. The first generation of electoral deepfakes concentrated on famous people: make a politician appear to say something damaging, or fabricate an endorsement from a celebrity. Synthetic vox pops reverse the perspective. The politician can remain completely authentic; it is the electorate around the politician that is fabricated. That changes the psychological proposition of the message. Instead of saying the candidate believes this, the video suggests people like you believe this. Age, clothing, accent, neighbourhood and social class can all be generated to construct an artificial constituency around almost any political claim. There is no evidence that the 50 Brazilian videos identified by Aos Fatos constitute a single centrally directed campaign, nor evidence that they changed voting intentions. What they demonstrate is a technique whose barrier to entry has become extremely low. AI no longer needs to forge the politician. #DISINFORMED #Episode14 #Brazil #BrazilElection2026 #Elections #ElectionDisinformation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticVoters #SyntheticMedia #AIAvatars #AIGeneratedVideo #VoxPop #FakeInterviews #Astroturfing #AIPropaganda #PoliticalDisinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #SocialMediaManipulation #TikTok #PublicOpinion #ManufacturedConsent #SyntheticPublicOpinion #DigitalInfluence #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity #TSE #AosFatos #FactChecking #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD (translated)