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Meanwhile, after the brief "word battle" with Siegmund, ZDF reporter Köster was followed by a microphone holder from the right-wing "Deutschland-Kurier" in the Magdeburg state parliament, who asked him silly questions in his own or "Activist Man" style ("Why are you always trembling?", "Will you tell us how you earn your money – with compulsory fees?", "Why don't you want to say anything?") and received the response from Köster that he doesn't give interviews "while working." #AfD #heuteshow #UlrichSiegmund (translated)

Björn Harms announced that his new book "The Asylum Complex" would be available in stores the following day; he already had some freshly printed copies in hand. He wrote that the book includes, among other things, a detailed overall calculation of the asylum costs of past years and an overview of the number of asylum accommodations in Germany. According to him, the federal government does not know this number. According to Harms, the book also addresses real estate companies and hoteliers who earn millions by renting to the state, as well as home operators, welfare associations, lawyer networks, and state companies that benefit from the growing market or mass immigration. He announced interviews with insiders from the social industry and the real estate market, as well as insights into asylum NGOs, refugee councils, and million-euro funding programs from the EU and the federal government. Additionally, the book aims to address legal questions related to the topic of asylum. Harms requested feedback on the book. #Asylkomplex #Buchneuerscheinung #Asylpolitik (translated)

Tear Off reported that Lewis Hamilton would not attend the interviews after the Singapore Grand Prix, after going to the medical center at the end of the race. According to the account, Ferrari had indicated that the driver was not feeling well and had been examined by the FIA medical team, which had allowed him to skip the post-race interviews. #F1 #SingaporeGP #F1 #GrandPrix #LewisHamilton (translated)

Operation Dark Clark – Russia built a real organisation around a false identity Most influence operations create fake people, fake websites or fake news stories. Operation Dark Clark appears to have gone considerably further: Russian operators built what looked like a functioning research organisation in Latin America, employed real people to produce genuine research and concealed from those employees who was ultimately directing their work. OpenAI disclosed the operation on 8 October after banning a cluster of accounts originating in Russia. The actors used ChatGPT while targeting countries across Latin America, principally to damage Ukraine’s reputation, manipulate domestic political debates and manage a self-described research organisation called the Social Research Center, or SRC. OpenAI assessed Dark Clark as Category Five on the six-level Breakout Scale, the first operation it has disrupted since beginning its influence-operation reporting to reach that level. A front organisation with real employees The SRC presented itself as a research platform studying subjects including Latin America’s relationship with India and the Indian diaspora. OpenAI found more than 60 articles on its website, most of them apparently original rather than plagiarised. Internal reports produced by the Russian operators discussed hiring, dismissals, salary scales, staffing and unfinished research projects, strongly suggesting that the operators controlled the organisation rather than merely collaborating with it. At the centre of the structure was “Mia Clark”, a fictitious identity reportedly used to manage social-media activity and communicate with staff. According to OpenAI, the available evidence indicates that employees working for SRC in Latin America were probably unaware that the organisation was being directed by Russian actors. They interviewed experts, conducted research and wrote papers in what appears to have been good faith. The deception therefore existed primarily at the organisational level: much of the work was real, but the identity and strategic purpose of the institution commissioning it were not. OpenAI This is one reason Dark Clark differs from the familiar model of a troll farm. A reader encountering an SRC paper might be looking at research genuinely written by a Latin American employee based on genuine interviews. The manipulation lies further upstream, in who built the institution, selected its direction and controlled its infrastructure. From forged emails to real events The operation also appears to have attempted something more ambitious than online persuasion: inducing real people to produce events that could later be turned into propaganda. In May 2026, according to the operators’ internal reports, they created an email address impersonating Lima’s regional education authorities and instructed schools to organise activities about Ukraine for a cultural-diversity event. The instructions included references to Stepan Bandera, whose historical legacy remains particularly contentious in Poland and parts of Eastern Europe. The operators claimed that some schools complied, replied to the false address and sent photographs of the events. OpenAI could not independently verify every claim contained in the operators’ reports. It did, however, find Peruvian reporting matching the story, followed by publications in Poland and an English-language outlet in Hungary. Some coverage included comments from a Polish MEP calling for people displaying what he described as anti-Polish attitudes to be declared persona non grata. OpenAI therefore concluded that the fabricated starting point appears to have entered genuine political debate across national borders. The mechanism is unusually effective because the final photographs need not themselves be fabricated. If people can be tricked into staging a real event on the basis of a forged instruction, the operation creates authentic visual evidence of something that was artificially initiated. The same method in Ecuador and Bolivia Dark Clark’s internal reports describe similar efforts elsewhere. In Ecuador, the operators claimed they used a fake education email to encourage schools to stage ceremonies involving President Daniel Noboa and Erik Prince, the former head of Blackwater. Ecuadorian media subsequently covered a matching controversy, and the country’s education minister issued a detailed denial. Other Ecuador-focused material included fabricated audio attributed to Ukraine’s consul and a false television report alleging that Noboa’s government was recruiting Ecuadorians to fight in Ukraine. Local fact-checker Lupa found that the supposed Teleamazonas report had never been broadcast, that images had been taken from Instagram, that the audio was AI-generated and that a company named in a supposed recruitment contract did not exist in Ecuador’s corporate registry. In Bolivia, an internal report described a fake audio recording supposedly made by an employee of state water company EPSAS during anti-government protests. It claimed that water supplies to La Paz would be cut and a state of emergency declared. The allegation produced a fact-check and an official denial. OpenAI says the operators explicitly described their objective as worsening the political crisis surrounding the demonstrations. Possible links to the post-Wagner influence machine Dark Clark did not emerge in a vacuum. The operators repeatedly asked ChatGPT about Politology and La Compania, names associated in previous investigations with the Russian influence apparatus that developed from structures once connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Forbidden Stories and its partners obtained 1,431 pages of internal documents describing a network known as “The Company”, which they reported had grown to almost 100 operatives and was conducting influence projects across roughly 30 Global South countries. Their investigation found that the organisation moved under the supervision of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, after Prigozhin’s death. Its documented budget for ten months of activity in 2024 was approximately €7.3 million. Two older Argentina campaigns claimed in Dark Clark’s internal reports — a false story about Javier Milei buying Cartier collars for his dogs and the staging of anti-Milei graffiti — had already been independently attributed by investigative journalists to Politology/La Compania. That is significant corroboration, but it is not enough to prove that every Dark Clark activity was run by the same organisational structure. AI was the back office, not the mastermind Perhaps the most important finding concerns artificial intelligence itself. In most documented cases, the Russians were not using ChatGPT to generate the propaganda seen by the public. Their principal use was administrative: drafting reports for an unknown superior, summarising operations, translating material and recording the supposed success of campaigns. Those reports also expose a weakness in the operators’ own measurement. OpenAI found instances in which they tried to claim credit for developments they had probably not caused, suggesting that they were not only attempting to manipulate Latin American audiences but also presenting an inflated picture of their effectiveness to whoever was supervising them. Dark Clark nevertheless broke further into the real world than any influence operation OpenAI had previously disrupted. Under the Brookings framework, Category Five means that an operation has escaped its original network and been amplified by high-profile individuals such as politicians. Dark Clark crossed that threshold because fabricated narratives appear to have provoked governmental denials, mainstream reporting and political comment in several countries. Its most important innovation was therefore not a particularly convincing deepfake. It was the construction of a partly genuine institution around a concealed foreign controller. The research could be real. The employees could be real. The interviews could be real. What was false was who they were ultimately working for. Sources OpenAI — Disrupting AI-enabled “false front” operations https://openai.com/index/disrupting-ai-enabled-false-front-operations/ Forbidden Stories — Propaganda Machine: Russia’s foreign influence strategy across three continents https://forbiddenstories.org/propaganda-machine-secret-documents-reveal-russias-foreign-influence-strategy-across-three-continents/ Forbidden Stories — Ghost Journalists, Cash and Kremlin Scripts: Argentina https://forbiddenstories.org/ghost-journalists-cash-and-kremlin-scripts-how-russian-operatives-tried-to-influence-argentinian-media/ openDemocracy — Russian influence operation in Bolivia https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia-bolivia-south-america-putin-evo-morales-wagner-prigozhin-covert-operations-propaganda-disinformation-foreign-interference/ Lupa Media — Fake Teleamazonas report about recruiting Ecuadorians for Ukraine https://lupa.com.ec/verificaciones/noboa-mercenarios-ucrania-ecuador/ Brookings Institution — The Breakout Scale https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-breakout-scale-measuring-the-impact-of-influence-operations/ Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode17 #OperationDarkClark #DarkClark #Russia #LatinAmerica #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #FalseFront #FrontOrganisation #FakeInstitution #SocialResearchCenter #SRC #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ChatGPT #OpenAI #NarrativeManipulation #SourceLaundering #InstitutionalManipulation #ForgedDocuments #FakeAudio #PoliticalInfluence #CovertInfluence #Peru #Ecuador #Bolivia #Argentina #Ukraine #Politology #LaCompania #TheCompany #SVR #WagnerLegacy #PropagandaMachine #GlobalSouth #BreakoutScale #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

Brazil’s synthetic voters – when AI manufactures public opinion They look like ordinary street interviews. A reporter approaches a passer-by in a Brazilian square and asks a simple question: who will you vote for? A young voter explains why Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva deserves another term. An elderly woman says Brazil needs Flávio Bolsonaro because he represents political renewal and greater security. The locations look plausible, the microphones are visible and the answers sound much like the brief political opinions heard in television vox pops around the world. None of the people are real. Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election on 4 October, fact-checking organisation Aos Fatos identified at least 50 TikTok videos in which artificial intelligence was used to manufacture voters, reporters and apparently spontaneous political interviews. Together, the videos had accumulated around 7.4 million views by mid-August. Some promoted Lula, others Flávio Bolsonaro, while another group used synthetic characters to ridicule or stereotype supporters of one side. Aos Fatos found no apparent evidence linking the accounts producing the videos to either presidential campaign. The opinion poll that never took place The format is important. These were not conventional deepfakes in which a recognisable politician is made to say something he never said. Instead, the creators reproduced the visual language of the vox pop – the short street interview used by broadcasters and social-media creators to illustrate what ordinary people supposedly think. In pro-Lula videos, synthetic voters described themselves as beneficiaries of social programmes or credited the president with improving their lives. In videos supporting Flávio Bolsonaro, artificial interviewees associated him with political renewal, public security and fighting corruption. Other clips were openly hostile: AI-generated characters presented as poor or living in parts of Brazil’s north-east were shown in dirty clothes or run-down surroundings, declaring support for Lula because they supposedly preferred welfare payments to work. The deception is therefore subtler than fabricating a candidate’s statement. It manufactures something that political communication normally treats as evidence of public sentiment. A real vox pop may be unscientific, but the people interviewed at least exist. These videos created the appearance that identifiable social groups – young people, pensioners, welfare recipients or residents of particular regions – were spontaneously expressing political preferences when no such encounters had taken place. An electoral-law specialist interviewed by Aos Fatos described the technique as the fabrication of a “social fact that never occurred”. That captures the central innovation: AI is being used not merely to falsify political speech, but to manufacture the impression of grassroots opinion. Fifty videos, but not one proven network The available evidence does not support describing the 50 posts as a centrally controlled influence operation. Aos Fatos located them through TikTok searches and recommendations produced by the platform itself, then examined the accounts responsible for publication. Most had relatively small individual audiences, although their combined reach was substantial. The first examples identified by the investigation appeared as early as March 2026. Activity increased in June and was concentrated particularly in July and the first half of August as Brazil’s election calendar intensified. Some accounts specialised in AI-generated videos generally, including fabricated podcast-style material. Others were explicitly political or supportive of a candidate, but Aos Fatos found no apparent links between those profiles and the official Lula or Bolsonaro campaigns. That distinction is essential. The evidence demonstrates a common technique and a shared political environment, not a single command structure. Some creators may have been motivated by ideology, others by engagement or monetisation. Publicly available evidence does not establish who commissioned the individual videos or whether any coordination existed between the accounts. This decentralised model also creates a different enforcement problem from a traditional bot network. There may be no headquarters to expose and no infrastructure whose removal disables the entire operation. The format itself can be copied by anyone with access to inexpensive generative-video tools. When the algorithm mixes real and synthetic citizens Aos Fatos documented another important feature of the phenomenon: TikTok’s recommendation system placed AI-generated interviews alongside genuine street interviews. For a user scrolling quickly through the platform, the transition between an authentic citizen and an entirely fabricated one could therefore be almost invisible. In 18 per cent of the 50 videos analysed, there was no indication that the people shown had been generated using AI. After Aos Fatos provided TikTok with the videos, the company said it had removed all of them for violating its rules on edited and AI-generated media. TikTok said its policies require creators to identify synthetic content and prohibit manipulated media capable of misleading users about matters of public importance or impersonating genuine journalistic material. The issue extends beyond one platform. Factchequeado’s review of Brazil’s 2026 election campaign found that synthetic endorsements and other deepfakes had become one of the most visible forms of AI-assisted electoral misinformation, alongside fabricated candidate statements and invented scenes. Brazil already had rules for synthetic politics Brazil entered the campaign with unusually detailed electoral rules governing artificial intelligence. The Superior Electoral Court, the TSE, requires electoral propaganda using synthetic multimedia to disclose clearly that AI was used. More importantly for the fake-voter videos, its rules prohibit synthetic audio or video used to favour or harm a candidacy when it creates or alters the image or voice of a living, deceased or fictitious person. The difficulty is attribution and enforcement. When a synthetic video is published by an official campaign, responsibility can be relatively straightforward to investigate. When it comes from an apparently independent account with no demonstrated relationship to a candidate, lawyers interviewed by Aos Fatos said responsibility is more likely to fall on the individual creator, while imposing electoral sanctions on a campaign would require evidence of a connection. For the final 72 hours before the election and the 24 hours following it, the TSE has imposed additional restrictions on newly published or republished synthetic material involving candidates or public figures, reflecting the particular difficulty of correcting fabricated content immediately before voting. From deepfake politicians to synthetic electorates The Brazilian case illustrates a broader change in political manipulation. The first generation of electoral deepfakes concentrated on famous people: make a politician appear to say something damaging, or fabricate an endorsement from a celebrity. Synthetic vox pops reverse the perspective. The politician can remain completely authentic; it is the electorate around the politician that is fabricated. That changes the psychological proposition of the message. Instead of saying the candidate believes this, the video suggests people like you believe this. Age, clothing, accent, neighbourhood and social class can all be generated to construct an artificial constituency around almost any political claim. There is no evidence that the 50 Brazilian videos identified by Aos Fatos constitute a single centrally directed campaign, nor evidence that they changed voting intentions. What they demonstrate is a technique whose barrier to entry has become extremely low. AI no longer needs to forge the politician. #DISINFORMED #Episode14 #Brazil #BrazilElection2026 #Elections #ElectionDisinformation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticVoters #SyntheticMedia #AIAvatars #AIGeneratedVideo #VoxPop #FakeInterviews #Astroturfing #AIPropaganda #PoliticalDisinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #SocialMediaManipulation #TikTok #PublicOpinion #ManufacturedConsent #SyntheticPublicOpinion #DigitalInfluence #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity #TSE #AosFatos #FactChecking #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD (translated)

Claudia van Zanten referred to a report from Het Parool stating that the Israeli army questioned the interviews without providing evidence for it. According to Van Zanten, the interviews with 24 IDF soldiers were anonymous, it was not proven that the interviewees were actually soldiers, and their motives were unknown. She wrote that Het Parool should have critically evaluated the interviews themselves if it took journalistic codes seriously. Van Zanten stated that many media present opinions they agree with as facts, and as a result, facts no longer count. https://t.co/MWtPnSO57t #media #journalistiek #Israël (translated)

Actu Foot reported that Igor Paixão had mentioned contacts regarding Flamengo and Palmeiras, communicated by his agents, but that no lead had materialized and that it was mainly speculation. The player also stated that joining Flamengo was a childhood dream shared by his family, and that he hoped to one day wear the club's jersey. He had already mentioned this desire in an interview, according to Band, cited by ESPN Brasil. #Flamengo #Football #Transferts (translated)

The author wrote that the AfD has reached 30 percent for the first time and that the Union has fallen to 18 percent. He stated that he is pleased to have reported fairly about the AfD in his blog for ten years and to have conducted one of the first personal interviews with Alice Weidel. https://t.co/vGScMjx2ZV #AfD #Politik #Deutschland #DE (translated)

Jinnih Beels... Wij hebben veel met Jinnih Beels gelachen. Wij hebben Jinnih Beels verketterd. Wij hebben informatie uit haar politieverleden gebruikt om haar een satirische poot uit te draaien. Maar wij geven toe, ja, zelfs wij bij 'tScheldt, geven toe dat Jinnih Beels ons heeft verrast met haar Doorbraak interviews en vooral haar eerste gedurfde interview met Tom van Grieken. Ja, zelfs wij, moeten dan erkennen, dat Beels uit ander hout is gesneden dan de gemiddelde socialist. Het stond in de sterren geschreven dat de racistische voorzitter van Vooruit, Conner Rousseau, een probleem met Beels zou hebben. Wij moeten Beels niet steunen. We erkennen mits deze tweet gewoon de kracht en moed van Jinnih Beels. @BeelsJinnih #politiek #satire #JinnihBeels

Jeg kan her til morgen se, at de socialdemokratiske spinkanoner er rettet mod mig! Indledningsvis er Bennys kritik en lille smule ironisk med tanke på, hvorfor han selv mistede sin ministerpost. Men fred være med det. :) EB har ret i flere af deres "afsløringer". Altså, jeg har - dog ubevidst og i god tro - sagt ting, der er forkerte. Og det står jeg 100 % på mål for og vil gerne beklage over! For når man har et stort talerør, skal man også gøre sig umage for, at ens udsagn holder vand. Men lad os lige dvæle lidt ved EB's "afsløring". Deres artikel går flere år tilbage. I den periode har jeg vitterligt skrevet flere tusind opslag på de sociale medier, lavet hundredevis af videoer og deltage i hundredevis af debatter og interviews. SELVFØLGELIG er jeg i den periode på et eller andet tidspunkt kommet til at sige noget, der er forkert! For den her historie ville du vitterligt kunne lave på alle, der i samme grad har deltaget i den offentlige debat. De eneste, der ikke laver fejl, er jo dem, der ikke laver noget. Og lad mig understrege; Jeg synes både, det er 100 % rimeligt og vigtigt, at medierne laver historier på det, hvis jeg eller andre siger noget forkert! For det er et afgørende aspekt af en sund offentlig debat. Men at Benny forsøger at koge suppe på det ved at få det til at lyde som om, at jeg bevidst går og lyver, er jo bare decideret lavt. For medmindre man virkelig prøver at fortolke det her som fanden læser Biblen, ved man jo udmærket godt, at der er tale om ubevidste fejl i god tro. Og dét er ret væsentligt. For alle kan i god tro lave fejl - og medmindre man gør sig umage for at finde hår i suppen, ved folk jo godt, at det er en uvægerlig præmis for at deltage i debatten. Siger man mange ting, vil man på et tidspunkt også sige noget forkert. Men hvordan er det egentlig lige, Socialdemokratiet selv agerer i den offentlige debat? Jeg vil ikke opliste alle eksemplerne - men se gerne @hr_noergaard s fremragende liste nedenfor i kommentarfeltet. Så man man jo vurdere for sig selv, hvem der bidrager til en dårlig politisk kultur. Hæv niveauet, Benny. #offentligdebat #politiskkultur #fejl

Die absurden vermeintlich "sachgerechten Gründe" zur Geschäftskonto-Kündigung unseres Mandanten Flavio von Witzleben durch die Sparkasse Karlsruhe liegen inzwischen vor. Flavio hat diese heute mitgeteilt, siehe unten. Verdächtig sind für einen Journalisten demnach: Kleinspenden, eine Bargeldeinzahlung, ein anderes Bankkonto, die Durchführung eines Interviews, Gelder von Google und PayPal-Nutzung. Man kann sich diesen Schwachsinn gar nicht ausdenken. Hinzu kommt, dass der Schriftsatz der Gegenseite mit der Mitteilung dieser absurden Gründe zunächst von der Zentralstelle für Finanztransaktions-untersuchungen gegenüber dem Gericht freigegeben werden musste. Hat man auch nicht alle Tage. Deswegen zieht sich das Verfahren auch. Am Ende wird die Sparkasse Karlsruhe unterliegen und Flavio sein Konto zurückbekommen. Es wird nur noch ein wenig dauern. PS: Bereits am 12. September hat Flavio diese Informationen bei der "Debanking"-Veranstaltung der AfD-Bundestagsfraktion mitgeteilt. Bis heute weigert sich die Fraktion, das von ihr zensierte Video der Veranstaltung zu veröffentlichen. #Geschäftskonto #Journalismus #Debanking

Die mörderische Grenze der DDR Die Honecker sagte in einem ihrer letzten Interviews nach den Toten an der Grenze befragt, sinngemäß: " Ja, tut mir leid. Aber die waren ja auch dumm, denn jeder wusste doch, was da passieren kann". Auch so eine Lüge, denn ich wusste zum Beispiel nicht, wie diese perversen Grenzanlagen aufgebaut waren. Ich wusste, dass dort geschossen wird, aber mehr auch schon nicht. Von den Tretminen, Stolperdrähten, scharfen Hunden und den Selbstschussanlagen SM 70 wusste ich so gut wie nichts. Und auch ich überlegte mal eine Zeitlang, es vielleicht zu versuchen und bin heute so froh, das ich den anderen Weg - über die Haft -gewählt habe. Wissen konnten über die Grenze nur die etwas, die dort als Grenzer stationiert waren. Wobei ich auch gleich sage, dass ich die armen Jungs nicht generell verurteile, denn viele von ihnen fanden sich ja plötzlich an der grünen Grenze mit Schießbefehl wieder und wussten gar nicht wie ihnen geschieht. In deren Haut möchte ich damals auch nicht gesteckt haben, aber aus Interviews ist ja bekannt, dass wohl fast alle von ihnen geschossen hätten, um nicht in Schwedt zu landen. Nur halt 20 Meter drüber, oder nach links oder rechts. Ganz anders sah es dann aber an der Mauer aus, denn hier kamen nur die handverlesenen Grenzer zum Einsatz. 200 prozentige die alle bei der STASI waren und ohne mit der Wimper zu zucken, voll drauf gehalten hätten . Und natürlich wurde nach der Wende, von einigen wenigen Fällen mal abgesehen, wieder niemand wirklich verfolgt und angeklagt. Und ganz aktuell haben wir ja auch den Fall Sven Hüber, der noch der Klärung bedarf. Im Stillen Gedenken an die vielen Opfer, die nur in die Freiheit wollten. 🙏 #DDRGeschichte #Grenze #Freiheit

🚨🚨 Harry KANE 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿 interrogé sur les campagnes médiatiques sans fin de YAMAL 🇪🇸 et MBAPPÉ 🇫🇷 pour le Ballon d'Or 🌕 : « Chacun a le droit de faire ce qu'il veut dans cette situation (en campagne). Évidemment, le Ballon d'Or est devenu de plus en plus important ces dernières années, principalement à cause des réseaux sociaux, de tout ce bruit, et de toutes ces conversations à ce sujet. De mon point de vue, CE N’EST TOUT SIMPLEMENT PAS DANS MA PERSONNALITÉ DE PARLER DE MOI SOUS CET ANGLE. ❌ Je suis toujours très fier de ce que j'ai accompli. Et d'un point de vue principe, je sais que ce que j'ai réalisé l'année dernière était aussi bon que n'importe qui. Donc je ne veux pas non plus esquiver cela. Mais en fin de compte, mon état d'esprit est d'avancer. Je pense que le timing du Ballon d'Or est difficile, carvous êtes déjà dans une nouvelle saison, vous êtes déjà concentré sur ce que je peux accomplir cette année. Et après chaque match, vous parlez de ce que vous avez fait l'année dernière… 🙄 Donc c'est dur pour moi de m'y faire. Mais de mon point de vue, ce serait incroyable de le gagner, je serais extrêmement fier de le remporter. Je pense que je suis définitivement dans la course pour le gagner, sans aucun doute. Donc le temps nous le dira, les votants voteront pour qui ils veulent. Que (les autres prétendants) fassent plus d'interviews ou moins d'interviews ait un impact là-dessus, ça a évidemment un impact socialement, et sur le débat autour, c'est sûr. Mais les votants réels, je ne suis pas sûr à 100 pour cent. Je pense que les votants voteront pour qui ils pensent mériter, et ils auront les informations, les stats, et ils décideront ! » 🎙️ Standard Sport via @iMiaSanMia #BallonDor #HarryKane #Football

Ti år som grønlandsordfører i Folketinget og formand for Folketingets forsvarsudvalg. Erhvervsminister som havde ansvaret for at finansiere de tre nye grønlandske lufthavne. 130 - 140 dagsordenssætttende interviews med internationale medier da Trump truede Grønland med invasion TV2 “Jarlov sidder i byrådet i Roskilde og bliver inviteret på fjernsyn fordi han er meget aktiv på sociale medier.“ #Grønland #Folketinget #Forsvarsudvalg

🚨🇫🇷 ALERTE : Rétropédalage grossier de @francediplo, qui nous prend pour des demeurés en invoquant un « contresens » de traduction. Le président @EmmanuelMacron a pourtant bel et bien déclaré, en français : « Le Hamas n’a jamais sévi en Cisjordanie. » ‼️ Et ce n’est pas la première fois qu’il profère ce mensonge, comme en témoignent ces deux autres extraits d’interviews👇🏼 #France #Macron #Hamas