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Conservative Raiz Banido said that, from the next day until the 25th, the profile would publish content frequently and offer daily materials for sending via WhatsApp, as well as ready-to-use photos for stories. He also asked followers to inform in the comments about car rallies or sticker campaigns in their cities, so he could share the calls. #Engajamento #Comunidade #Carreata (translated)

R•G•7 reported that his son, who would turn 10 in November and was attending the 5th grade, talked to him about F1 25, which he said was played by older students. After seeing the game's website and the PEGI 3 suitability rating, he asked Gemini for more information and expressed his surprise at the content. According to the description he provided, the game included races with teams, drivers, and tracks corresponding to real ones, career and team management features, a narrative storyline titled Braking Point 3, as well as online play or races with two players on the same screen. R•G•7 argued that the content warranted a rating for adults and not for children over the age of 3 years. He cited pit battles, driving at speeds over 200 km/h, and causing accidents without legal or insurance consequences, other than a penalty to the driver’s time. He added that, as described in the game, the police were not notified but a safety car appeared. He also mentioned that the communications in the pits contained, according to the description, strong curses and racist or misogynistic expressions. Connecting the reference to the speeds with traffic rules, R•G•7 wrote that speeds over 200 km/h incurred a fine of €2,000 and a one-year driving license suspension, with heavier penalties in case of reoffending. He expressed his opposition to the presence of such elements in a game with a PEGI 3 rating. #F1 #Formula1 #βιντεοπαιχνίδια (translated)

https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000343082/im-cafe-englaender-wird-nach-dem-plachutta-eklat-weiter-gekellnert-noch?fbclid=IwY2xjawU4S4xleHRuA2FlbQIxMABwZG9mBWJyaWQRMHd2OEpCbDZaUzhoSmtSelpzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEe3SBbtuyik49drab2hYCkqePRMtzENkqPxXNXBH_KOnBowP0opjFYurYt2Pk_aem_hrQv0_TpDUgSlstq5oyJjA

Apollo News reported that on Friday evening in Stade, around 50 men with Syrian and Kurdish nationality reportedly clashed with each other outside a sports hall using batons and knives. Six people were injured, four of them seriously. https://t.co/IbgLVXGJj7 #Stade #Gewalt #Syrien (translated)

Operation Dark Clark – Russia built a real organisation around a false identity Most influence operations create fake people, fake websites or fake news stories. Operation Dark Clark appears to have gone considerably further: Russian operators built what looked like a functioning research organisation in Latin America, employed real people to produce genuine research and concealed from those employees who was ultimately directing their work. OpenAI disclosed the operation on 8 October after banning a cluster of accounts originating in Russia. The actors used ChatGPT while targeting countries across Latin America, principally to damage Ukraine’s reputation, manipulate domestic political debates and manage a self-described research organisation called the Social Research Center, or SRC. OpenAI assessed Dark Clark as Category Five on the six-level Breakout Scale, the first operation it has disrupted since beginning its influence-operation reporting to reach that level. A front organisation with real employees The SRC presented itself as a research platform studying subjects including Latin America’s relationship with India and the Indian diaspora. OpenAI found more than 60 articles on its website, most of them apparently original rather than plagiarised. Internal reports produced by the Russian operators discussed hiring, dismissals, salary scales, staffing and unfinished research projects, strongly suggesting that the operators controlled the organisation rather than merely collaborating with it. At the centre of the structure was “Mia Clark”, a fictitious identity reportedly used to manage social-media activity and communicate with staff. According to OpenAI, the available evidence indicates that employees working for SRC in Latin America were probably unaware that the organisation was being directed by Russian actors. They interviewed experts, conducted research and wrote papers in what appears to have been good faith. The deception therefore existed primarily at the organisational level: much of the work was real, but the identity and strategic purpose of the institution commissioning it were not. OpenAI This is one reason Dark Clark differs from the familiar model of a troll farm. A reader encountering an SRC paper might be looking at research genuinely written by a Latin American employee based on genuine interviews. The manipulation lies further upstream, in who built the institution, selected its direction and controlled its infrastructure. From forged emails to real events The operation also appears to have attempted something more ambitious than online persuasion: inducing real people to produce events that could later be turned into propaganda. In May 2026, according to the operators’ internal reports, they created an email address impersonating Lima’s regional education authorities and instructed schools to organise activities about Ukraine for a cultural-diversity event. The instructions included references to Stepan Bandera, whose historical legacy remains particularly contentious in Poland and parts of Eastern Europe. The operators claimed that some schools complied, replied to the false address and sent photographs of the events. OpenAI could not independently verify every claim contained in the operators’ reports. It did, however, find Peruvian reporting matching the story, followed by publications in Poland and an English-language outlet in Hungary. Some coverage included comments from a Polish MEP calling for people displaying what he described as anti-Polish attitudes to be declared persona non grata. OpenAI therefore concluded that the fabricated starting point appears to have entered genuine political debate across national borders. The mechanism is unusually effective because the final photographs need not themselves be fabricated. If people can be tricked into staging a real event on the basis of a forged instruction, the operation creates authentic visual evidence of something that was artificially initiated. The same method in Ecuador and Bolivia Dark Clark’s internal reports describe similar efforts elsewhere. In Ecuador, the operators claimed they used a fake education email to encourage schools to stage ceremonies involving President Daniel Noboa and Erik Prince, the former head of Blackwater. Ecuadorian media subsequently covered a matching controversy, and the country’s education minister issued a detailed denial. Other Ecuador-focused material included fabricated audio attributed to Ukraine’s consul and a false television report alleging that Noboa’s government was recruiting Ecuadorians to fight in Ukraine. Local fact-checker Lupa found that the supposed Teleamazonas report had never been broadcast, that images had been taken from Instagram, that the audio was AI-generated and that a company named in a supposed recruitment contract did not exist in Ecuador’s corporate registry. In Bolivia, an internal report described a fake audio recording supposedly made by an employee of state water company EPSAS during anti-government protests. It claimed that water supplies to La Paz would be cut and a state of emergency declared. The allegation produced a fact-check and an official denial. OpenAI says the operators explicitly described their objective as worsening the political crisis surrounding the demonstrations. Possible links to the post-Wagner influence machine Dark Clark did not emerge in a vacuum. The operators repeatedly asked ChatGPT about Politology and La Compania, names associated in previous investigations with the Russian influence apparatus that developed from structures once connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Forbidden Stories and its partners obtained 1,431 pages of internal documents describing a network known as “The Company”, which they reported had grown to almost 100 operatives and was conducting influence projects across roughly 30 Global South countries. Their investigation found that the organisation moved under the supervision of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, after Prigozhin’s death. Its documented budget for ten months of activity in 2024 was approximately €7.3 million. Two older Argentina campaigns claimed in Dark Clark’s internal reports — a false story about Javier Milei buying Cartier collars for his dogs and the staging of anti-Milei graffiti — had already been independently attributed by investigative journalists to Politology/La Compania. That is significant corroboration, but it is not enough to prove that every Dark Clark activity was run by the same organisational structure. AI was the back office, not the mastermind Perhaps the most important finding concerns artificial intelligence itself. In most documented cases, the Russians were not using ChatGPT to generate the propaganda seen by the public. Their principal use was administrative: drafting reports for an unknown superior, summarising operations, translating material and recording the supposed success of campaigns. Those reports also expose a weakness in the operators’ own measurement. OpenAI found instances in which they tried to claim credit for developments they had probably not caused, suggesting that they were not only attempting to manipulate Latin American audiences but also presenting an inflated picture of their effectiveness to whoever was supervising them. Dark Clark nevertheless broke further into the real world than any influence operation OpenAI had previously disrupted. Under the Brookings framework, Category Five means that an operation has escaped its original network and been amplified by high-profile individuals such as politicians. Dark Clark crossed that threshold because fabricated narratives appear to have provoked governmental denials, mainstream reporting and political comment in several countries. Its most important innovation was therefore not a particularly convincing deepfake. It was the construction of a partly genuine institution around a concealed foreign controller. The research could be real. The employees could be real. The interviews could be real. What was false was who they were ultimately working for. Sources OpenAI — Disrupting AI-enabled “false front” operations https://openai.com/index/disrupting-ai-enabled-false-front-operations/ Forbidden Stories — Propaganda Machine: Russia’s foreign influence strategy across three continents https://forbiddenstories.org/propaganda-machine-secret-documents-reveal-russias-foreign-influence-strategy-across-three-continents/ Forbidden Stories — Ghost Journalists, Cash and Kremlin Scripts: Argentina https://forbiddenstories.org/ghost-journalists-cash-and-kremlin-scripts-how-russian-operatives-tried-to-influence-argentinian-media/ openDemocracy — Russian influence operation in Bolivia https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia-bolivia-south-america-putin-evo-morales-wagner-prigozhin-covert-operations-propaganda-disinformation-foreign-interference/ Lupa Media — Fake Teleamazonas report about recruiting Ecuadorians for Ukraine https://lupa.com.ec/verificaciones/noboa-mercenarios-ucrania-ecuador/ Brookings Institution — The Breakout Scale https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-breakout-scale-measuring-the-impact-of-influence-operations/ Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode17 #OperationDarkClark #DarkClark #Russia #LatinAmerica #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #FalseFront #FrontOrganisation #FakeInstitution #SocialResearchCenter #SRC #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #ChatGPT #OpenAI #NarrativeManipulation #SourceLaundering #InstitutionalManipulation #ForgedDocuments #FakeAudio #PoliticalInfluence #CovertInfluence #Peru #Ecuador #Bolivia #Argentina #Ukraine #Politology #LaCompania #TheCompany #SVR #WagnerLegacy #PropagandaMachine #GlobalSouth #BreakoutScale #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

The author identified the main story of the elections as the decline of ANO and SPD in poorer regions and stated that according to the number of represented citizens, i.e., effective mandates, they suffered significant losses. He claims that the government parties are paying the price for having done almost nothing for regional development so far, nor having prepared a plan, and they are not helping the lower working class. He added that relying solely on pensions is not enough. https://t.co/59nN5hjHkK #volby #politika #regiony #CZ (translated)

Cartoons On The Moon claimed that Cartoon Network had suffered one of the largest leaks in its history, with over 200 GB of storyboards, scripts, and resources published. It added that the network had only been under the command of Paramount for four days. https://t.co/U11eb2A5O4 #CartoonNetwork #filtración #Paramount (translated)

Jamesons stated that Meta reactivated its Instagram page after removing it in July, when it had more than 30,000 followers. According to the author, the company informed via email that the account did not violate Community Standards and could be used normally again. He said the page was deactivated for more than three months, including the entire first round of elections, and that the absence caused losses in reach, engagement, events, and content opportunities. Jamesons stated that he turned to the courts and that the process would continue, as the reactivation would not compensate for the damages. The author also alleged that Meta had been arbitrarily banning left-wing accounts while reducing their reach. He thanked those who followed the project during the period and asked for support to rebuild the page's presence on Instagram, with likes, comments, shares, and other interactions. #CulturaPop #LiberdadeDeExpressão #Justiça (translated)

The author accused Donald Trump of maintaining a politically treacherous relationship with Putin’s Russia, saying he had repeatedly deferred to Putin, attacked Ukraine, weakened confidence in NATO and advanced positions that served Moscow’s strategic interests. The author also referred to the “Krasnov” story. https://t.co/rwwfFV4YYK #Trump #Putin #NATO #US #RU #UA #NATO

The author wrote that more than 84 million people in the EU were estimated to struggle with their mental health. Marking World Mental Health Day, they said they would continue listening, learning and acting to improve mental health outcomes for everyone. https://t.co/iT08L6sfSX #MentalHealth #Wellbeing #MentalHealthAwareness #EU

SCCP News reported that Emiliano Díaz, assistant coach and son of Ramón Díaz, posted a statement on Instagram after Ramón declined a return to Corinthians. According to the profile, Emiliano said that returning to the club was a dream, but out of loyalty to his father, he did not accept to take over the team without him or with Ramón in the role of assistant coach. #Corinthians #RamónDíaz #Futebol (translated)

The author called the decision risky and disturbing, asking whether Russia would become a guarantor of oil prices for the US and global market and whether the US would fund Russia’s war budget. They argued that making deals with someone they likened to a bandit would legitimise and strengthen him. https://t.co/BcvgLqFPTt #Russia #OilPrices #Geopolitics #RU #US

Sérgio Santos stated that Igão and Mítico knew that most of their audience was pro-Bolsonaro, yet they still talked about the importance of voting for Lula. He emphasized that the post was made in the feed and not in the stories, and said that it made a big difference. #Lula #Voto #Política (translated)