WRLD

Search

#Algorithm
Valérie Nataf 3d

The author criticized the ban on mobile phones in class. He recalled that the measure had previously been presented as a way to protect children from bullying and toxic algorithms, and deemed it infantilizing, describing it as a condition for the return of students to high schools. #éducation #harcèlement #lycée #FR (translated)

2681
Krzysztof Graj 3d

Russia’s war propaganda gets a soundtrack – how AI-generated songs reached global streaming platforms Russian war propaganda is no longer confined to television broadcasts, Telegram channels or political videos. A study by the Ukrainian threat-intelligence organisation Terrecon has identified 981 songs combining signs of AI generation with pro-Russian military narratives, distributed through an ecosystem that reaches YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music, Deezer and SoundCloud. The songs range from sentimental ballads to rock and heavy metal. Their recurring themes are familiar from conventional Russian wartime propaganda: the heroisation of Russian soldiers, romanticisation of the war, mobilisation, the “Russian world”, commemoration of fallen troops and attacks on Ukraine and its armed forces. Some contain derogatory or dehumanising references to Ukrainians. What is new is not necessarily the message, but the production and distribution model: generative AI allows propagandistic music to be produced rapidly, cheaply and in quantities that would previously have required musicians, studios and producers. Nearly 1,000 tracks identified Terrecon examined 3,725 tracks collected from YouTube, YouTube Music, SoundCloud and the AI music platform Suno. After manual review, researchers classified 981 as showing both indications of AI generation and pro-Russian war propaganda. In 681 tracks they identified 728 propaganda-related keywords or phrases. The largest category was the glorification of the Russian military, followed by romanticised treatment of Moscow’s so-called “special military operation”, mobilisation appeals, narratives about the “Russian world”, and the cult of fallen soldiers and the state. The reach was not merely theoretical. Listening or viewing statistics were available for 608 of the identified tracks; together they had accumulated 86.8 million plays and views, according to Terrecon. A smaller group of 13 high-performing songs accounted for more than 53 million YouTube views and more than 67 million when YouTube Music was included. Among the better-known examples is “Power of Artillery”, a Russian-language rock song praising artillery weapons that passed two million views on YouTube. Most of the tracks for which publication dates could be established appeared after 2024, broadly coinciding with the rapid expansion of consumer AI music generators such as Suno and Udio. That correlation does not prove that AI alone caused the increase, but it illustrates how drastically the economics of production have changed. A propaganda song for as little as $11 Terrecon also tested how difficult it would be to commission such material. Researchers approached 25 creators producing AI-assisted militaristic music; 15 agreed to take commissions. Prices ranged from approximately $11 to $330, while delivery times ranged from two hours to three days. According to Terrecon, some were prepared to produce highly aggressive anti-Ukrainian material, including content intended for audiences involving children from occupied Ukrainian territories. Some creators used Russian intermediary services that provided access to Western AI tools such as Suno and Udio despite restrictions. The researchers then tested several AI generators themselves. Across 40 prompts submitted to Suno, Udio, Mureka, Google Flow Music and ElevenLabs, 25 resulted in successful generations, while safeguards were circumvented in 15 cases. Terrecon reported that four of the five services tested produced Russian-language material containing wartime narratives, although technical problems prevented comparable testing on some systems. In one Udio experiment, the researchers said the model itself introduced more explicit violent language than had appeared in the original promp These tests do not demonstrate that the commercial platforms knowingly support Russian propaganda. They show something narrower: existing safeguards can be inconsistent when political messaging is packaged as music. From generation to Spotify The distribution experiment may be the most revealing part of Terrecon’s research. The team deliberately uploaded test tracks containing explicit hostile language to YouTube, SoundCloud, Spotify and Deezer. Terrecon says none was blocked during the experiment. On SoundCloud, researchers used an account identifying its location as Moscow, disclosed the use of AI and added markers including references to the Russian military and the war. The platform accepted the upload and subsequently offered paid promotional and distribution tools. This does not prove that streaming recommendation systems systematically promote pro-war music. There is currently insufficient public evidence to make that claim. It does demonstrate that material can enter the same commercial distribution infrastructure as ordinary music and, once there, potentially benefit from playlists, searches, sharing and recommendation mechanisms available to other releases. That distinction is important. Propaganda no longer has to announce itself as political communication. On a streaming platform it can look like another song. Culture as a delivery mechanism Music has always been used in wartime propaganda. What generative AI changes is scale. Instead of investing heavily in a limited number of patriotic performers or officially commissioned productions, creators can generate variations across styles, audiences and emotional registers at very low cost. Terrecon found material ranging from war rock to sentimental songs and content styled for younger audiences. Some creators also experimented with cloned celebrity voices and stylistic imitation of established musicians. The format also offers a different relationship with the audience. A political video asks a viewer to consume an argument. Music can accompany commuting, exercise or entertainment and may be encountered outside explicitly political spaces. This does not automatically make it more persuasive, and Terrecon’s research does not establish measurable effects on political attitudes. It does, however, place wartime narratives inside a cultural environment where users may not initially perceive themselves as consuming political messaging. An ecosystem, not a proven Kremlin command structure The strongest evidence supports describing this as a growing AI-assisted pro-Russian propaganda-music ecosystem, not a single operation controlled from Moscow. Terrecon did not establish that the Russian government created, financed or coordinated all 981 tracks. Reporting on the study likewise notes that the extent of direct state involvement remains unclear. There is broader evidence that the Russian state finances cultural projects and digital content supporting the war, including through state-backed funding bodies. That context matters, but it does not allow individual songs in Terrecon’s dataset to be attributed to the Kremlin without additional evidence. The significance of the case lies elsewhere. AI has reduced the cost of producing ideological content, intermediaries can help creators access generation tools, and global platforms can provide distribution. The result is a pipeline in which wartime propaganda no longer has to resemble propaganda at all. It can simply appear in a playlist. Sources Terrecon / Ukrainska Pravda — Daria Verbytska on the research https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2026/10/05/8056229/ Suspilne Culture — detailed breakdown of Terrecon findings https://suspilne.media/culture/1417933-rosijsku-voennu-propagandu-maskuut-pid-anime-karaoke-ta-rok-doslidzenna-si-pisen-vid-terrecon/ The Insider — AI-generated Russian war propaganda music https://theins.ru/news/297839 Institute of Mass Information — summary of New York Times reporting https://imi.org.ua/en/news/doslidzhennya-rf-masovo-stvoryu%D1%94-propagandistski-pisni-za-dopomogoyu-shi The Bridge Media — AI-generated songs and Russian military propaganda https://thebridgemedia.com.ua/en/ai-generated-songs-russian-military-propaganda/ Center for Strategic Communication — cost and production of AI propaganda music https://spravdi.org/propaganda-za-11-yak-rosiya-shtampuye-shi-pisni-z-miljonamy-prosluhovuvan/ Times of India — AI-generated Russian war songs https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/ai-sings-russias-war-story-inside-the-rise-of-generative-songs-about-ukraine-conflict/articleshow/134650594.cms EU Council / EUR-Lex — Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32026D1351 Human Rights Watch — Russian state funding of digital and patriotic content https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/07/30/disrupted-throttled-and-blocked/state-censorship-control-and-increasing-isolation #DISINFORMED #Episode16 #Russia #Ukraine #RussianPropaganda #WarPropaganda #MusicPropaganda #AIMusic #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticMedia #AIPropaganda #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #CulturalPropaganda #DigitalInfluence #NarrativeManipulation #PropagandaMusic #StreamingPlatforms #Spotify #AppleMusic #YouTube #YouTubeMusic #Deezer #SoundCloud #Suno #Udio #RussianWorld #RusskiyMir #MilitaryPropaganda #WarNarratives #Mobilisation #AlgorithmicDistribution #RecommendationAlgorithms #MusicStreaming #PlatformManipulation #Terrecon #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD

112
Eric Ciotti 3d

The author indicated that he had submitted a bill a few months earlier aimed at abolishing Parcoursup, believing that the platform subjected children's futures to an algorithm. He expressed support for selection, which he deemed essential, while asserting that the fate of young people should not be left to chance. https://t.co/3uc5ih5mGF #Éducation #ParcoursSup #Loi #FR (translated)

3136
D
der Standard 3d

Singapore has introduced a government dating app to increase the birth rate, which is at a historic low of just 0.87 children per woman, and is using an algorithm to match potential couples. #Singapur #Geburtenrate #DatingApp (translated)

www.derstandard.at
Singapur will mit einer staatlichen Dating-App die Geburtenrate ankurbeln
2802
Rimvydas Valatka 4d

The author claimed that Ukrainian drones had hit Russia’s largest oil refinery in Omsk, Siberia, on July 6 and August 2. They described the intervals between visits as 27 and 67 days and suggested the next one should come after 107 days, allowing time to restore the refinery. https://t.co/Xr2k0DxPt9 #UkrainianDrones #Russia #OilandGas #UA #RU

3365
François Ruffin 5d

The author asked if an emergency meeting had been held that evening at the Élysée. To resolve it, he proposed that the Prime Minister put an end to Parcoursup, believing that the future of young people should not be decided by an algorithm and that a human exchange was necessary. He also requested that no positions be cut. https://t.co/egPuOjg3dP #Éducation #Politique #Crise #FR (translated)

2711
Krzysztof Graj 6d

Brazil’s synthetic voters – when AI manufactures public opinion They look like ordinary street interviews. A reporter approaches a passer-by in a Brazilian square and asks a simple question: who will you vote for? A young voter explains why Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva deserves another term. An elderly woman says Brazil needs Flávio Bolsonaro because he represents political renewal and greater security. The locations look plausible, the microphones are visible and the answers sound much like the brief political opinions heard in television vox pops around the world. None of the people are real. Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election on 4 October, fact-checking organisation Aos Fatos identified at least 50 TikTok videos in which artificial intelligence was used to manufacture voters, reporters and apparently spontaneous political interviews. Together, the videos had accumulated around 7.4 million views by mid-August. Some promoted Lula, others Flávio Bolsonaro, while another group used synthetic characters to ridicule or stereotype supporters of one side. Aos Fatos found no apparent evidence linking the accounts producing the videos to either presidential campaign. The opinion poll that never took place The format is important. These were not conventional deepfakes in which a recognisable politician is made to say something he never said. Instead, the creators reproduced the visual language of the vox pop – the short street interview used by broadcasters and social-media creators to illustrate what ordinary people supposedly think. In pro-Lula videos, synthetic voters described themselves as beneficiaries of social programmes or credited the president with improving their lives. In videos supporting Flávio Bolsonaro, artificial interviewees associated him with political renewal, public security and fighting corruption. Other clips were openly hostile: AI-generated characters presented as poor or living in parts of Brazil’s north-east were shown in dirty clothes or run-down surroundings, declaring support for Lula because they supposedly preferred welfare payments to work. The deception is therefore subtler than fabricating a candidate’s statement. It manufactures something that political communication normally treats as evidence of public sentiment. A real vox pop may be unscientific, but the people interviewed at least exist. These videos created the appearance that identifiable social groups – young people, pensioners, welfare recipients or residents of particular regions – were spontaneously expressing political preferences when no such encounters had taken place. An electoral-law specialist interviewed by Aos Fatos described the technique as the fabrication of a “social fact that never occurred”. That captures the central innovation: AI is being used not merely to falsify political speech, but to manufacture the impression of grassroots opinion. Fifty videos, but not one proven network The available evidence does not support describing the 50 posts as a centrally controlled influence operation. Aos Fatos located them through TikTok searches and recommendations produced by the platform itself, then examined the accounts responsible for publication. Most had relatively small individual audiences, although their combined reach was substantial. The first examples identified by the investigation appeared as early as March 2026. Activity increased in June and was concentrated particularly in July and the first half of August as Brazil’s election calendar intensified. Some accounts specialised in AI-generated videos generally, including fabricated podcast-style material. Others were explicitly political or supportive of a candidate, but Aos Fatos found no apparent links between those profiles and the official Lula or Bolsonaro campaigns. That distinction is essential. The evidence demonstrates a common technique and a shared political environment, not a single command structure. Some creators may have been motivated by ideology, others by engagement or monetisation. Publicly available evidence does not establish who commissioned the individual videos or whether any coordination existed between the accounts. This decentralised model also creates a different enforcement problem from a traditional bot network. There may be no headquarters to expose and no infrastructure whose removal disables the entire operation. The format itself can be copied by anyone with access to inexpensive generative-video tools. When the algorithm mixes real and synthetic citizens Aos Fatos documented another important feature of the phenomenon: TikTok’s recommendation system placed AI-generated interviews alongside genuine street interviews. For a user scrolling quickly through the platform, the transition between an authentic citizen and an entirely fabricated one could therefore be almost invisible. In 18 per cent of the 50 videos analysed, there was no indication that the people shown had been generated using AI. After Aos Fatos provided TikTok with the videos, the company said it had removed all of them for violating its rules on edited and AI-generated media. TikTok said its policies require creators to identify synthetic content and prohibit manipulated media capable of misleading users about matters of public importance or impersonating genuine journalistic material. The issue extends beyond one platform. Factchequeado’s review of Brazil’s 2026 election campaign found that synthetic endorsements and other deepfakes had become one of the most visible forms of AI-assisted electoral misinformation, alongside fabricated candidate statements and invented scenes. Brazil already had rules for synthetic politics Brazil entered the campaign with unusually detailed electoral rules governing artificial intelligence. The Superior Electoral Court, the TSE, requires electoral propaganda using synthetic multimedia to disclose clearly that AI was used. More importantly for the fake-voter videos, its rules prohibit synthetic audio or video used to favour or harm a candidacy when it creates or alters the image or voice of a living, deceased or fictitious person. The difficulty is attribution and enforcement. When a synthetic video is published by an official campaign, responsibility can be relatively straightforward to investigate. When it comes from an apparently independent account with no demonstrated relationship to a candidate, lawyers interviewed by Aos Fatos said responsibility is more likely to fall on the individual creator, while imposing electoral sanctions on a campaign would require evidence of a connection. For the final 72 hours before the election and the 24 hours following it, the TSE has imposed additional restrictions on newly published or republished synthetic material involving candidates or public figures, reflecting the particular difficulty of correcting fabricated content immediately before voting. From deepfake politicians to synthetic electorates The Brazilian case illustrates a broader change in political manipulation. The first generation of electoral deepfakes concentrated on famous people: make a politician appear to say something damaging, or fabricate an endorsement from a celebrity. Synthetic vox pops reverse the perspective. The politician can remain completely authentic; it is the electorate around the politician that is fabricated. That changes the psychological proposition of the message. Instead of saying the candidate believes this, the video suggests people like you believe this. Age, clothing, accent, neighbourhood and social class can all be generated to construct an artificial constituency around almost any political claim. There is no evidence that the 50 Brazilian videos identified by Aos Fatos constitute a single centrally directed campaign, nor evidence that they changed voting intentions. What they demonstrate is a technique whose barrier to entry has become extremely low. AI no longer needs to forge the politician. #DISINFORMED #Episode14 #Brazil #BrazilElection2026 #Elections #ElectionDisinformation #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #GenerativeAI #SyntheticVoters #SyntheticMedia #AIAvatars #AIGeneratedVideo #VoxPop #FakeInterviews #Astroturfing #AIPropaganda #PoliticalDisinformation #InfluenceOperations #InformationWarfare #SocialMediaManipulation #TikTok #PublicOpinion #ManufacturedConsent #SyntheticPublicOpinion #DigitalInfluence #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity #TSE #AosFatos #FactChecking #OSINT #MediaManipulation #WRLD (translated)

www.aosfatos.org
Eleitores gerados por IA fazem campanha no TikTok e põem em xeque regra do TSE
566
Le Parisien 6d

The article explores how algorithms influence the perception and understanding of the student movement, enclosing everyone in a bubble of personalized information. #Algorithmes #BulleInformationnelle #VisionDuMonde (translated)

www.leparisien.fr
« Chacun est enfermé dans sa bulle » : comment les algorithmes façonnent la vision du mouvement lycéen
1586
Otherland Bookshop Berlin 1w

The Nerd Reich: Silicon Valley Fascism and the War on Democracy by Gil Duran A fearless and urgent exposé of technofascism – and a road map to resistance. When Silicon Valley ‘moves fast and breaks things’, the world interprets the chaos as a necessary cost of innovation. Gil Durán reveals something far more sinister a decades-long campaign to replace elected governments with corporate rule. Drawing on insider political experience and new investigations, Durán traces this ideology from its philosophical roots in The Sovereign Individual by James Dale Davidson and Lord William Rees-Mogg. He introduces its modern apostles – Peter Thiel, Marc Andreessen, Balaji Srinivasan and Elon Musk – and shows how the promise of technological liberation has transformed into a global movement for digital feudalism, powered by cryptocurrency, artificial intelligence and algorithmically driven propaganda on social media. The Nerd Reich explains the origins, strategies and ambitions of Silicon Valley’s war on democracy for the first time. From San Francisco’s weaponised elections and secret billionaire projects to the White House, Durán exposes how the world’s richest men are building a new political order. The Nerd Reich is more than a hidden history; it’s an urgent democracy is being dismantled, not by coups or tanks but by code, capital and the illusion of innovation. Durán insists there is still time to fight back – if we act now.

682
Jürgen Schmidhuber 1w

The author wrote that I. J. Good had speculated in 1966 about an “intelligence explosion” driven by self-improving super-intelligences, but had not developed concrete RSI algorithms. By contrast, the author said their 1987 diploma thesis applied genetic programming to itself recursively.

228
Pape Léon XIV 1w

Pope Leo XIV believed that in the era of artificial intelligence, it was urgent to distinguish human art from creations generated by machines. He affirmed that an ontological difference, even before being aesthetic, separated the two, with algorithms producing works through statistical calculation from millions of images created by others. According to him, they lacked the human spark. He added that the Church wished to renew its alliance with artists and cultural institutions in order to preserve the human aspect. #IntelligenceArtificielle #ArtHumain #Culture (translated)

14727
BFMTV 1w

A new artificial intelligence algorithm is capable of setting the optimal price for a Big Mac, even proposing astonishing prices, such as 18 dollars in some cases. #IA #BigMac #prix (translated)

www.bfmtv.com
Quand l'IA décide du prix de votre Big Mac
1485
AlertesInfos 2w

🔔 Activate notifications from @AlertesInfos so you don't miss anything about the mobilization and anger of high school students in France. Even if you are subscribed, our posts may not all appear in your feed. The algorithm of X is currently working like this, especially when we post a lot of information in a row. #Education #Mobilisation #ColèreLycéenne (translated)

17721
Michał Wawrykiewicz MEP🇵🇱🇪🇺 2w

This week in the European Parliament, a debate titled "Gaming the Algorithm, Targeting Democracy" took place, which I had the pleasure of co-organizing. We talked about how foreign entities use platforms to influence European political processes, including https://t.co/AeInLQH6YL https://t.co/AeInLQH6YL #ParlamentEuropejski #Demokracja #Technologia #PL #EU (translated)

2
20minutes 2w

La fachosphère utilise un vocabulaire codé sur les réseaux sociaux pour diffuser ses idées racistes et antisémites, contournant ainsi la censure algorithmique dans un contexte électoral où l'extrême droite est en pleine ascension. #Fachosphère #DiscoursDeHaine #Algorithmes

www.20minutes.fr
« Arbres », « Noix », « Qui ? »… Comment la fachosphère contourne la censure en ligne avec à un vocabulaire codé
1723
D
der Standard 2w

Forschende arbeiten daran, KI-Systeme fairer zu gestalten, indem sie Algorithmen entwickeln, die unterschiedliche Interessen berücksichtigen und systematische Benachteiligungen verringern. #KünstlicheIntelligenz #Fairness #Demokratisierung

www.derstandard.at
Gemeinsame Kontrolle soll KI-Systeme demokratischer machen
1494
BBC 2w

Australia, which has strict social media restrictions and has proposed controls on algorithms and smart glasses, announced the breach at the UN. #ArtificialIntelligence #DataBreaches #TechRegulation

www.bbc.co.uk
Why Australia chose the world's biggest political stage to reveal OpenAI hack
2074
BBC 2w

Australia, which has strict social media restrictions and has proposed controls on algorithms and smart glasses, announced the breach at the UN. #Australia #AI #DataBreach

www.bbc.co.uk
Why Australia chose the world's biggest political stage to reveal OpenAI hack
1730
BBC 2w

Australia, which has strict social media restrictions and has proposed controls on algorithms and smart glasses, announced the breach at the UN. #AIRegulation #DataBreach #AustraliaPolitics

www.bbc.co.uk
Why Australia chose the world's biggest political stage to reveal OpenAI hack
1730
Dangiuz 3w

I'm well aware my art requires an above average amount of time and effort to be fully digested. We are falling apart and the algo deprioritizes socially conscious content because it's more convenient to keep people dull. Might not be for you if you just want to scroll and relax. https://t.co/rxdZ5T9iKj #Art #SocialAwareness #Algorithm #Thetweetdoesnotspecificallymentionanycountries.Therefore #theresponseis:

5076