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Sandu Negrea asked which politician had managed to bring people out into the street for days on end, in the country and in the diaspora, while being in prison, and answered that he did not know any. He claimed that the Western world had learned that Romania was abusing democracy through Romanians. Negrea questioned the judgment capacity of political leaders and state authorities and stated that the cancellation of the elections had been unnecessary. He predicted that a "steamroller" was about to fall upon them and criticized them for having turned Călin Georgescu into a symbol and almost a martyr, even though he was still alive. The post ended with the name Crina Dobre. #România #democrație #proteste (translated)

🚨 🧩 Screens and cognitive, mental or psychological disabilities: little data, but seven intervention levers, each illustrated by an existing project, and the testimony of a DIME. 📒 Preventing problematic screen use among people with cognitive, mental or psychological disabilities ✍️ Caroline Tête (Health Promotion Federation), Agathe Sandon (Health Promotion Burgundy-Franche-Comté), Mathilde Leroux and Claire Sanzani (FRAPS Health Promotion Centre-Val de Loire), Nathalie Leray and Yannick Lemoine-Maulny (Health Promotion Pays de la Loire). Collection under the direction of Christine Ferron, file coordinated by Séverine Lafitte - Health Promotion Federation Audio Capsules of Health Practices 🎙️🎥 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R3YqwbQdBfk 🧩 Screens and cognitive, mental or psychological disabilities: little data, but seven intervention levers, each illustrated by an existing project, and the testimony of a DIME. 🤝🏫 Families, critical thinking, psychosocial skills, environments: guidelines for decision-makers, with the testimony of an establishment. Analysis of Health Practices and link to the source ℹ️➕ Preventing problematic screen use among people with cognitive, mental or psychological disabilities 📌 The file presents itself as a decision aid: it provides accessible data to support the implementation of health promotion projects (back cover). It brings together key points for decision-makers on one page (p. 2), definitions of the three targeted forms of disabilities (p. 3), a benefits-risk table (p. 10), seven intervention levers (p. 11-13) illustrated by seven examples of projects with their links (p. 14) and the account of a implementation in an establishment (p. 15). The complete bibliography is available online (p. 16). 🇬🇧: Preventing problematic screen use among people with cognitive, mental or psychological disabilities - Preventing problematic screen use among people with cognitive, mental or psychological disabilities #️⃣ #healthpractices #Disability #ScreensAndHealth #ProblematicScreenUse #PsychosocialSkills #MediaEducation #ESMS #HealthPromotion #pratiquesensante #Handicap #ÉcransEtSanté #UsageProblématiqueDesÉcrans #CompétencesPsychosociales #ÉducationAuxMédias #ESMS #PromotionDeLaSanté (translated)

ElBuni stated that each new video of the Sancor incident was better than the previous one. He claimed that Chiqui Tapia had committed a "terrorist attack" live and had unleashed a cognitive risk, in a scene that, he wrote, not even Lovecraft would have imagined. https://t.co/SGuL6GYsOD #Sancor #ChiquiTapia #CulturaPop (translated)

Tina considered it worrying that almost half of Brazil voted for the son of a former president convicted of attempting to carry out a coup and break the democratic order to maintain power. She added that, in her opinion, the problem was no longer just political, but also cognitive. #Brasil #Democracia #Política (translated)

The 'weakening' refers to the gradual erosion of our cognitive and emotional capacities as we delegate more responsibilities to machines, which could pose a significant risk to humanity according to some experts. #InteligenciaArtificial #Debilitamiento #PensamientoCrítico (translated)

An international team has developed an algorithm called the speech clock that analyzes voice characteristics to calculate a person's biological age and detect possible signs of cognitive aging, although it is not yet a diagnostic method for dementia. #InteligenciaArtificial #Envejecimiento #Ciencia (translated)

Wow, the strategy of the RN is being completely exposed by the most predictable outcome of the case... The release of a second wave that demonstrates the materiality of the facts. ''Youth error'' will not be enough to repair the cognitive dissonance, we will have to resolve the lie 🤌 #politique #RN #vérité (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

Donald Trump has announced the inauguration of the era of Super Intelligence with an executive order that replaces the term artificial intelligence, without addressing the associated risks, as indicated by a MIT study on cognitive debt. #SuperIntelligenza #IntelligenzaArtificiale #DonaldTrump (translated)

Researchers proved AI has deleted every reason universities exist. Harvard University ran a controlled experiment pitting a custom AI against their own top-tier classrooms. And the results are going to collapse the higher education bubble. They took 194 undergraduates and split them up. One group learned physics in one of Harvard’s best hands-on, active-learning physical classrooms. Group work. Instructor support. The premium university experience. The other group went home and learned the exact same material with an AI tutor. The AI didn't just win. It embarrassed the institution. Students using the AI learned more than twice as much as the students in the elite Harvard classroom. They scored 30% higher on the final assessment. And they did it in less time. Let that sink in. A piece of software sitting on a laptop outperformed a world-class faculty in one of the most elite learning environments on Earth. Universities have always justified their exorbitant tuition with two things: access to elite knowledge and the physical classroom experience. This study just proved both of those moats are gone. When software can teach you complex physics twice as well as a $60,000-a-year institution, the math of higher education breaks permanently. The AI didn't just give the students answers. It used strict pedagogical guardrails. It guided. It questioned. It forced the students to do the cognitive work. It offered perfect, one-to-one tutoring, personalized to the exact moment a student misunderstood a concept. That level of attention is mathematically impossible to scale in a physical lecture hall. For a thousand years, the university was the only place to get a premium education. Now, it’s the bottleneck. If AI can double your learning speed for a fraction of the cost, what exactly are students taking on decades of debt to pay for? https://x.com/thesupermannx/status/2104519995292344521

If we let basic cognitive skills erode, we don’t just lose math or reading. We lose resistance. We lose sovereignty. And we become an open field for behavioural manipulation by anyone with access to the models. #CognitiveSkills #Manipulation #Sovereignty #Thetweetdoesnotmentionanyspecificcountries.Therefore #therearenocountrycodestoreturn.