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The legal profile Jake Gyllenhaal released a website about Flávio Bolsonaro before the second round, scheduled, according to the publication, for 10/25. It said that the page gathered short cards with facts and links to the sources, in addition to options to download posters in PDF with a code about each topic and share the cards on social networks. The author stated that the website was independent and had no paid advertisements. He also invited readers to send corrections, suggestions, or new facts accompanied by sources to [email protected]. The publication reported that the project was created by Saltynicsz and presented it as an initiative in defense of the Brazilian people, workers, and democracy. #Eleições2023 #FlávioBolsonaro #Democracia (translated)

Gustavo Petro said that El Espectador had mentioned his complaint about alleged electoral fraud and manipulation of millions of voters —which, according to him, the penal code refers to as "coercion of the voter"— but had not informed about its content. Therefore, he presented his allegations and asked readers to analyze them. Petro asked the registrar, in response to a legal action he had filed, why 97% of the PDF E14 forms published online by the private counting firm Thomas Gregg and Sons did not have a Hash code, despite Petro stating that he had requested it as head of State and that it had also been requested by electoral observers. He claimed that this code prevented the documents from being modified and that it had been used in his presidential election, but had been removed in subsequent elections. He also asked whether the upcoming local elections would take place without that protection. Furthermore, he argued that a forensic statistical analysis of all the polling stations had found mathematical patterns, rather than randomness, in tens of thousands of consecutive tables. He stated that the Testigos Digitales investigation —a group that, according to him, was made up of 75,000 people with knowledge of statistics and programming— had detected patterns in 1,350 voting stations, and that experts had corroborated them. He added that the analysis had utilized the Wald-Wolfowitz model, or runs test. Petro accused the registrar of lying by claiming that the PDF E14 forms had a Hash code. According to Petro, only an alphanumeric code identifying the forms had been added, but it did not prevent them from being modified, which he claimed was against the law. He also asked why the registrar had not responded to the public statement made by Donald Trump, who, according to Petro, had said that candidate Abelardo de la Espriella had won the elections thanks to him. Petro inquired whether that statement from a head of State constituted evidence against the registrar and his management. He requested that the registrar respond publicly or in the legal proceedings. #Colombia #FraudeElectoral #Democracia (translated)

The fan account Sabrina Carpenter Brasil reported that it has made three exclusive PDF designs available, created by SCBR, for printing stickers in support of Lula in the second round of the elections. It recommended a size of 9x9 cm and the use of the cut and bleed lines in the files to facilitate cutting. It also stated that it would distribute physical stickers on its networks whenever possible and advocated voting for number 13, stating that Carpenter's fans did not vote for fascists. #Eleições2023 #Lula #Adesivos (translated)

Gustavo Petro stated that the complaint about alleged electoral fraud was in the hands of the judiciary and argued that the lack of transparency from the Registraduría had violated his right to vote in the presidential elections. In a post addressed to the registrar, he asked him to explain why, according to Petro, 97% of the PDF E14 forms uploaded to the internet by the private firm Thomas Gregg and Sons did not have a Hash code. He claimed that this code prevented document modifications and that it had been used in the results of his presidential election, but not in subsequent elections. He also asked whether the upcoming local elections would be held without that tool. Petro pointed out that a statistical analysis of all voting stations, conducted with the Wald-Wolfowitz model or runs test analysis, had detected mathematical patterns in tens of thousands of consecutive voting tables, in 1,350 polling places. He attributed the finding to the group Testigos Digitales, which he wrote was made up of 75,000 citizens with knowledge of statistics and programming, and said that it had been endorsed by experts and specialists. Additionally, he accused the registrar of falsely claiming that the E14 forms had Hash codes and maintained that they had only been assigned an alphanumeric code that did not prevent modifications. Petro also asked why the registrar had not responded to Donald Trump's public claim that the candidate Abelardo de la Espriella had won the elections thanks to him. He requested a public response or one during the protection process. https://t.co/6BbFATeXGB #EleccionesTransparentes #FraudeElectoral #DerechoALaVerdad (translated)

Chris Klomp wrote that he had sent Robert Moszkowicz an email with a deadline of October 5 at 1:00 PM. According to Klomp, the reason was that Moszkowicz had made his summons public by informing Fleurspolitiek, which called Klomp a conspiracy thinker and suspect. Klomp stated that he outlined in a document of more than 4,000 words, with evidence and arguments, why he believed his characterizations of Moszkowicz were defensible and fell under his right to free speech. He added that he would publish the piece on his website shortly after 1:00 PM on October 5, regardless of whether Moszkowicz responded. Klomp said he would not be intimidated or silenced and invoked the public interest and the defense of his human rights. https://t.co/oxIqMJUCsv #VrijeMeningsuiting #Persvrijheid #Reputatie (translated)

Secretary Marco Rubio@SecRubioFor more than six decades, the Cuban regime has been the leading sponsor of radical leftism and Third Worldism in the United States.The State Department is exposing the full history of Cuban espionage and subversion in our country. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Cuba-Report.pdf

Gustavo Petro defended the right to protest and stated that it should not be limited when the mobilizations were directed against the wealthy. He affirmed that this right belonged to the masses and the people as a constituent power, and said that the protests gathered millions of people, not hundreds. Regarding truck drivers, he pointed out that the protest referred to the labor rights of drivers—including eight-hour workdays, benefits, insurance, and pensions—and not just to the transit of goods. He also said that small truckers should be protected and accused large companies of money laundering of preventing the arrival of the electric train. Petro maintained that the mobilized people could command the public force in exercise of their constituent power and that no established institution was above this. Furthermore, he claimed that there was fraud in the past presidential, legislative, and local elections, attributing a 95% statistical probability to experts. He said that justice must compare the E14 forms with the votes deposited in the bags by table and verify the identities of jurors and voters. Finally, he urged the people to reclaim what he described as their sword and to save Colombia's democratic institutions. #Protesta #DerechosHumanos #PuebloUnido (translated)

Diafaneia reported that the previous day it had published a post about transparency, without expecting a response. According to it, in less than 24 hours the initiative gained over 480 new users and collected nearly 2,000 questions about where public money is going. It stated that behind the initiative there was not an institute, but a person who believed that transparency should be understandable to everyone and not just to those who had time to search for information in PDFs. Finally, it thanked the supporters of the initiative. #Διαφάνεια #ΔημόσιεςΥπηρεσίες #Διαύγεια (translated)

THE MOHAMED SANHADJI CASE HAS CAUSED A REAL SHOCK within Didier Deschamps' former staff. Several members of the France team management say they are "shocked" and even feel "betrayed" after the revelations from L’Équipe. "We fell from the cupboard." The PDF of the investigation has circulated widely on WhatsApp among former players and staff members. Many believed until now that "Momo's" problems were mainly related to his relationship with Kylian Mbappé. Indicted for corruption, influence peddling, and fraud, the former security officer is now forbidden from contacting the football community. #Football #Bleus #Corruption (translated)

Iran’s cognitive warfare – when AI becomes the operating layer of state propaganda Iranian state-linked influence operators were not using artificial intelligence simply to write faster social-media posts. According to Anthropic’s September 2026 threat intelligence report, three separate operations connected to Iranian propaganda institutions were using Claude to help construct the machinery behind what the operators themselves called “soft war” and “cognitive warfare” – non-military efforts intended to shape public opinion inside Iran and abroad. Anthropic linked the activity to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization (ICCO), which operates under Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi; and the Bina Cultural Observatory, part of the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The company said each operation was run by someone working within or on behalf of the named institution. The attribution was based on a combination of account telemetry, institutional references disclosed during conversations, branded documents and open-source corroboration. Anthropic subsequently removed the accounts. AI as an operational headquarters The most significant feature of the operation was the role assigned to AI. Claude was used to develop campaign plans, doctrine manuals, coded project portfolios, persona systems, target databases, early-warning protocols, amplification schedules and ministerial planning documents. Anthropic described the model as the principal administrative and operational layer supporting the three campaigns, allowing relatively small groups of operators to create organisational structures and planning material that would otherwise have required a much larger staff. This distinction matters. The reported use of AI went considerably beyond content generation. Operators were using the model to help organise how influence activity should function: which audiences to target, which identities should deliver particular narratives, how official material should be repackaged and when amplification should take place. Human operators still determined objectives and supplied the underlying political doctrine; AI helped translate those decisions into an operational system. Anthropic found that all three operations explicitly connected their activity to Jihad al-Tabyin, often translated as “explanatory jihad”, a concept used within the Iranian state system to frame information activity as both a strategic and ideological responsibility. In internal planning material examined by the company, this doctrine was not merely rhetorical: it informed manuals and campaign structures used by the operators. ‘Not the narrator, but the director’ One sentence contained in the ICCO material captures the model particularly clearly. According to Anthropic, an operator described the role of Iranian cultural attachés as being “not to be the narrator, but the director” of the narrative. The distinction reveals the logic of attribution laundering. Instead of publishing an overt state message and asking foreign audiences to believe it, the operator attempts to create the appearance that the same narrative emerged independently from journalists, activists, foreign writers or ordinary citizens. Anthropic found that Claude was used specifically to make content appear to come from foreign authors or independent media organisations and to design hashtag campaigns that looked grassroots rather than centrally organised. The ICCO operation reportedly used the organisation’s international cultural network as part of this structure. Anthropic found ministerial-level documents carrying official ICCO branding, including a nine-part international influence portfolio. This makes the operation particularly significant because the infrastructure was not limited to anonymous social-media accounts; it intersected with formal state institutions and an existing network of cultural representation abroad. A multilingual content factory A second operation was associated with the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi and what Anthropic described as a “cognitive warfare command room” operating from a seminary in Mashhad. Its organisers ran a multi-province content production system known internally as Manjanegh, or “Catapult”. According to Anthropic, dozens of activists were involved in repackaging publicly available reporting from Iranian security institutions under different personas so that the material no longer appeared directly connected to those institutions. The network used Claude to transform official government intelligence bulletins into customised material in Farsi, Arabic, Urdu, Malay, Spanish and English, while planning expansion into a total of 20 languages. Distribution extended across Iranian platforms such as Eitaa, Bale and Rubika and international services including X, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok and YouTube. Anthropic also documented paid amplification across more than 100 Iranian channels, including channels associated with IRGC narratives. The scale should nevertheless be interpreted carefully. Anthropic documented production infrastructure and some real-world dissemination, but it did not demonstrate that all planned campaigns were fully deployed or that they meaningfully changed public opinion. The company placed the operation in Category Three of its Breakout Scale, indicating multi-platform activity with content observed in external distribution channels, rather than evidence of strategic impact on entire populations. From security bulletins to apparently independent voices The Bina Cultural Observatory operation provides another example of the same architecture. Anthropic linked a director-level official at Bina to activity in which Claude generated messaging in the voice of an IRGC spokesperson. During the 2026 US–Israel–Iran war, the network also attributed false claims to Western institutions including CSIS, Brookings and RAND. The apparent objective was to make Iranian state-aligned claims look as though they had been independently validated by respected foreign research organisations. That technique is more sophisticated than simply publishing propaganda under a false name. It attempts to manufacture a chain of external validation: official information is transformed into apparently independent commentary, which can then be recirculated as evidence that outside observers have reached the same conclusion. Anthropic also found target databases naming international officials and Iranian opposition figures, as well as aggressive counter-narrative material directed against the Bahá’í community. These findings show that the infrastructure was designed not only for broad messaging but also for targeted influence activity against specific groups and individuals. What AI changed The Iranian operations described by Anthropic did not create a new doctrine of influence. Iran has used cultural institutions, official media, aligned organisations and covert or semi-covert online networks for years. What AI changed was the economics and organisational capacity of that model. A relatively small team could use the system to draft doctrine, create personas, translate material, structure target databases, produce campaign calendars and generate multiple versions of the same message for different audiences. The operator remained responsible for intent, political direction and selection of targets. AI reduced the amount of human labour required to turn those decisions into a functioning influence operation. The most revealing part of the case is therefore not that an Iranian propaganda network used a chatbot. It is that AI was being treated as part of the back office of information warfare – a system for converting state doctrine into apparently decentralised, multilingual and plausibly independent voices. Sources Anthropic — Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 Iran International — Iran state-aligned accounts used Claude to push IRGC narratives https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609105561 BNE IntelliNews — Yemen missile cell used AI to write guidance software, Anthropic says https://new.intellinews.com/articles/yemen-missile-cell-used-ai-to-write-guidance-software-anthropic-says-467296 This is Beirut — Anthropic report details Iranian propaganda operations https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/news/politics/anthropic-report-details-iranian-propaganda-operations-and-yemen-missile-development-using-claude Anthropic report — PDF mirror https://static.foxbusiness.com/foxbusiness.com/content/uploads/2026/09/anthropic-detecting-and-countering-091026-1.pdf Keywords #DISINFORMED #Episode11 #Iran #IranianInfluence #IranianPropaganda #CognitiveWarfare #SoftWar #JihadAlTabyin #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #GenerativeAI #ClaudeAI #Anthropic #SyntheticMedia #NarrativeManipulation #NarrativeLaundering #AttributionLaundering #PersonaNetworks #Astroturfing #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #StatePropaganda #IslamicCultureAndCommunicationsOrganization #ICCO #IslamicPropagandaOrganization #KhorasanRazavi #IRGC #MultilingualInfluence #Targeting #Amplification #OSINT #WRLD

We created an AI that can "read" the entire Diavgeia. Not just the amounts and the metadata. But also the PDFs of the decisions and contracts. Here's how we did it 🧵👇 #AI #Διαφάνεια #Τεχνολογία (translated)

Esta es la dirección del Pacto Histórico provisional Se convoca la elección popular de delegados para la configuración democrática del Movimiento Pacto Histórico La votación será abierta, cualquier persona puede participar y votar en cualquier lugar del país, en las mesas electorales, cualquier persona se puede afiliar al movimiento, siempre que esté de acuerdo en el programa progresista del movimiento y la lucha por la democracia y la justicia social en Colombia u la Justicia Social. Se crearán equipos especiales para la investigación del fraude electoral y se exigirá que el candado Hash que impide la modificacion de un documento PDF, como ordena la ley, sea reincorporado a los formularios E14 como ordena la ley y el tratado internacional firmado por Colombia para impedir el fraude en elecciones locales. Se creará el equipo de defensa jurídica porque los perseguidos por el gobierno en su consigna de "destripar el progresismo" por ser un crimen de lesa humanidad incluído los extranjeros que ayudan en este camino e implica sanción penal nacional e internacional. Se creará un espacio comunicacional, que sea capaz de enfrentar el efecto de las granjas de bots que apoyan a Abelardo creando una matrix de falsedad y manipulación sobre la conciencia ciudadana. #PactoHistórico #JusticiaSocial #DemocraciaColombiana

Russia’s influence operation arrives ahead of the US midterms With weeks remaining before America's November midterm elections, a familiar type of content has begun appearing online. Videos resembling reports from CNN, the BBC and The New York Times accuse candidates of corruption, antisemitism and misconduct. Hollywood actors appear to denounce Democrats. Other clips claim that warnings about Russian interference are themselves a Democratic disinformation campaign. The reports are fabricated. Graphika, which tracks online influence operations, says it has identified a coordinated campaign targeting candidates in competitive US Senate races. It assesses with high confidence that the material was produced by Operation Overload, also known as Matryoshka – a long-running Russia-aligned influence operation previously active against elections and political debates in Europe and the United States. The activity coincides with a broader warning from American intelligence officials. Classified assessments reported by The New York Times conclude that the Kremlin has authorised another digital influence campaign ahead of the 2026 midterms, aimed primarily at exploiting existing divisions and undermining confidence in American democracy. There is an important distinction. US officials have not reported evidence that Russia is attempting to manipulate voting machines or alter the counting of votes. The operation is about influencing the information environment surrounding the election. Fake scandals for competitive Senate races Graphika traced a concentrated wave of activity between 10 and 14 September. Likely inauthentic or repurposed accounts distributed videos accusing Democratic politicians of corruption, antisemitism and other misconduct. The targets included Senator Jon Ossoff in Georgia, Representative Chris Pappas in New Hampshire and Texas state representative James Talarico, as well as Senate candidates Sherrod Brown in Ohio, Roy Cooper in North Carolina, Mary Peltola in Alaska, Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, Joshua Turek in Iowa and Troy Jackson in Maine. The selection was not random. These were politicians involved in Senate contests where the result could matter to control of the chamber. The campaign did not rely on a single political narrative. Instead, it attached different accusations to different candidates – corruption, social issues, antisemitism or personal misconduct – while maintaining a consistent production and distribution model. That model is characteristic of Matryoshka: create apparently independent pieces of evidence, disguise them as journalism and distribute them through networks of disposable accounts. Hollywood celebrities who never said what the videos claimed One of the campaign's more distinctive techniques involved genuine footage of American actors. Videos featuring celebrities including Sarah Jessica Parker and Julia Roberts were altered with captions and other material to suggest they were promoting the slogan #AllDemocratsAreCriminals. The technique continued in subsequent material. Fact-checkers identified fabricated New York Times-branded videos using footage of Alyssa Milano, Sean Astin, Rachael Harris, Leonardo DiCaprio, Eric Braeden, Annie Potts and Patrick Fabian. Some of the original footage came from Cameo, where actors record personalised video messages. Their authentic images were retained while fabricated audio, captions or surrounding material changed the meaning entirely. Lead Stories compared several of the clips with the originals and found that the supposed political statements did not appear in the genuine recordings. Eric Braeden's representative separately confirmed that the claim he had joined the anti-Democratic campaign was false. The advantage of the technique is straightforward. Generative AI does not need to create a convincing celebrity from nothing. The operator can begin with authentic footage of a recognisable person and manipulate only the elements necessary to manufacture a political statement. Stealing the authority of real newsrooms Celebrity impersonation was only one layer. The operation repeatedly borrowed the visual identity of established media organisations. Graphika identified material impersonating or falsely citing the BBC, CNN and Politico, alongside references to France's VIGINUM foreign-interference agency and journalist Brandy Zadrozny. Other material reproduced New York Times-style branding. Some fabricated reports made an unusual claim: that Democrats themselves were organising disinformation or “false-flag operations” and then blaming Russia. This creates a defensive layer around the influence operation. Instead of merely distributing false political allegations, the campaign also attempts to discredit future reporting about the manipulation itself. If successful, evidence exposing foreign interference can be reframed as part of the conspiracy. Graphika says it assesses with high confidence that Operation Overload produced these videos. The technique is well established. Earlier investigations by CheckFirst and Reset Tech documented hundreds of falsified pieces of content produced by Operation Overload, often impersonating journalists, institutions and major media brands. AI-generated or manipulated material has increasingly become part of that production system. What US intelligence says Russia is trying to achieve The broader strategic picture comes from American intelligence assessments reported on 18 September. According to US officials familiar with classified findings, the Kremlin has authorised a covert digital influence campaign aimed at Americans during the 2026 election season. Its apparent objective is to seed or amplify domestic divisions and weaken confidence in the political process. Some officials described the principal aim as creating disorder rather than helping a single political party. The publicly identified Matryoshka material examined so far, however, has targeted Democratic candidates. Those two findings should not be treated as contradictory. An operation can exploit partisan divisions while serving the broader objective of making the electoral system appear corrupt, chaotic or illegitimate. US officials also reportedly assess the current Russian campaign as less extensive or coordinated than some previous election operations. Moscow is considered less focused on congressional elections than presidential contests and remains heavily occupied by its war against Ukraine. Russia has denied previous US accusations of election interference. An operation with limited reach – so far There is another reason for caution: producing large quantities of disinformation is not the same as successfully influencing voters. Matryoshka has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to manufacture content at industrial speed, but much of its material receives little genuine engagement. Researchers monitoring the network have previously warned against confusing automated distribution and platform view counts with authentic audience penetration. There are exceptions. A fabricated New York Times-style video featuring Jamie Lee Curtis had accumulated nearly 200,000 views on X by the end of 17 September, according to reporting by The New York Times. Other pieces attracted considerably less attention. There is currently no public evidence demonstrating that the campaign has changed voting intentions or will affect election results. What the September activity demonstrates is something narrower but important: a Russia-aligned influence infrastructure previously used against European elections has now turned significant attention towards the American midterms. The basic method has changed little – impersonate trusted media, manufacture scandals and use networks of inauthentic accounts to distribute them. What has changed is the production technology. Authentic celebrity footage, synthetic voices, manipulated video and rapidly generated fake journalism allow the same operation to produce more tailored material for more candidates at lower cost. The objective does not require Americans to believe every fabrication. Creating uncertainty over which videos, news reports and public statements are authentic can itself degrade trust in the information environment surrounding an election. Sources - Graphika — Russia-Aligned Influence Operation Targets US Midterm Candidates, German State Elections https://www.graphika.com/insights/russia-aligned-influence-operation-targets-us-midterm-candidates-german-state-elections - The New York Times — Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections, U.S. Intelligence Finds https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/18/us/politics/russia-election-disinformation-us-intelligence.html - Kathimerini / The New York Times — Russia Aims to Inject Chaos Into Elections https://www.ekathimerini.com/nytimes/1315792/russia-aims-to-inject-chaos-into-elections-us-intelligence-finds/ - CheckFirst — Operation Overload: An AI-fuelled escalation of the Kremlin-linked propaganda effort https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-an-ai-fuelled-escalation-of-the-kremlin-linked-propaganda-effort/ - CheckFirst — Operation Overload targeting the US election https://checkfirst.network/operation-overload-a-growing-disinformation-threat-now-targeting-the-u-s-presidential-election/ - Lead Stories — Fake NYT videos: Alyssa Milano, Rachael Harris and Sean Astin https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-new-york-times-videos-of-alyssa-milano-rachael-harris-sean-astin-falsely-claim-they-support-all-democrats-are-criminals.html - Lead Stories — Fake NYT videos: Leonardo DiCaprio, Eric Braeden and other celebrities https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/09/fact-check-fake-new-york-times-videos-of-leonardo-dicaprio-eric-braeden-other-celebs-falsely-claim-they-support-all-democrats-are-criminals.html - Brennan Center for Justice — AI Is Changing Foreign Election Influence https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/ai-changing-foreign-election-influence - ODNI — previous US intelligence assessment of foreign election information operations https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICM-Declassified-Foreign-Threats-to-US-Elections-After-Voting-Ends-in-2024.pdf - FBI / ODNI / CISA — previous joint assessment of Russian election influence operations https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-110424 #DISINFORMED #Episode9 #Russia #UnitedStates #USMidterms #Midterms2026 #USElections #ElectionInterference #ForeignInterference #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #OperationOverload #Matryoshka #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #FIMI #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #AIPropaganda #Deepfakes #SyntheticMedia #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #FakeNews #PoliticalDisinformation #CelebrityDeepfakes #SocialMediaManipulation #DigitalInfluence #ElectionSecurity #CognitiveWarfare #Graphika #OSINT #Democracy #WRLD

🚨 8 techniques des industries pour freiner la prévention (et comment les repérer) 📒 Une santé sous influence : la stratégie des industries derrière les atteintes évitables à la santé en Écosse ✍️ Health Under Influence: The Industry Playbook Behind Scotland’s Preventable Health Harms - NCD Alliance Scotland (coalition de 26 organisations de santé créée en 2020 ; rapport diffusé sur le site de la British Heart Foundation Scotland, membre de la coalition). Avant-propos de David McColgan, président. Études de cas rédigées par Punyja Singh (alcool) et Maura Francisco (HFSS), étudiantes de master à l'Université de Stirling. Capsules Audio de Pratiques en Santé 🎙️🎥 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aaXxT8QNp50 🔍💡 Déterminants commerciaux de la santé : un rapport écossais décrit 8 tactiques des industries de l'alcool, du tabac et de la malbouffe pour ralentir la prévention. 🧭 Une grille utile pour choisir ses partenaires et repérer les programmes « éducatifs » qui ne sont pas neutres. Analyse de Pratiques en Santé et lien vers la source ℹ️➕ https://www.bhf.org.uk/-/media/Files/what-we-do/in-your-area-scotland-pages/ncd/health-under-influence-ncd-alliance-scotland-report-2026.pdf 📌 Un programme « éducatif » gratuit proposé à un collège, un sponsor pour le club de foot, un partenaire « responsable » pour une action locale : ce rapport aide à reconnaître quand une offre sert d'abord les intérêts d'une industrie de l'alcool, du tabac ou de la malbouffe. Il décrit 8 tactiques concrètes, avec des exemples vérifiables. Même s'il parle de l'Écosse, les mécanismes sont les mêmes en France. On peut s'en servir pour choisir ses partenaires, former une équipe ou argumenter face à un élu. 🇬🇧: Health Under Influence: The Industry Strategy Behind Preventable Health Harms in Scotland - https://www.pratiquesensante.com/en/blog/practices-15/une-sante-sous-influence-la-strategie-des-industries-derriere-les-atteintes-evitables-a-la-sante-en-ecosse-6215 #️⃣ #pratiquesensante #DéterminantsCommerciauxDeLaSanté #Prévention #ConflitsDIntérêts #PolitiquesDeSanté #PréventionAlcool #MarketingAlimentaire #PlaidoyerSanté

REPASEMOS LOS FAN PROJECTS JUNTO AL GRANINO 🎀🤠 Decora con moñito colombiano y/o sombrero vueltiao tu Army Bomb 🕶️Gafas negras durante FYA (Opcional) 📰Banners para Body To Body, por cada día de concierto. La versión PDF para impresión se publicará pocos días antes debido a las situaciones desafortunadas que se han presentado en otros países - edición de los banners con IA- 📲 Iluminemos el estadio durante "Come Over" con el flash del telefono con la bandera de Colombia - Zonas Altas Amarillo, Zonas Bajas Azul, VIP (gramilla) Rojo 🐤Cantemos el cumpleaños a Jimin durante su discurso final ambos días Guarda esta imagen en caso que tengas dudas o sepas de personas que no tienen claro aun los FPs 💜 #ArmyBomb #FanProjects #BTS

Storm-1516 – Russia’s information war arrives early in France’s 2027 election France will not elect its next president until April 2027, but the information operations surrounding the campaign have already begun. In late July and August 2026, fabricated stories targeted several prominent figures associated with the presidential race, including Raphaël Glucksmann, Gabriel Attal and former prime minister Édouard Philippe. The methods included fake news websites copying established French media, impersonated journalists, AI-generated voices and manipulated video. French authorities identified the Russian operation known as Storm-1516 behind several of these campaigns. Other attacks were linked to Matryoshka, another Russia-aligned influence network. The timing is significant. Storm-1516 began targeting the French presidential environment roughly nine months before the first round, scheduled for 18 April 2027. Rather than a single disinformation campaign, the activity demonstrates how Russian influence networks can establish narratives and infrastructure long before an election reaches its decisive phase. A fake scandal targeting Raphaël Glucksmann One of the clearest examples appeared at the end of July. A website impersonating the French independent outlet Blast published a fabricated investigation claiming that journalist Léa Salamé had attempted to bribe media organisations in exchange for favourable coverage of her partner, Raphaël Glucksmann. The operation went beyond copying the appearance of a legitimate news site. The identities of real journalists were appropriated and a manipulated video used an AI-generated imitation of the voice of Edwy Plenel, founder of Mediapart, supposedly confirming the allegations. The accusation was false. On 4 August, Glucksmann said France's General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the SGDSN, had informed him that he had been targeted by Storm-1516. Two days later, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference. The importance of the operation was not the quality of one particular deepfake but the construction of several mutually reinforcing elements: a fake media organisation, impersonated journalists, synthetic audio and social-media accounts distributing the material. Together they created the impression that the allegation had been independently corroborated. Different candidates, overlapping Russian networks Édouard Philippe was also targeted by fabricated stories claiming that he suffered from dementia and was medically incapable of running for president. VIGINUM attributed the operation to Storm-1516. Gabriel Attal faced another wave of false content, including fabricated stories mimicking the identities of French outlets such as RFI, BFM TV, France 24, AFP, Le Parisien, Libération and Le Monde. Some claimed that Attal had symptoms of Parkinson's disease or links to drug trafficking. Attribution here is more complicated. French reporting connected at least part of the campaign against Attal to Matryoshka, rather than Storm-1516. A later digitally manipulated video, apparently associated with Storm-1516, used genuine LCI footage from an August debate but added a white earpiece to Attal, suggesting that someone had secretly been feeding him answers. NewsGuard compared the circulating clip with authentic LCI footage and found no earpiece in the original. The distinction is important. France is not facing a single Russian propaganda operation but several overlapping networks using similar techniques and narratives. Treating every manipulation as Storm-1516 would obscure how this ecosystem actually functions. The real weapon is media impersonation The most interesting feature of Storm-1516 is not artificial intelligence itself. It is the systematic appropriation of the credibility of established journalism. Instead of relying only on anonymous Telegram channels or social-media profiles, operators create material that looks as though it originated from organisations audiences already recognise. A fabricated investigation can resemble Blast, a manipulated television report can borrow LCI's visual identity, while fake journalists and social-media accounts provide additional layers of apparent confirmation. VIGINUM has documented this architecture extensively. Its 2025 investigation analysed 77 Storm-1516 information operations and described a mature Russian system using fabricated media, websites and distribution networks to promote anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. The European External Action Service found that the infrastructure continued to expand. According to its 2026 FIMI Threat Report, Storm-1516 almost doubled its output during 2025. Five networks created that year to target French, German, American, Moldovan and international audiences comprised 453 websites, including fictional news organisations and sites impersonating genuine media or political platforms. A typical operation therefore follows a recognisable pattern: a fabricated allegation is supported by synthetic or manipulated evidence, published through an apparently legitimate source and then distributed by networks of accounts that create the appearance of wider discussion. AI makes this process faster and cheaper, but the fundamental objective remains the same – to manufacture credibility. Why begin nine months before an election? VIGINUM concluded that Storm-1516 is capable both of reacting rapidly to current events and of conducting longer campaigns aimed at discrediting Western institutions and public figures, particularly around elections and other major political events. This provides important context for France. Storm-1516 activity around the presidential race became visible in July 2026, approximately nine months before voting begins. There is no public evidence of a predetermined Russian “nine-month plan”, and the timing should not be presented as such. Early activity nevertheless provides operational advantages: narratives can be tested, websites and accounts established, audience reactions measured and the responses of journalists, authorities and fact-checkers observed. The first operations may therefore also provide information about which themes and techniques are most effective before the campaign enters its decisive months. This remains an analytical interpretation rather than a demonstrated statement of the operators' intentions. Russian operation, but what about the GRU? Attribution requires similar precision. VIGINUM explicitly describes Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation, and French authorities have attributed individual campaigns to it with high confidence. Connections with Russian military intelligence have also been reported. Glucksmann said the SGDSN informed him that the network targeting him was controlled by Russia's GRU, while French media have repeatedly described Storm-1516 as linked to Russian military intelligence. However, VIGINUM's publicly available technical documentation describes Storm-1516 primarily as a Russian information modus operandi, rather than identifying it as a formally established GRU unit. It is therefore well supported to describe Storm-1516 as a Russian influence operation with reported links to military intelligence. Saying simply that Storm-1516 is a GRU unit would go beyond what France's published technical evidence currently establishes. An early warning for the French election There is also no evidence that the operations have so far had a significant effect on French voters. Some of the fabricated material generated only limited engagement, and measuring the real impact of foreign information operations remains extremely difficult. Even a video attracting hundreds of thousands of views does not establish how many viewers believed it or whether it changed political attitudes. The significance of Storm-1516 lies instead in the infrastructure already being deployed. Months before the election, Russian influence networks have been able to test fake newsrooms, synthetic voices, manipulated television footage, candidate-specific narratives and systems for distributing them. The French case illustrates a broader evolution in election interference. The objective is no longer simply to place false claims on social media. Modern operations can manufacture an entire chain of apparent evidence in which a fake journalist cites a fake investigation, synthetic audio appears to confirm it and networks of accounts give the impression that an authentic controversy is unfolding. France still has months to go before its presidential election. The information environment surrounding it is already being contested. Sources: VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 analysis https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/analyse-du-mode-operatoire-informationnel-russe-storm-1516 VIGINUM / SGDSN — Full Storm-1516 technical report https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/20250507_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Technical%20report_Storm-1516.pdf VIGINUM / SGDSN — Storm-1516 operation targeting Emmanuel Macron https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/publications/storm-1516-detection-dune-operation-dingerence-numerique-etrangere-ciblant-emmanuel EEAS — 4th Report on FIMI Threats https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web.pdf Le Monde — Russian interference targeting Philippe, Glucksmann and Attal https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/08/07/presidentielle-2027-glucksmann-attal-philippe-les-ingerences-russes-s-invitent-dans-la-campagne_6740451_823448.html Le Monde — Storm-1516 and Matryoshka analysis https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/08/06/ingerences-russes-pourquoi-il-ne-faut-pas-nourrir-le-troll_6739956_4408996.html NewsGuard Risk Briefing — Russian activity targeting the French election https://newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com/p/russia-targets-french-elections-iran Euronews — Operation targeting Raphaël Glucksmann https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/04/presidentielle-de-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-une-operation-de-destabilisation-russe Télérama / AFP — Glucksmann deepfake investigation https://www.telerama.fr/debats-reportages/presidentielle-2027-raphael-glucksmann-vise-par-un-deepfake-d-origine-russe-7032318.php Le Parisien — Operation targeting Gabriel Attal https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-2027-gabriel-attal-a-son-tour-vise-par-une-ingerence-en-provenance-de-russie-05-08-2026-I3Z67Z7ZUBDUVBXUNDARI5KGPA.php Euronews — Paris prosecutor investigations into suspected Russian interference https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/18/soupcons-dingerence-russe-visant-attal-et-philippe-le-parquet-de-paris-ouvre-dune-enquete Keywords: #DISINFORMED #Episode6 #Storm1516 #France #FrenchElection2027 #Disinformation #InformationWarfare #InfluenceOperations #ForeignInterference #FIMI #RussianInfluence #RussianDisinformation #Propaganda #Deepfakes #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SyntheticMedia #FakeNews #MediaImpersonation #FakeMedia #DigitalManipulation #ElectionInterference #PoliticalDisinformation #Matryoshka #VIGINUM #OSINT #CyberInfluence #DigitalInfluence #MediaManipulation #EuropeanSecurity #Democracy #WRLD

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